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This volume consists of nine papers that discuss issues on 
the interaction between knowledge, politics and education 
in democratic societies. These papers take up issues related 
to the aims of education, the organization of knowledge 
in a curriculum and the identity and role of teachers and 
pedagogy. Most of them invoke or rest on some debates in 
philosophy of education in the past few decades, that have 
come up in the criticism or defense of liberal education.
Individual autonomy is a primary aim of education and 
learners’ ability to think by themselves has to be developed 
in order for them to grow up to be free individuals. This 
aim has its roots in liberal education. Critics of liberal 
education, particularly progressive educationists, insist that 
if individual freedom is the objective then the very notion 
of schooling goes against this objective. They argue that the 
restrictive and regimented character of schools, in terms of 
curriculum and pedagogy, results in children learning to be 
obedient and subservient to others’ opinions. They argue 
that it is important to focus on the manner of teaching, 
where children make choices themselves, and gain the ability 
to question and criticize rather than be silent acceptors of 
knowledge from the school curriculum. Children should 
decide what they want to learn and when. This is a different 
conception of curriculum and learning, that has in turn been 
criticised. How do we expect a child to know enough to take 
decisions for herself? Doesn’t she have to learn in order to be 
able to be free? Critics of progressive education also point out 
that this view mistakes autonomy for freedom, and conflates 
two different concepts. Autonomy is a capability of human 
minds to think by themselves, whereas freedom means the 
absence of obstacles from the world outside (or internal to the 
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mind). So keeping children free from all obstacles in school 
or otherwise does nothing to develop their ability to be free. 
Children should enter the conversation between generations 
and this can happen only by them learning substantive 
human knowledge that has developed over centuries.
This leads to the second concern. Does the curriculum have 
to be organized on the basis of disciplines, or can we break 
out of the shackles of this knowledge by organizing it in a 
different manner? Critics of this disciplinary organization 
of curriculum argue that children are being taught strictly 
determined tools and methods attached to disciplines. 
That results in them thinking the same way that previous 
generations did. Disciplinary knowledge is insidious and it 
is the “means by which society perpetually re-creates the 
conditions of its very existence” by “a systematic socialisation 
of the young generation.” (Durkheim 1956: 123 -124). Is 
discilinary knowledge that dangerous? What purposes do 
disciplines serve towards the development of individual 
autonomy? 
An alternative way of organization people argue is theme-
based curricula. It is difficult if not impossible to organize 
curriculum in themes and cover everything children need 
to learn. That apart the premise that multidisciplinary 
subjects would do away with discipline based thinking is 
self-contradictory. To be multidisciplinary, themes need 
to be consciously built to include multiple disciplines, 
and children have to be taught how to deal with questions 
raised by different disciplines. This anyway presumes the 
acceptance of disciplines. How can we be multi disciplinary 
without learning individual disciplines? 
If the problem is despotism of learners’ minds, maybe 
curriculum organization is not the reason. Maybe it is 
pedagogical methods. If a discipline is taught in a way that 
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encourages children to learn what humans have achieved so 
far, understand it and critically reflect on it, then knowledge 
would not be accepted unquestioningly. This way of teaching 
would neutralize the possibilities of education becoming 
conditioning or indoctrination of children into various 
disciplines. Supporters of curriculum organized along 
disciplines, argue that learning diciplinary knowledge does 
not necessarily mean unquestioning acceptance of all that is 
said. That may be caused by bad pedagogy.
A third issue is that inordinate focus on formal curriculum 
and pedagogical methods alone leads us to imagine the school 
as an insulated environment that can and would lead to the 
formation of good, autonomous individuals. But schools 
and people in schools reside in particular social contexts, 
and prevalent social injustices percolate into the school 
environment, influencing practices and traditions in schools. 
For example, if so-called upper caste dominates so-called 
lower castes in society, this domination could translate into 
an insistence that children of the so-called lower caste accept 
popular knowledge unquestioningly. Politics and political 
stands influence the teacher’s view towards children, the way 
teaching as a profession is seen and the identity of a teacher 
is imagined. 
These three concerns, autonomy as an aim of education, 
organization of curriculum and the percolation of prevalent 
societal injustices into the school, raise further issues about 
knowledge, politics of knowledge, curriculum, teaching, 
learning and assesment that papers in this volume deal with.
The first section of this volume begins with O’Hear’s 
eloquently strident criticism of critics of liberal education. 
Most critics are concerned with individual freedom, and 
suggest alternatives that would safeguard and nurture 
freedom. “An education stressing or aiming at freedom 
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can, however, be seen in rather different and incompatible 
ways.”, O’Hear says. He analyzes a range of criticisms that 
invoke liberalism as “despotism of the mind” and either say 
liberalism controls individual freedom (A. S. Neill, John Holt), 
or corrupts children’s natural selves (Rousseau), or provides 
useless knowledge (Bacon) or rejects knowledge from the past 
in its entirety (Dewey). O’Hear points out subtle but serious 
mistakes that could be made in conceptualising education 
that safeguards individual autonomy and egalitarianism in 
a plural democratic society. He says freedom of individuals 
and social groups have to be conceptualised differently when 
we think of education.
Dhankar raises some critical issues with public political 
discourse that amount to injustice of a specific kind: distrust 
and lack of confidence in people’s ability to deliberate 
rationally. He demonstrates how, with the intention of 
maintaining harmony and peace, public intellectuals and 
politicans often deliberately confuse concepts, blur truth 
and even communicate information they know to be 
untrue. He argues that this does not fulfill the moral notion 
of truth, which he says, “...is not about the correctness 
of the statement one makes, rather it is about the ‘correct 
communication’ of what one happens to believe.” He argues 
that being epistemically careless, disregarding standards of 
justification, or wilful “epistemic obfuscation” is a distrust in 
people’s rational autonomy.  Both in public political discourse 
and in education, he says we need to trust people’s ability for 
rational deliberation, and be wary of two enemies of truth: 
political correctness and bullshit (defined by Frankfurt as 
communication of a standpoint, rather than only truth). 
Rata’s paper takes up the general concern that standard 
forms of knowledge that curriculum is based on in 
democratic societies is an attempt to homogenise the 
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powerless by the powerful. She argues that there is no 
reason to view disciplinary knowledge as “knowledge of 
the powerful”; rather the already marginalized would be 
further excluded from the mainstream if they did not have 
access to disciplinary knowledge. She says the ability for 
abstraction, which is an essential part of learning academic 
disciplines, helps learners take a step back from their 
context and reflect on it. This creates a dialectical approach 
to prevalent knowledge and the need to fight possible 
“tyranny of the present” (Bailey, 1984) possible. She 
elaborates on the implications of a dialectical approach 
on pedagogy.
Stojanov builds a critical account of egalitarianism as a 
response to social injustice. By definition egalitarianism 
would be in opposition to discrimination of any kind, 
but over time societies have developed some forms of 
positive discrimination that are necessary to help the 
underprivileged or the disadvantaged. Stojanov critiques 
different conceptions of egalitarianism that societies have 
taken up over time, like luck egalitarianism (to compensate 
“brute, bad luck” that disadvantaged people grow up in) and 
minimal egalitarianism (some minimum capabilities have to 
be developed in everyone). Stojanov argues that both these 
notions fail to lead to social justice and cannot be normative 
principles, especially for education. He argues that respect 
egalitarianism (equal  treatment coming from a sense of 
respect for all) is reliable and would ensure social justice.
Section II comprises two papers specific to the Indian context. 
Heredia makes an intriguing and compelling beginning by 
pointing out to the inherent tension between an “envisioned 
future” and an “idealized past” when we imagine a national 
education. He then foregrounds social justice as the main 
concern in Indian education, and highlights how some 
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acts towards justice could lead to injustice elsewhere. He 
then applies this idea of social justice to education, and 
describes various forms of preoccupations with pedagogical 
principles. The quest for the perfect principle interferes with 
the knowledge that pedagogy is a creative act and it cannot 
work merely with the help of pedagogical principles. He 
then projects possible ways in which this analysis could help 
resolve particular practical problems that are rife in India.  
Madan responds to a particularly complicated notion 
of how the way the intersection of class, caste and gender 
are interpreted, could lead to an obfuscated or misleading 
response to injustice. He analyzes data from the National 
Sample Survey (2009-10) to bring to our attention how 
certain classes dominate enrolments in higher education 
across different caste groups. But the proportion of women 
in varies within across different castes, within the same class. 
Such a pattern where injustice becomes more complex when 
different disadvantaged groups intersect, it is important to 
think of a theoretical explanation for this so that one can 
take up appropriate responses to resolve the injustice. 
Section III takes up specific issues related to teachers and 
teaching. McLaughlin observes and analyzes empirical data 
to understand teaching as a profession. Using criteria to 
identify a practice as a profession, she dissects the notion of 
school-teacher community and describes the various forms 
this community takes. She then analyzes some important 
features of the environments teachers reside in to arrive at 
her answer of the normative question: what ought a good 
teacher-student environment be like? She arrives at the idea 
that teachers should belong to “communities of practice” 
where they are able to constantly learn and keep improving 
themselves. She describes various methods and benefits of 
each form of the community and argues that learning ought 
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to be central to teaching as a profession. From this analysis 
she points out various benefits of construing teaching as a 
learning profession.
Gopichandran argues that neo-liberalism has resulted in 
significant changes in the way teacher’s work is envisioned; 
a movement from professionalism and bureaucracy to 
market, managerialism and performativity. This leads to a 
control and command approach to teachers, rather than an 
approach that encourages commitment. She analyzes the 
idea of teacher professionalism in three parts: professional 
knowledge of teachers, professionalisation of teachers and 
teacher professionalism. From a detailed analysis she arrives 
at the conclusion that there is a strong imposition on the 
teacher to form certain kinds of personal and social identities 
that are not robust or natural. Their work in developing 
this identity is largely emotional and teachers expend 
considerable energy in “forming, shaping, constructing and 
re constructing notions about themselves as teachers” in 
constantly changing contexts and expectations from society.
Siddiqui argues along with Dewey and Ambedkar that 
different social groups and communities have a lot to learn 
from each other, rather he says that learning from others is 
a necessary part of education. Pace Thorat he argues that 
educating students in a way that they learn from each other 
is an educationists’ endeavor. This in turn would involve 
bringing them into situations where they have to recognize 
their own prejudices, and confront them in a way that 
they eventually act differently. To this end, Siddiqui says, 
an epistemological or rational view of a person limits this 
process to being only cognitive. Borrowing from feminist 
theory, he says that there is an “ontological centrality to 
the relation of the self and the world”. He relates this to 
Ambedkar’s strong recommendation that principles and 
rules merely tell us what we ought to do (and not do), whereas 
the need is to develop like-mindedness for which we have to 
get people to be in constant communication with each other 
and participate in each other’s activities. He concludes that 
education needs to work on the triad of caring relationships, 
ethical action and knowledge of democratic principles, and 
an unequal attention between the three would “skew the 
educational process”.
This volume takes up three categories of papers from the 
conferences in PoE over 5 years. Hopefully this volume will 
retain the momentum the conference events created, and 
contribute to the educational discourse. 
Video recordings of these presentations are available in our 
YouTube channel, Azim Premji University.
Section I
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Liberal Education, Human Nature  
and the State
Anthony O’Hear
Retired as Professor in the Department of  
Philosophy in University of Buckingham.
Education for Freedom: the Child
Liberal education, as I am understanding it, is an education 
for freedom. ‘Liberal’ in the phrase ‘liberal education’ derives 
from the Latin ‘liber’ = free (rather than ‘liber’ = child, which 
would be tautologous, or ‘liber’ = book, which will certainly 
be involved in any course of liberal education, but only as a 
part of the whole thing). An education stressing or aiming 
at freedom can, however, be seen in rather different and 
incompatible ways. At one extreme, at what we might call the 
progressive end, there would be the typical ‘free’ school, of 
which A.S. Neill’s Summerhill would be a famous example, 
or in the USA the type of thing advocated by John Holt in 
his book How Children Fail. (Holt, 1964) Summerhill was, 
and to an extent still is, a school in which children do not 
attend lessons if they do not feel like it; they study the things 
they want as and when they themselves feel ready for it; and, 
with teachers and other members of the school community, 
they collectively decide on the rules to be imposed in the 
school. In Neill’s own words (on the School’s website), at 
Summerhill ‘we had to renounce all discipline, all direction, 
all suggestion, all moral training, all religious instruction. 
We have been called brave, but it did not require courage. All 
it required was what we had – a complete belief in the child 
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as a good, not an evil, being.’ Notably absent from this type 
of free school will be any form of external discipline, either 
in the conduct of lessons and the structuring of curricula, 
or, more generally, in the ethos or conduct of the school as 
an institution. The underlying thought here is that there is 
something de-humanising in imposing external curricula 
and controls even on young children. According to Holt, 
‘nobody starts off stupid’, yet schools are no more than 
places in which pupils are coerced according to external 
social goals, with the result that in them ‘children learn to be 
stupid’. (Holt, 1964, p. 196) 
By contrast in the type of liberal education I am interested in 
here discipline and externally imposed curricula will play a 
major role. There is an understanding that children – pupils 
– are not when young fully human, and only become human 
in the full sense by being initiated into various practices and 
forms of knowledge and experience in which one’s humanity 
achieves its full embodiment and articulation. I have put this 
bluntly and starkly, because I think it needs stating clearly 
and emphatically, in these post-Rousseauan and possibly 
post-Freudian days when childhood is seen, sentimentally, 
as a paradise from which we adults have been excluded 
by the forces of civilization. Plato, of course, took a rather 
different view. Paradise was that from which we descended 
before we were born, and childhood is actually the start of 
our descent into the Cave. Human existence thereafter is 
an uphill struggle to rise above our humanity, in which we 
attempt to control the two horses we set bestride, one that 
would fly up and one that would drag us down, a metaphor 
which might seem to be a more accurate representation of 
our life in general and of childhood in particular than seeing 
childhood simply as a time of innocence.
Actually claiming that the child is not fully human is not as 
extreme as it might at first sight seem. It is simply recognizing 
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the fact of what biologists call neoteny, that when we are 
born we are very immature and unformed, in comparison 
to most other species, and remain immature for a long time. 
When we are young, our instincts on their own will not take 
us very far. The great distinction between humans and other 
animals is the way in which, in all cultures, human beings 
pass on to their young by education and training, formal and 
informal, immense tracts of what they need to know and do 
in order to survive and flourish in both natural and social 
worlds. During the Enlightenment many thinkers – and not 
just Rousseau – were fascinated by the prospect of l’enfant 
sauvage, the child who had not had a human upbringing, 
and who was raised in nature, among the beasts. As is well 
known from the film of Francois Truffaut, when such a 
child was actually found in the Auvergne (the wild boy of 
Aveyron), sadly, tragically, even despite all the efforts of the 
well-meaning doctor who fostered him, he never succeeded 
in becoming (dare I say?) fully human, and actually ended up 
as an exhibit in Paris. But, whether or not, acculturation is 
possible for children or young people after a certain age, what 
l’enfant sauvage graphically illustrates is the significance and 
extent of learning and acculturation in human life.
Marx was wrong when he famously spoke of humans having 
no nature, but only history, because part of our nature is 
precisely to live our lives in the polis where we will flourish 
in and through what we learn and are taught – and this 
(Aristotelian) view is quite compatible with thinking that 
there are eternal truths about what does and does not 
contribute to human flourishing. But because flourishing 
involves acculturation, in a human society, with its traditions 
and history, education, formal and informal, becomes 
critical. 
The proponent of liberal education takes a view of childhood 
which has its roots in the thought of the classical Greek 
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philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Pace Holt, who thinks 
that ‘children are by nature not only kind and loving 
but serious and purposeful’, (Holt, 1964, p. 196) for the 
philosophers of classical antiquity the child is unhabituated 
in desirable traits either of character or of intellect, and so 
is in no position to exercise the type of freedom accorded 
to children in A.S.Neill’s school or advocated by Holt. It is 
not that children are evil or malignant (though some might 
have evil and malignant tendencies and original sin weighs 
on us all), so much as that they are unformed. And this lack 
of formation goes all through, intellectual, physical, moral 
and in terms of character. So, famously, the ancient Greeks 
emphasized the need in education for gymnastic (the training 
of the body), music (the training of sensibility through music 
and the other arts), while Aristotle stressed the way in which 
a virtuous character can emerge only from an habituation in 
virtuous acts, which will, if things go well, lead to a love of 
virtue itself. 
As far as the intellect goes, what the young need above all 
is initiation into disciplines and traditions in which reason 
is exercised. None of these things is instinctive; hence the 
need for discipline and training. I will leave it to those who 
have had experience of young children to judge between the 
Greeks and the likes of Holt and Neill. Here I will restrict 
myself to the comment that even if Holt is right in thinking 
that schools actually produce the sort of malice and stupidity 
we see in pupils in many secondary schools these days, what 
this would show is that the good qualities he discerns in very 
young children are not strongly embedded, and need careful 
nurturing, just as the Greeks thought and Christians think. 
A similar point could be made about Rousseau, who also puts 
the blame for our evil inclinations on the social world, and to 
whom many of our current sentimental notions of childhood 
can be traced, but who in Emile requires an astonishingly 
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artificial set up in order that Emile’s natural goodness should 
develop naturally. (It is perhaps worth underlining here 
that Rousseau’s idea of childhood, as being a stage in which 
children should develop naturally and in interaction between 
the natural world and their childhood inclinations, is the 
source not only of much current thinking about primary 
and early years education, but also of a powerful strand of 
opposition to the type of education I am here advocating.)
True Enlargement of Mind
From the perspective of the liberal educator (as represented 
by, say, Cardinal Newman and Matthew Arnold in the 
nineteenth century), in an education which truly frees the 
mind, a, if not the, key element will be initiation into the 
best that has been thought and known (or said) (Arnold, 
1882); as a result of such an initiation we will develop that 
‘true enlargement of mind which is the power of viewing 
many things at once as one whole, of understanding their 
respective values, and determining their mutual dependence’, 
as Newman has it (Newman, 1858). Here teaching and 
discipline are essential because the ‘best’ in whatever field 
is not going to be picked up randomly. Much of it will be 
hard and different from anything the pupil will be familiar 
with or will pick up in his or her ordinary life. It will require 
a grounding of knowledge and vocabulary and reference 
beyond what the pupil will meet in everyday life.
The subject matter of liberal education will include science 
and mathematics, treated in a serious way, as inquiries for 
their own sakes, examining the fundamental nature of reality 
from both a physical and from an abstract mathematical point 
of view. This enterprise will remind us of both of Aristotle’s 
view that part of wisdom is the pure desire to know the 
causes of things and also of the Pythagorean-Platonic sense 
of number as a realm of its own, adamantine in its certainty 
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and proof, arguably penetrating to the essence of the world. 
But over and above science and maths, liberal education will 
involve an encounter with our cultural roots. Like Odysseus 
in Book XI of The Odyssey, we will, in a sense, enter Hades to 
converse with the dead and to discover who we and they are. 
Like Odysseus, each one of us has to ‘sail after knowledge’, or 
else we will be in a state ‘knowing less than drugged beasts’, 
in thrall to the clamour, mindlessness and superficiality of 
the present when we have nothing with which to compare or 
judge it. 
Liberal education, then, involves an orderly and disciplined 
initiation into the best that has been thought and known in 
various dimensions, as well as an education in sensibility 
and in habits of virtue. In this process the learner will be 
introduced to various traditions and canons of thought, 
sensibility and behaviour (the best that has been thought and 
known) as streams of experience and conversations through 
the ages, which of necessity have a longevity and an authority 
far more extensive and commanding than anything which 
could be produced by any groups or individuals making 
things anew to-day. In that sense we will, all of us, be dwarves 
sitting on the shoulders of giants, as John of Salisbury put it 
in the twelfth century. Of course we know more than those 
earlier in the conversation, as T.S.Eliot observed, and a key 
part of what we know is precisely those who have gone before 
us, and their achievements. The thought, though, is that this 
initiation, disciplined as it is, is actually the precondition of 
true intellectual and moral freedom. Without this grounding 
there will always be an element of the barbarian at a loss in 
a temple whose meaning he does not understand, or of the 
untrained would-be artist cut off from subtlety and depth of 
expression by his incompetence in the medium. 
Much modern education is predicated on just such models. 
For example, ‘creativity’ without training is valued, pupils 
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are expected to express a reaction to poems whose context 
is deliberately hidden from them, and they are envisaged as 
working out for themselves a type of social contract for their 
school just in the way Rousseau envisaged the noble savage 
moving the state of nature into a state of social organization. 
All this underlines the difference between the conception 
of freedom at work in liberal education and that envisaged 
in the progressive free school. To put it broadly and bluntly, 
the liberal educator sees freedom in terms of the ability of 
the learner to participate in and add to the conversations 
of mankind, in Michael Oakeshott’s phrase, whereas the 
freedom envisaged by the progressive is that championed 
by Francis Bacon right at the start of the modern era in the 
early seventeenth century, the freedom of the man who dives 
into the River Lethe, erasing from his soul the memory of all 
knowledge, all art, all poetry, to re-emerge on the opposite 
shore, naked and glorious like the first man.
It might seem a cheap shot to point out that in expressing 
his vision so beautifully Bacon is relying on classical and 
biblical imagery, but it would not be a cheap shot to point 
out that Bacon was the advocate of a new science, based 
solely on observation and experiment, which was supposed 
to look at the world anew and without preconception or 
influence from past authorities. For Bacon was a polemicist 
who referred to the knowledge of the middle ages and of the 
renaissance as consisting of idols, and who excoriated the 
intellectual influence of Aristotle. Bacon’s own contributions 
to the actual new science of his day were less than nugatory, 
and he misunderstood the mathematical and theoretical 
nature of the new science he was supposedly advocating, 
which was actually very far from addressing nature without 
preconceptions. Nevertheless none of this has prevented the 
Baconian ideal of science, and his re-writing of its history 
(in effect wiping out the contribution of the medieval to 
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empirical knowledge) from exercising a dominance in the 
popular (and even not so popular) mind ever since. 
Nor should we overlook the way in which the Baconian 
conception of science is a thoroughly utilitarian one, in 
contrast to the view of Aristotle, in which knowledge of 
causes is a species of wisdom, good in and for itself, an aspect 
of mental and moral liberation. For Bacon the true and only 
point of science is to improve man’s estate, and the liberation 
is one afforded (if at all) by technique and technology. 
It is not, then, surprising that Bacon should have been an 
opponent of liberal education, to the extent that he opposed 
the foundation of Charterhouse because its curriculum was 
to be based on the Greek and Roman classics. As things have 
turned out, Bacon can be seen to be one of the first of many 
who have opposed liberal education on grounds of economic 
and scientific utility, including John Locke, Newman’s bête 
noire in this respect. We stand here at the point of one of 
the big divides in educational thought, that between the 
followers of Aristotle and Cicero, the liberal educators, who 
see a virtue in knowledge for its own sake and the rational 
life as an end in itself, and the utilitarians, Bacon, Locke and 
their followers, who see education and indeed knowledge 
itself primarily as means to ulterior practical ends, with 
reason the slave of the passions, rather than their master. (To 
avoid confusion, I should underline here that the greatest of 
the so-called utilitarian philosophers, John Stuart Mill, was 
actually a doughty defender of the ideals of liberal education 
; but then the happiness he defended in Utilitarianism was 
the philosophic happiness, or perhaps unhappiness, of a 
Socrates, as opposed to the cruder pleasures envisaged in the 
philosophies of his father and Jeremy Bentham.) 
A further element is added to the utilitarianism of Bacon 
and Locke by John Dewey. According to Dewey’s pragmatist 
philosophy the key notions for any human activity are 
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problem solving and growth. Dewey had an in-built hostility 
to the past, because, in his denial that there were any eternal 
or permanent verities, the legacy of the past was that of 
yesterday’s solutions to yesterday’s problems. Explicitly 
linking his thought to Darwin’s theory of evolution – the 
‘greatest dissolvent in contemporary thought of old questions’ 
(Dewey, 1951 edition) - Dewey wanted everything, including 
philosophy and education to address ‘the intelligent 
administration of existent conditions’, without being tied 
to what he saw as the absolutism and authoritarianism of 
the idea that the essences of things could be or had been 
discovered. Moreover, in contrast to the Aristotelian notion 
that different modes of enquiry were appropriate for different 
areas of life, Dewey insisted that the methods of the physical 
sciences, of observation and, above all, experiment, were 
suitable for all our endeavours. In the continuous flow of 
life in which we are all swimming, we must always be ready 
for new problems and ready – through our education – to 
experiment with new solutions.
For all Dewey’s occasional nod towards great minds of the 
past, there is in his educational thinking and, even more, in 
that of his followers, a relentless focus on the modern and the 
demands (or what they take to be the demands) of the present, 
which cannot but be suspicious of any Arnoldian lingering 
over the best that has been thought and known. For Dewey, 
not only should education be directed at practical ends - to-
day’s practical ends and to-day’s problems - approached in a 
technologico-scientific spirit, but it will be collectivized. As 
is clear from his Chicago school experiments of the 1890s, 
Dewey saw education in highly politicized terms, in which 
the community as a whole will participate in solving its 
problems. The school would be part of the local democratic 
community, and its activities would focus on projects which 
grew out of the concerns and interests of the people in the 
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locality. At the same time the classroom itself would be run 
as a democracy in miniature, with the teacher no ‘external 
boss or dictator’, but a moderator or co-ordinator of the 
activities of the group (facilitator in to-day’s jargon); to this 
fundamentally democratic enterprise all pupils would be 
encouraged to contribute their own individual slants on 
whatever topic was being investigated. And to hammer home 
his message that education was to be a socialized activity, 
as early as 1889 Dewey said this: ‘What the best and wisest 
parent wants for his own child, that must the community 
want for all its children.’ (Dewey, 1956 edition)
A Transcendent Dimension 
But over and above all this, there is yet another aspect to liberal 
education which would make its promotion problematic 
for the modern state. As will be evident from a glance at 
its history, (O’Hear and Sidwell, 2009) there are among its 
devotees and forbears, both Christian and pre-Christian, a 
striking number of thinkers who are explicitly committed to 
a belief in the supernatural destiny of mankind, from Plato, 
Aristotle and Cicero through to Ruskin, Newman, Tawney, 
T.S.Eliot, C.S.Lewis and Dorothy L Sayers in more modern 
times. From the point of view of these thinkers, the formation 
involved in a programme of liberal education is part of the 
way we would respond to our nature as having a destiny not 
confined to this world.
At the very least, liberal education leaves open the possibility 
that human beings have a calling which is open, and not 
confined to any ulterior ends, economic, political, social or, as 
Newman stressed, even moral. Our intellectual and aesthetic 
sensibilities are treated as ends in themselves, worthwhile in 
themselves. A full analysis of these faculties may well see 
them as having a transcendent aspect, not just worthwhile 
in themselves, which they are, but as crucial aspects of our 
27Liberal Education, human nature and the State
spiritual nature. Aristotle and Newman would have analysed 
our intellectual faculties in these terms. In Newman’s case, 
as we see from The Idea of a University, 1873, Discourse V, 
what liberal education aims at is that ‘illuminative reason 
and true philosophy’ which is ‘the power of viewing many 
things at once as one whole, of referring them severally to 
their true place in the universal system, of understanding 
their respective values, and determining their mutual 
dependence.’ (Newman, 1858) But if this power is not to be a 
mere intellectual fastidiousness, which is often found among 
the highly educated and can be little more than a form of 
snobbery, it will need a context against which to make 
these judgements. Secular reason has proved incapable of 
overcoming the fissiparous nature of intellectual disciplines, 
and the ‘unity of the sciences’, much trumpeted in the 
1920s and 1930s, remains as elusive as ever it was, as in the 
modern university does any uncontentious way of relating 
the sciences to other aspects of human nature. Newman’s 
conclusion is that universalizing and synthesising aspirations 
of intellectual endeavour which he is seeking makes sense 
only against the background of a unifying and legitimating 
divinely upheld order. (MacIntyre, 2009)
Plato and Ruskin, and a host of neo-Platonists saw beauty 
and our perception of it as a bridge to the divine. Clearly 
a significant element of liberal education will be what the 
Greeks called music, things to do with the muses, perhaps, so 
not just music in the strict sense, but also literature and the 
other arts and humanities. One could argue, as did Simone 
Weil, that all art of the first order is essentially religious, 
and not just because of the obvious, but often overlooked 
fact, that so much of the greatest art is an articulation of 
religious feelings. But even in art which is not on the surface 
religious, both creators and listeners sense that in much of it 
there is a reaching out to something beyond us, or perhaps 
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more accurately, a reaching down of the divine to us, that in 
great art there is often a sense, hard to express but definitely 
there, that in it the veil which separates life on earth from its 
ultimate source is for a time drawn aside. 
Whether either of those aspects of the mind and feelings 
with which liberal education deals are actually rooted in the 
spiritual or not – and there are plenty of people who would 
see themselves as defenders of liberal education who would 
stringently deny any such thing – still in liberal education 
we are treating of things of intrinsic value and independent 
from all other concerns; by virtue of these facts the devotees 
of liberal education, whether teachers or students, are going 
to put the more quantifiable and basic concerns of the 
community to one side, at least for a time. 
The Interests of the State 
There is no need here to go into great detail as to the ways 
in which ends such as the ones just mentioned have become 
prominent in state run systems of education. Nor is this a 
new phenomenon. As long ago as 1796, Benjamin Rush, one 
of the signatories of the American Constitution, said this: 
‘Each youth does not belong to himself, but is public property 
and a warrior in the cause of liberty.’ (Knight and Hall, 1951, 
p. 306) Paradoxical as it may be to think of someone being 
public property in the cause of liberty, in the century following 
Rush’s statement public education, as far as it existed, was 
designed not only to prepare populations for work, whether 
manual or mental (in most industrialized countries), but also 
to promote such causes as Evangelical Christianity against 
Catholicism (USA), nation building in general (Prussia and 
Germany), the values of the secular state (France) and the 
production of a cadre of young people fit and apt for military 
service and running an over-extended empire (Britain in the 
late 19th century, under the Conservatives, and opposed by 
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the churches for what they saw as glorification of war), to 
take but four typical examples. In the twentieth century, in 
addition to some or all of these there has been a stress in 
many places on education as an agent of social mobility, and 
latterly of equality.
In each case the policy in question would be defended by 
claiming that education is a social concern. As such it 
should reflect social needs and values, and moreover as a 
state education will necessarily be paid for out of the public 
purse, the state has a very direct interest in what it does and 
what it is for. (The fact that the public purse is involved here 
only because the state has taken money from individual 
parents who would otherwise have been able to educate their 
children themselves is generally overlooked at this point 
in the argument.) Further, as societies have become more 
democratic, and democracy itself more populist, there is also 
a move to make education more egalitarian, shunning elitism 
(as it would be called) and those elements of the curriculum 
which cannot be shared by all, a theme characteristically 
prominent in the writings of Dewey and his followers, for 
whom what is now known as inclusiveness or inclusion is to 
be the very touchstone of a healthily democratic system of 
education.
‘A Despotism Over the Mind’
The liberal educator need not deny that education is in 
some sense a social concern, nor that society as a whole has 
an interest and even a paternalistic duty in seeing that its 
members are educated. Both Newman and Arnold, in their 
different ways, saw an educated population as a good in 
itself, something that would leaven and civilize the society 
it made up, and so did Mill. But as Mill saw with compelling 
clarity, saying that is one thing; saying (as is almost taken 
as axiomatic these days) that therefore the state should 
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take charge of education is quite another. In Chapter V of 
On Liberty, Mill warned that ‘a general state education is 
a mere contrivance for moulding people to be exactly like 
one another’, and that ‘in proportion as it is efficient and 
successful, it establishes a despotism over the mind, leading 
to one over the body’ (Mill, ed. By Warnock, 1960, p. 239-
240). One may, of course, have doubts about the efficiency 
of the enterprise, but looking at the materials of the English 
National Curriculum as it was under New Labour, there 
can be no doubt about an intention of just the kind Mill 
feared: an overwhelming and overweening drive within it to 
produce a certain set of attitudes on topics such as multi-
culturalism, environmentalism, citizenship, social justice, 
and even the European Union (amazingly, according to the 
Single European Act of 1986 we in Britain are now bound by 
law to bring out the (pro) European dimension of every topic 
in the curriculum).
We have so far been treating the question of the influence 
of the state and its bureaucracies as if they were in a sense 
neutral phenomena, simply administering policies laid 
down by rulers and politicians in a disinterested way. In 
practice, though, we know both from experience and from 
the findings of public choice theory that bureaucracies are 
never disinterested players. They always have their own 
interests to pursue, their own empires to build up, their 
own influence and power to expand. While this need not be 
sinister in itself, no bureaucracy is likely to favour an activity 
whose aims and rationale are essentially in tension with a 
managerial, bureaucratic approach and also essentially to 
place its adherents at one or more mental removes from the 
state. The aims of liberal education certainly are, in that they 
involve values which are unquantifiable, and which will seem 
to the managerial mind to be unaccountable, and aims which 
may well be critical of the forms of economic utility and 
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social levelling beloved of the politician and the bureaucrat. 
No one in to-day’s world should be surprised to learn what 
underpinned the English National Curriculum under the 
government of 1997-2010. In its statement of the values we 
were told that education is ‘a route to equality of opportunity 
for all, a healthy and just democracy, a productive economy 
and sustainable development… valuing diversity in our 
society and the environment in which we live’. Given that 
any genuine equality of opportunity will necessarily involve 
a continuous discounting of unequal outcomes at any stage 
(a direction the British government is already moving in 
with regard to university admissions, where pupils from 
poorly achieving schools are to have their grades artificially 
enhanced), and given that the politics of diversity amount in 
practice to a refusal to admit differences of quality between, 
say, the art of the ghetto and that of Bach and Rembrandt, as 
well as a repudiation of the idea of culture as one inclusive 
conversation, these are anything but neutral requirements.
Though the liberal educator may hope from his work for a 
social leavening and other desirable social ends (though not, 
one hopes, the delusory and ultimately totalitarian ‘equality 
of opportunity’), it is a leavening which will occur, if at all, 
through the care and nurture of the soul of the individual 
(Plato) and by the cultivation of the best that has been 
thought and known, and of those who are the best. This 
aristocracy of talent need not and should not imply a regime 
of social barriers; but the alternative is the situation dreaded 
by both Plato and Matthew Arnold in which those with most 
talent track down to the level of the lowest tastes, keeping 
those from educationally under-privileged backgrounds 
firmly in their place by flattering them into believing that 
there is nothing better to aspire to than their own uneducated 
tastes (rather how the mass media work in to-day’s world, 
in fact). 
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Nor should we forget that the modern world and the politics 
of the modern state above all are aspects of what Plato called 
the great beast (Plato, Republic). The great beast is the public 
world which can be pulled in any direction by the force 
of public opinion, without regard to truth or justice. In a 
populist democracy public opinion is easily manipulated 
by propaganda and the mass media. Political leaders are 
demagogues, and they in turn are in thrall to all sorts of 
other interests and powers. Political parties exist, but as mass 
movements, concerned only with growing and furthering 
their own power. All this is highly corrosive of the type of 
serene individualism the liberal educator endeavours to 
foster, and so we should not be surprised if the modern state 
hardly wants to cherish institutions of liberal education.
An Unregulated System: Parental Choice
This is not the place to discuss the mechanics of an unregulated 
system in any detail, though some form of voucher system 
has occasionally received support from the political left as 
well as from the political right. Parents would receive in the 
form of vouchers what they paid in taxes for the education 
of their children with various top-ups in the case of poor 
parents and handicapped children. Such a system could be 
a godsend to the poor – for it is poor parents in poor areas 
who are most trapped in the monolithic and unresponsive 
state system, in which they have no option but to send their 
children to the poorly performing and undisciplined state 
schools which constitute their community schools. In the 
few places where vouchers have been tried in the USA, they 
have been popular with inner city parents, though rather less 
popular with the middle classes outside the inner cities who 
are not given vouchers and who do not have access to the sort 
of choice afforded by vouchers, who see their taxes going to 
fund to others advantages they themselves do not have. 
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In a system of education not run or controlled by the state, 
even if supported by state taxes in the form of vouchers, 
should the state have a regulatory role? Here, along with 
its artificial restriction to areas of high deprivation, is the 
Achilles heel of the voucher system, for the state will find 
it very hard not to place restrictions on the use to which 
vouchers can be put. Many who could see some virtue in 
a voucher based system would fear the consequences of 
an unregulated system. Schools they did not like may well 
appear within it. It is tempting to think that some form of 
central regulation could guard against the worst excesses, 
and so the freedom state gives in doling out vouchers, it then 
takes away through regulation. 
Whether it would be possible within a voucher system 
for the state to manage to confine its role in the way just 
suggested is, of course, an empirical matter. Economists 
and public choice theorists who are highly sensitive to the 
self-aggrandising tendencies of state bureaucracies point out 
that vouchers are just too much of a Trojan horse, because 
they require both that the state takes the money away from 
tax payers in the first place, and then hands it out again (as 
well as deciding on the amount). Both the collection and the 
distribution of the money will be costly, quite apart from any 
less neutral accompanying intervention. Maybe tax-credits, 
where people are simply allowed to set school fees against 
tax, would be a more efficient and more genuinely liberal 
way. Or maybe, most radical of all, education should simply 
be left entirely to the private decisions of private individuals. 
In such a world, no doubt charities would provide education 
for the very poor, but also, as the work of James Tooley in 
India, Africa and China has demonstrated – small schools 
would spring up even in the poorest areas from the private 
initiative of groups of parents and educational entrepreneurs 
(who, in those third world settings, often provide a better 
level of education than the competing state schools). 
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In advocating in whatever form the de-regulation of 
education, the defender of liberal education will have to take 
on board the fact that there will undoubtedly be schools he or 
she disapproves of. Here his position will be liberal in a wider 
sense. We can all think of examples of schools which might 
crop up in a de-regulated system, schools for Scientologists 
or creationists or Islamists and the rest, which doubtless 
some will object to strongly. On this general point, I will just 
say two things. 
First, freedom in whatever sphere will always involve 
outcomes some disapprove of, but this does not mean that 
those making those choices do not have the right to make 
them. This is what freedom means, and in the case of schooling 
there is the further point that (many) parents are tax-payers, 
from whom the state actually takes the money in order to 
impose on them and their children the model of schooling it 
and its bureaucracies prefer. Against this I would urge that, 
on balance, parents will know more about the educational 
needs of their children than bureaucrats, motivated by 
bureaucratic imperatives with little regard for the individual 
child. Of course, some parents will make choices other find 
unfortunate (the price of freedom), but apart from the point 
of principle at stake we in the Western world are not in a 
situation in which bureaucratic management of schools is a 
roaring success. To put it bluntly large numbers of children 
are failed by this system in the most callous way. There is 
no reason to suppose that more children would be failed 
were their parents to have some genuine control over their 
education, however bizarre some of their choices might look 
to others. 
But then, secondly, let us suppose that we have a traditionalist 
Muslim school, for example. In a context of parental choice 
it would be supported by the parents who sent their children 
there, otherwise it would not exist, which would be important 
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educationally and in other ways, and a big advantage over 
the present situation in which many parents are unhappy 
with the schools the state forcers their children to go to; but 
over and above that, the Muslim school would have to be 
a pretty dreadful place to be worse that many of the state 
schools which so signally fail so many children as it is. Of 
course it would teach things some people did not like, but 
again many state schools do just that, and from them there is 
currently no exit for the vast majority. As far as the teaching 
of what is disliked goes, there would, of course, be the normal 
application of the law to prevent incitements to violence, 
suppression of the rights of girls and women, vilification of 
minorities and the rest. So long as a school remained within 
the law, it is hard to see by what right even the best meaning 
of authorities could forbid the teaching of specific doctrines 
or world views; but equally the vast majority of parents do 
want their children to enter mainstream society, whatever 
their own particular beliefs, and so there would be pressure 
there for an education which was no so bizarre as to make 
that impossible. And even where that was not the case – as 
with the Amish in parts of the USA – other things being 
equal, tolerance by society as a whole would seem more fair, 
more constructive and more in a genuinely liberal spirit 
than attempts to suppress minorities by force (which is what 
external intervention would amount to).
In sum, then, supporters of liberal education ought to favour 
a system of genuine parental choice stimulating genuine 
diversity of provision, with the state playing as small a role in 
educations as is consistent with it ensuring that all children 
are educated and that in their education the law is upheld in 
a general sense and that children are not subject to obvious 
physical or moral danger in schools. Not only does liberal 
education view education as in principle autonomous, but for 
the practical reasons just considered it is most likely to thrive 
where education is not run by the state.
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Given, though, that education in most Western democracies 
is run predominantly by the state, and in many cases 
increasingly intrusively, and that we do not have a voucher 
system or anything permitting genuine parental choice 
for the vast majority of parents (who cannot afford private 
schooling), the best hope for liberal education would seem 
to, lie in whatever private sector of education is allowed to 
exist. Meanwhile, as things stand, the best plan for liberal 
educators who want to do more than simply teach in whatever 
setting they can would be to campaign for greater levels of 
autonomy within their national systems of education.
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Indian society currently seems to be struggling hard to 
preserve meaning in its old slogan “unity in diversity”. The 
slogan recognises the range of diversity in Indian people 
that is beyond imagination for many other societies; and 
simultaneously claims unity at a level deeper than this 
diversity. The number of languages (22 constitutionally 
recognised and 2701 languages spoken as mother tongue) is 
only the tip of proverbial iceberg of diversity underneath the 
Indian unity. Add to that the diversity in cultural customs, 
attires, food habits and religious beliefs and one has a very 
complex tapestry of a society, where even communication 
between all groups seems to be a huge challenge. Almost 
all major world religions are significantly represented in 
India. The amorphous nature of Hinduism coupled with 
its enormously complicated caste system itself seriously 
challenges the claimed unity within this set of people. The 
three major religions - Hinduism, Islam and Christianity 
- almost always look at each other with suspicion. That 
gives Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism anxiety and they 
start asserting their own identities. This diversity has now 
crystallised into hard and contesting political positions. 
1.  As per census data 2011. Linguists note a much larger number of 
spoken languages. 
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It is but natural that such a diverse country will have a wide 
range of value systems informed by culture, local customs 
and religions. It is also natural that there shall be cross cutting 
interest groups concerned with economic, political and social 
power in this diversity of value systems. It is also natural 
and legitimate that these diverse groups will formulate their 
separate political agendas and will work through political 
discourse, protests and agitations to realise those agendas. 
All this has pushed Indian society into a deep turmoil 
at the level of thinking and political action. This could be 
understood as adversarial strife or could also be seen as a 
churning, to find ways of creating a just political and social 
order according to the constitution, and overall cultural 
milieu of the country. I would prefer the latter. In this sense 
it is akin to the mythological Samudra-manthan2. But it is 
a Samudra-manthan with a difference. In the mythological 
Samudra-manthan there were devas and asuras with very 
definite characteristics; devas were presented as good and 
benevolent while asuras were assumed to be all bad and 
malevolent. In the contemporary Samudra-manthan there 
are no such definite categories; therefore, the deceit used by 
devas in gaining all the nectar can have not even a semblance 
of justification in this new age churning. Here the poison 
as well as the nectar have to be shared equally by all; and 
that makes the situation much more complicated today than 
described in the mythology. 
As said above, it is legitimate for diverse population groups 
to work towards realising their values and agendas in a 
democracy. But if democracy is to remain functional and 
2.  This term literally means, “churning of the ocean”. It is a reference to 
the mythological event when devas (gods) and asuras (demons) they had 
to cooperate and churn the ocean in order to get amrut/nectar (elixir of 
immortality). The devas conspired and designed the happenings in a way 
that only they would get the nectar, and not the asuras. Details of the 
story can be found at: https://www.sacred-texts.com/hin/vp/vp044.htm 
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the country to be united, then a certain kind of harmony 
beneath all this turmoil is an imperative. Contradictions 
in value systems and political agendas necessarily lead 
to struggle, strife, opposition and antagonism. A society 
rife with such qualities cannot be called harmonious. 
Harmony can be regained only through resolving all 
these contradictions, getting rid of strife, and cessation of 
struggle. In a democracy with so much diversity, complete 
resolution of contradictions and cessation of all struggle is 
impossible, as new issues will necessarily emerge as soon 
as old ones are resolved. Peace and harmony are not static 
and fixed for all times in any society. They are dynamically 
or perpetually created conditions which constantly face 
new problems, and keep solving them. Thus, the aim could 
only be to reduce these contradictions etc. to a level where 
harmonious functioning of democracy for a common good 
is not threatened; and to build socio-political systems which 
are alive to such challenges, and rational capabilities of its 
people who can continuously produce ideas and practices, 
that are operationalised through those systems. 
Harmony is more than absence of struggle and strife. 
Absence of struggle and strife or active antagonism is called 
“negative peace” in the literature on Education for Peace. 
Harmony is closer to “positive peace”3 which is characterised 
by cooperation and collaboration for common good, mutual 
respect and tolerance of difference in opinions and value 
systems. It is compatibility in opinion and action. Negative 
peace can be achieved even in an unjust social order, as it is 
possible to either manipulate people’s opinion and actions 
through deceit, or to silence difference of opinion by force. 
Indian society in maintaining its caste system has been using 
3.  Gur-Ze’ev, International Encyclopedia of Education, Third Edition 
(2010), Academic Press (Academic Press is an imprint of Elsevier), 
London. (Electronic Edition: page: 6:22) 
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these two in tandem for centuries. Such a social peace can 
be legitimately characterised as unjust; and it is rightly said 
that “the demands of justice must take precedence over the 
claims of peace”4. The reasons for such a precedence to justice 
over peace are not only pragmatic, they are primarily ethical, 
which we will see presently. 
Without going into details it could be plausibly argued 
that a just socio-political order necessarily grants (i) equal 
opportunity to develop one’s reason, and (ii) rational 
autonomy to form one’s judgment to each citizen.5 If some 
people are not allowed to, or denied opportunities to develop 
their rational capability and use those capabilities in forming 
their opinion, such a socio-political order can not be called 
just in a democracy. Also, any action that deliberately hinders 
people’s development of reason and forming informed 
opinion has to be counted as hindering justice and being 
opposed to harmony.
Therefore, lasting and just harmony has to be achieved only 
through freely formed rational opinion of citizens on all 
issues of controversy and strife. Two necessary conditions of 
being able to form rational opinion are, having knowledge 
and capability for rational deliberation. 
Capability for rational deliberation is more than logic alone, 
it involves moral and emotional commitment to truth and 
consistency. As Scheffler notes “[R]eason stands always in 
contrast with inconsistency and with expediency, in the 
judgment of particular issues”. Reason treats evidence fairly 
without bias, in the interest of truth. “In the moral realm, 
reason is action on principle, action that therefore does 
4.  NCERT, National Focus Group Position Paper on Education for 
Peace, page 4
5.  In addition, a just social order also entails fair distribution of liberties 
and material and social goods. Here we need not go into those details. 
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not bend with the wind, nor lean to the side of advantage 
or power out of weakness or self-interest. Whether in the 
cognitive or the moral realm, reason is always a matter of 
treating equal reasons equally, and of judging the issues 
in the light of general principles to which one has bound 
oneself”6. Thus reason is also a self-made commitment to 
general principles, consistency and truth, even in the face of 
self-interest, advantage and power.
The second necessary condition for forming one’s own 
rational opinion is availability of knowledge. Often 
knowledge is confused with belief. Whatever one believes 
is deemed as his knowledge. However, knowledge is more 
than just the psychological process of forming beliefs. It 
necessarily requires epistemic criteria of justification and 
truth. Justification is having evidence and arguments that 
support the belief in question, and cognitively convince one 
to consider it to be true. 
In spite of truth being a very problematic and controversial 
concept in epistemology, no concept of knowledge can do 
without it. Scheffler has argued at length that truth can 
survive acceptance of fallibility and loss of certainty in 
empirical matters, he concludes his discussion on truth as 
a condition of knowledge by stating that “even if we totally 
reject certainty as a condition of knowledge, we need not 
also reject (absolute) truth. To attribute knowledge that Q7, 
is not only to attribute belief that Q but also to affirm that 
Q — in effect, to affirm that “Q” is true, in the absolute sense 
of the term”8. Truth here survives not always as an achieved 
6.  Israel Scheffler, Philosophical Models of Teaching in Reason and 
Teaching, Routledge, Oxon (2014) (1973), Page 76.
7.  Q being the asserted proposition. 
8.  Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge: An introduction to 
epistemology and education, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
(1965), page 53. 
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goal, but as a necessary ideal for a belief to be counted as 
knowledge. 
I would argue that a commitment to this epistemic ideal 
of truth is necessary in public discourse aiming for justice 
and harmony. Even more important for such a discourse 
is another related but distinguishable notion of truth, i.e. 
moral notion of truth. Moral truth is certainly connected 
with epistemic truth, but is not identical with it. Epistemic 
truth is concerned with judging whether a belief is correct 
or not, and has to meet certain standards of evidence and 
justification to establish it’s correctness. Moral truth is about 
expression or communication of the belief so formed. When 
one communicates a belief as one holds it, s/he is telling the 
truth. But when one’s communication is at variance with 
his/her belief, s/he is telling a lie. It is possible to have an 
epistemically false belief B and still tell a moral truth by 
communicating it as it is, i.e. by communicating the belief 
as one holds it. 
For example, a member of Flat Earth Society may actually 
believe that (B) “The earth is flat”. Epistemically this may be 
provable as false based on available observation data. But 
if he (i) actually believes in this, and (ii) communicates the 
same to others, he is not telling a lie, as he is communicating 
his belief as he holds it. Though his statement that “The earth 
is flat” is epistemically false, he is speaking truthfully. In 
such a situation we call him “wrong”, but not a “liar”. On 
the other hand, imagine the same person appearing for 
Geography teacher’s interview in a school. He knows that if 
the interview board comes to know of his true belief about 
the shape of earth, he will be considered lacking in knowledge 
and will not get the job. When asked: “What do you believe 
about the shape of the earth?” he says “It is nearly spherical”. 
Epistemically he is correct, but he is giving false information 
about his belief, thus is telling a lie. Moral truth is not about 
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the correctness of the statement one makes, rather it is about 
the “correct communication” of what one happens to believe. 
The opposite of moral-truth is a lie. The intention of a liar 
is to deceive others into forming false beliefs, either about 
himself or about the state of affairs in the world. Harry 
Frankfurt rightly states “[I]n some accounts of lying there 
is no lie unless a false statement is made; in others a person 
may be lying even if the statement he makes is true, as long 
as he himself believes that the statement is false and intends 
by making it to deceive”9. 
In public political discourse in a democracy intellectuals 
and politicians have a responsibility to be epistemically and 
morally committed to truth. Deviation from truth in either 
sense aids injustice and disrupts harmony. 
As mentioned above, dignity and autonomy of individual 
citizens demand that a just order in society should be 
formed on the basis of freely formed opinions of citizens. 
Their agreement on the definition of common good and 
compromises made in their personal and group values, and 
interests should be arrived at of their own free will and on 
the basis of reasons they themselves accept cognitively. 
Meeting these tough standards of rational decision making 
by every single individual in a society is not possible. In actual 
fact perhaps a majority of people do not meet the standards 
of knowledge and rational deliberation. However, this fact 
can not be used to trample upon their dignity and autonomy. 
A public political discourse should aim at convincing the 
public with epistemically fair means, without deceit or 
taking recourse to lies or obfuscation of information. It is the 
job of public intellectuals, politicians and media to provide 
required information as well as styles of argumentation, 
9.  Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
(2005), page 8
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making sense of that information, and often actually on 
formed opinions. Furthermore public political discourses, 
movements and agitations are a form of mass education in 
democratic citizenship. Dewey defines education “as the 
process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual 
and emotional, toward nature and fellow men”. And notes 
that “[P]ublic agitation, propaganda, … are effective in 
producing the change of disposition which a philosophy 
indicates as desirable, but only in the degree in which they 
are educative—that is to say, in the degree in which they 
modify mental and moral attitudes”10. 
Opinion makers (public intellectuals, politicians and media 
personalities) have a sway over the thinking of large sections 
of population. When such people are epistemically careless, 
and disregard standards of justification and truth, they are 
guilty of misleading people into forming false beliefs. In 
comparison to well considered true and justified beliefs, 
false beliefs are less likely to produce appropriate action to 
achieve the aims of justice and harmony. Thus, they harm 
the prospects of justice and harmony in the society. 
But when opinion makers deliberately tell lies or hide truth, 
they harm justice and harmony even more. In this latter 
case they are guilty of manipulating people into false beliefs. 
Manipulation of citizens is an attack on their dignity and 
autonomy. It is a direct interference in their freedom of 
thought and expression, and in their autonomous judgment. 
This is deliberate corruption of their rational cognitive 
processes. Further, in both these cases, of epistemic laxity 
and moral deception, the public is being miseducated, thus 
harming future prospects of justice and harmony in the 
society. 
10.  John Dewey, Democracy and Education, Aakar Books, Delhi, 2004 
(1915), page 354
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To clarify the issue further let’s take two examples. About 20 
years back one very prominent and famous professor-cum-
activist started arguing that “all children out of school should 
be considered victims of child-labour under the law”. Now 
the idea of child labour means that children are pushed into 
labour beyond their capabilities, which harms their health, 
physical growth, and adversely effects their mental growth. 
The operating concepts here are “labour”, “harm” and 
“adverse effect on growth due to being involved in labour”. 
A child can be in a situation which is harmful to him/her 
and adversely effects his/her growth; but no labour may 
be involved. Malnutrition is an example. But malnutrition 
cannot be called labour. If one uses common sense, a child 
being malnutritioned cannot be called a victim of child 
labour. A child out of school and having no opportunity of 
education is actually in a situation where his mental growth 
might be adversely affected. However, if she is not pushed into 
work it is not because of labour, but for some other reasons. 
Therefore, calling all out of school children child labour is 
actually an attack on people’s epistemic sensibilities. It is 
obfuscating the ideas of labour and child-labour.
A supporter of calling out of school children ‘child-labour’, 
however, might argue that terms like child-labour should 
be legally defined and they have no “absolute meaning” in 
a society. Defining all out of school children as child-labour 
will benefit children, as child-labour is illegal in the country 
and, therefore, keeping children out of school will become 
illegal. This is a sentimental appeal to morally good-hearted 
people to discard their epistemic sensibilities; in other words, 
this is a false juxtaposition of epistemic and moral concepts 
of truth; claiming that justice can be better achieved if we 
blur epistemic truth. 
In another case a very famous and powerful Indian politician 
is on record saying that he deliberately misled people on 
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an issue that involved their safety and had far reaching 
political consequences. In 1993 there were eleven bomb 
blasts in a single day in Bombay, killing 363 people (according 
to the politician on record) and injuring another 1400. 
There was mounting tension between two major religious 
communities in the country and particularly in the city of 
Bombay. The bombs were planted targeting one community, 
say X, and it was an easy conclusion for anyone that the 
terrorist group responsible belongs to the other religious 
community, say Y. The government also had information 
that automatic weapons were distributed to select members 
of community Y by the terrorist group responsible for 
bomb blasts. The Chief Minister of the state reached the 
right conclusion that the bomb blasts and weapons 
distribution is part of a larger plan to start religious riots 
in the city. He surmised that such religious riots will take 
a larger toll on community Y, it being a minority; and that 
will prepare the ground for young people of the community 
Y to be recruited as terrorists. He wanted to avoid further 
riots as well as their aftereffect. To prevent riots, he invented 
a twelfth bomb blast - which never happened - in an area 
where the fatalities would have been more in community Y. 
By this false information he wanted people to form a belief 
that it is not only one community (X) that is targeted. He 
further invented a lie stating that the material used in the 
blasts was the kind used by another terrorist group active 
in a neighbouring community and belonging to community 
X. The terrorist group indicated by the Chief Minister had 
never claimed any religious reasons for their attacks, and 
had conducted only one targeted attack in India, killing the 
then Prime Minister of the country in 1991. But since this 
was in the minds of the people his ploy of diverting attention 
from one terrorist group (community Y) to another 
(community X) had chances of success. He thinks that by 
these lies he averted serious religious riots in the city and 
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prevented loss of life and property. Therefore, his intentions 
were good and honorable. 
Let’s note that:
  The first case is that of epistemic obfuscation, that attacks 
people’s capability to think clearly.
  The second is a deliberate lie, to divert accusation from 
the actual culprits and to accuse innocents at the least in 
this case. This also involved fixing the responsibility on 
members of the religious community which was targeted 
in this incident. 
  Both cases have good intention at heart, as per claims. 
  The first is supposed to enhance the prospects of better 
opportunity for education of deprived children. 
  The second is supposed to preserve social harmony in the 
city and the country. 
From the point of view of argument in this article both 
these issues are important in a democracy. Both examples 
manipulate citizens in order to form beliefs which are 
epistemically abhorrent to truth. Thus, both attack the 
dignity - as rational decision-making agents - and the 
autonomy of citizens. Morally speaking, from this point of 
view they run counter to justice and freedom of thought 
of citizens. Both manipulate people and use them for the 
aims set by the activist-professor and the politician without 
people’s informed and free consent. Thus, these actions of 
disregarding epistemic and moral truth cannot be justified, 
if we think from the citizens’ dignity and autonomy 
perspective. 
But can they be justified from consequential point of view 
in pragmatic socio-political discourse? At the first sight it 
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depends on what the results of their obfuscation and lies 
were. Understanding the results of these actions is an 
empirical question. On the basis of available information, 
perhaps some children might have got an opportunity to 
attend school as a result of the first campaign. The politician’s 
lie may have helped avoid a major religious riot in the 
city, and maybe in several other cities, as religious riots 
also have an induction effect. But one has to also think 
of the consequences of taking these devices as ‘accepted 
principles’ of conducting public discourse, and the long-
term results of frequent use of such principles. Again, this 
is largely an empirical question; answer to which will 
depend on several things, including public awareness and 
capability to think clearly, politicians’ prowess in telling 
lies, intellectuals’ capability to obfuscate thinking and 
killing clarity of mind and so on. But perhaps it is not 
too far fetched to imagine that frequent use of such 
devices will produce diminishing dividends and finally the 
intellectuals and politicians will lose credibility. Also, the 
politician’s device is a calumniation of the community X, 
and hides a problem in community Y. Repeated one sided 
use of use such devices, if successful, may finally result in 
the vilification of community X, which is direct injustice to 
the members of that community. 
If the above discussion and its tentative conclusions are 
acceptable then commitment to truth - moral and epistemic - 
seems to be a necessary condition for justice and harmony in 
the society. However, the present day Indian socio-political 
discourse does not seem to exhibit any serious commitment 
to truth. 
Two enemies of truth
In the Indian discourse today political correctness and 
what Harry Frankfurt calls bullshit seems to be the most 
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pronounced enemy of truth. Both of them are much more 
dangerous than plain lies. 
Political correctness manifests itself in two interrelated 
forms. One, its evolved form, is about using “language that 
seems intended to give the least amount of offense, especially 
when describing groups identified by external markers such 
as race, gender, culture, or sexual orientation”11. This form 
is concerned with sensitivity in civilised conversations and 
discourses. This may impinge on truth if taken to extremes, 
but is generally benign and harmless; even a demand of 
civility. In this article we are not talking of this form of 
political correctness. 
The other and its original form, which is alive and kicking 
in all ideological discourses, is inimical to truth. This form 
is a gift of communist ideologues, and emerged after 1917 
Bolshevik revolution. Political correctness in this form is “to 
judge the degree of compatibility of one’s ideas or political 
analyses with the official party line”12 and publicly express 
only that which is most compatible. At the least in India 
this form is practiced by all political parties and public 
intellectuals supporting them. It is no more a propagation of 
left-wing parties alone. 
Political correctness in this form necessarily involves hiding, 
twisting, ignoring evidence and truth; and fabricating 
evidence, justification and lies. In addition to the above-
mentioned dangers of lack of commitment to truth it also 
throttles freedom of expression. Not only in avoidance of 
speaking the truth, but also through intellectual attacks on 
those who express opinions against the accepted political 
11.  https://www.britannica.com/topic/political-correctness 2020. 
12.  Pierre L. van den Berghe, Political Correctness, in International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2nd edition, Macmillan Reference 
USA, 2008, Volume 6, page 298.
51Truth, Harmony and Justice
lines. Thus, botching up debates and freedom of thinking. It 
is consciously directed at manipulating people into accepting 
the party line. 
Harry Frankfurt in “On Bullshit”13 claims that bullshit 
is much more prevalent in societies than we think. He 
analyses the concept of bullshit, not as a term of abuse 
but as an expression used to communicate a standpoint in 
conversations. Frankfurt claims that: one, bullshitters are 
profoundly indifferent to truth. Two, they are not concerned 
with communicating information, though they may pretend 
to be doing so. Three, that they are fakers and phonies, as “the 
essence of bullshit is not that it is false but that it is phony”14 
and that what they care about primarily is whether what they 
say is effective in manipulating opinion.
This understanding of bullshit leads Frankfurt to the 
conclusion that “bullshitting constitutes a more insidious 
threat than lying does to the conduct of civilized life.”15 
Because a liar at least recognises the force of truth as well as 
its place in life; and he lies to avoid that force. A bullshitter 
is unaware of the place of truth in society and is profoundly 
indifferent to it; all that matters to him is manipulation of 
opinion to gain prominence and power.
Conclusion
If the above discussion has any merit, we can safely conclude 
that attacks on truth - epistemic and moral - happen in 
many forms. Some of them are a result of laxity in epistemic 
standards, deliberate obfuscation, plain lies, political 
13.  Harry G. Frankfurt, On Bullshit, Princeton University Press, New 
Jersey, 2005
14.  Ibid, page 47.
15.  Frankfurt, Harry G. On Truth (pp. 4-5). Random House. Kindle 
Edition
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correctness and bullshitting. All these forms are used to 
manipulate public opinion, often in the name of justice and 
harmony. However, any manipulation of peoples’ opinion 
constitutes attack on their dignity and autonomy; rational 
and informed persuasion is the only legitimate way of 
creating consensus in a democracy. Manipulation, thus, is 
morally unjustifiable. Secondly, a frequent use of devices of 
manipulation creates trust deficit in the society. Lack of trust 
in intellectuals, politicians, the state and any one in power 
in general makes smooth functioning very difficult, and it 
may invite the breakdown of law and order. Therefore, all 
such attempts decimate the democratic fabric of the society, 
even if often in an invisible manner. They are incapable of 
producing “just harmony”, rather they add fuel to strife and 
keep power struggle and animosity alive. 
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Introduction
Rohit Dhankar’s (2005) memorable phrase “curriculum 
frameworks in search of a coherent epistemology” captures 
succinctly the growing interest in theories of curriculum 
knowledge by sociologists of education. (See for example, 
Muller, 2000; Young, 2008; Maton & Moore, 2010; Barrett 
& Rata, 2014). Dhankar’s reference to the “inadequately 
articulated notion of knowledge in various Indian 
curriculum” in the period between 1988 and 2005 parallels 
similar experiences with curricula developments in, for 
example, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa, Norway, 
Scotland, and England. Central to the concern about how 
knowledge is theorised in the curriculum is the sociology of 
education’s perennial issue (Davies, 1995): equality of access 
and of opportunity for all social groups, especially for the 
working class and traditionally marginalised communities. 
This chapter links these two research questions by exploring 
the relationship between epistemic (i.e. context independent, 
disciplinary or academic) knowledge and democracy. It 
examines how that relationship affects access to academic 
knowledge for all children at school. My purpose is to locate 
the central paradox that characterises education systems in 
democracies, i.e. that systems intended to increase equality in 
fact reproduce class inequalities, in the deeper contradictions 
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of democracy’s main institutions: the nation, the state, and 
the citizen. 
The interest in developing a coherent theory of curriculum 
knowledge is in response to the current mis-alignment 
between epistemic knowledge and the curricula of national 
education systems in democratic countries; a mis-alignment 
located in the erosion of expertise and the loss of trust in 
specialist knowledge and science of recent decades (Derry, 
2014). Localising ideologies (Rata, 2012), supported by ethnic 
and religious writers, and fuelled by the relativism of subjects 
without boundaries (Muller, 2000; Moore, 2007) have 
disturbed the idea of epistemic knowledge as objective and 
universalising; an idea which previously enabled a degree of 
consensus about what knowledge should be taught at school 
(Rata, 2012; Turner, 2012) even though there has been little 
agreement about how and to whom the knowledge should be 
taught. 
I argue that the disturbance to the objective and universalising 
nature of epistemic knowledge has had profoundly negative 
effects on the curriculum’s role in supporting democracy; a 
goal of national education systems in democratic societies 
since the 19th century. I make this case by claiming that 
epistemic knowledge and democratic politics operate in a 
structurally inter-dependent relationship. My premise is that 
national education systems which aim to teach objective and 
universalising knowledge to all social groups, including the 
working class, poor, and marginalised, are the means to ensure 
progressive societies. This is a disputed position amongst 
educationalists, with some arguing that knowledge is always 
and necessarily ‘knowledge of the powerful’. However, I 
argue, following Durkheim (2001), Gramsci (1986), and more 
recently Michael Young and Johan Muller (2013), and Rob 
Moore (2013); that access to objective disciplinary knowledge 
enables access to the collective representations of modern 
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societies. Without such access, individuals and groups 
remain outside a society’s self-representation. As a result they 
become increasingly marginalised and increasingly unable 
to contribute to, and identify with, that society. With such 
access however, individuals acquire the ability to understand 
abstractions, to generalise, and to specialise; abilities needed 
to take up the authority and control over their own lives that 
is possible, but not guaranteed, in the modern democratic 
world.
According to Gramsci, the job of the school is, 
[…] to accustom [the students] to reason, to think 
abstractly and schematically while remaining able to 
plunge back from abstraction into real and immediate 
life, to see in each fact or datum what is general and 
what is particular, to distinguish the concept from the 
particular instance. (1986, p. 38 in Muller 2000, pp. 7–8)
Without the ability to think in abstract ways, the child is 
confined to the world of immediate experience, i.e. to culture. 
With that ability however, he or she is able to conceptualise 
the world of immediate cultural experience objectively, 
and, as a consequence of that objective inquiry, criticise 
and change it. In addition, the ability to think abstractly 
enables young people to enter social worlds that are not, 
and cannot be known from experience. It is what modern 
education offers that traditional forms of education cannot 
offer. The former is subversive of culture because it offers a 
way out of the immediate by providing the means by which 
traditional cultural norms and practices can be objectified 
and criticised. The latter provide an instrumental education 
that fits individuals for their place in life – usually according 
to birth status and gender.
Abstract thinking not only provides the intellectual tools 
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of objectification and criticism, but it provides a social 
community - a ‘culture’ but one unlike the kinship or ethnic 
cultures of groups that draw on the past for their cohesion. 
Having access to the knowledge created by universal 
intellectual communities (Collins, 1998) brings the child 
into a way of thinking that, because it is based on provisional 
and contested truth, cannot offer the guarantee of stability 
that traditional beliefs offer. As compensation, it offers access 
to the unthinkable, to the ‘not-yet thought’ (Bernstein, 2000, 
p. 30). This is the knowledge built up over centuries through 
the cooperative endeavours of individuals working in social 
contexts and relating to other individuals according to the 
social mores of the discipline’s procedures: 
The guiding ideas elaborated by our civilization are 
collective ideas that must be transmitted to the child, 
because he would not know, how to elaborate them 
alone. One does not recreate science through one’s 
own personal experience, because it is social and not 
individual; one learns it. (Durkheim, 1956, p. 48) 
Durkheim’s ideas speak of the latent philosophy in the 
disciplines as ‘a system of cardinal notions which sum up 
the most characteristics of things as we conceive them, and 
which govern their interpretation’. He calls this philosophy 
‘the product of the cumulative work of generations, that must 
be transmitted to the child, because it constitutes the very 
framework of the intelligence’ (1956, p. 50). It is the universal 
knowledge inheritance most vividly captured in Bourdieu’s 
phrase: “A twenty-year-old mathematician can have twenty 
centuries of mathematics in his mind” (Bourdieu 2004, 
p. 40). The task for education is to include the children of 
disadvantaged groups in this universal inheritance, knowing 
that entering into the world of abstract, objective thought 
is both alienating for such children and also contains the 
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potential for criticism of the very world from which the 
child comes. This is the dilemma, not only for culture-based 
schooling, but for the multicultural politics of which it is a 
part (Rata, 2014). 
If academic knowledge and democracy share the same 
structuring principle; the argument that I develop below, 
then access to the former is essential for involvement in 
the latter. This means that questions about the nature of 
academic knowledge, about how the knowledge is altered to 
become subjects in the school curiculum, and about how it 
should be taught, are not confined to educational research. 
They are central political questions given that the knowledge 
each generation acquires at school affects how people are 
able to engage with democratic politics. This includes how 
individuals exercise the authority of criticism in holding 
to account those in power. Indeed, as this chapter makes 
clear, questions about authority and power are deeply 
embedded in both knowledge and politics. Those with 
‘powerful knowledge’ (as distinguished from ‘knowledge of 
the powerful’) have authority in both domains. (See Beck, 
2014 for a discussion of the origins and meanings of the dyad 
‘powerful knowledge/ knowledge of the powerful’ in Michael 
Young’s post-1990s’ writings.)
The strife of the dialectic
The structuring principle uniting democracy and rational 
knowledge was recognised by Kant, who referred to the 
ongoing contradictory nature of modern society as “the 
strife of the dialectic”, a state that he described as both the 
necessity of reason and of politics (1993, p. 488). It is the strife 
of the dialectic which produces the contradictory ‘provisional 
truth’ of knowledge and the equally contradictory ‘peaceful 
dispute’ of democratic politics. It allows for the plurality 
of collective representations described by Durkheim (2002) 
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that draw upon the authority of science (epistemic knowledge 
in its broadest sense), rather than the received beliefs of 
religion and traditional authority. 
Those students with the ability to grasp the ‘strife of the 
dialectic’ have an advantage in understanding politics and 
knowledge over those who do not. It is an understanding 
of complexity and contradiction that does not arise from 
the ‘spontaneous’ concepts recognised by Vygotsky (1962) 
as belonging to experience and that I discuss in greater 
detail in the final section. Rather the ability to find 
complexity and contradiction that are not obvious in 
the world of appearance comes from acquiring abstract 
thinking. Thinking in abstract concepts is, as Durkheim 
(2001) noted “not simply to see the real through the most 
general; it is to project onto sensation a light that illuminates, 
penetrates, and transforms it” (p. 331). Those without access 
to the intellectual tools of abstract thinking, intellectual 
resources that, for almost all children, are available only at 
school, remain confined to the limited world of personal 
experience. They are blocked from access to society’s 
collective representations, including how we represent all 
the inherent contradictions and paradoxes of our social and 
political relations and institutions. This makes individuals 
vulnerable to ideologies as the ability to understand how a 
society represents itself also includes the ability to recognise 
‘mis-representations’, that is, ideologies. In his defense of 
liberal education, Charles Bailey (1984) argues that this type 
of education liberates “ from the tyranny of the present and 
the particular and liberates for the ideal of the autonomous, 
rational, moral agent” (p. 22, italics in the original). It is 
clear that he regards education’s role as linking rational 
knowledge and political agency, the argument taken in this 
chapter. 
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Structural contradictions
Of all the contradictions shaping modern society, the most 
important are those which shape the three structuring 
institutions of the modern nation: the nation itself, the 
state, and the citizen. Understanding these contradictions 
gives access to genuine political involvement, but it is an 
understanding which can only be acquired from knowledge 
about how power and authority are controlled, distributed, 
and regulated. This is knowledge most likely to be created 
and taught in the Social Sciences and Humanities disciplines. 
It is altered for teaching in schools, usually in the subjects 
of History and in various types of Social Studies. Access to 
the content of specific subject knowledge is insufficient on its 
own. It requires a way of thinking that enables individuals 
to understand increasingly complex systems of abstract 
knowledge. 
Unfortunately the teaching of subject knowledge as a 
‘gradgrind’ recitation of meaningless facts has contributed 
to the mistrust of the knowledge itself. This is the rote 
learning of subject knowledge, “the direct teaching of 
concepts [as] impossible and fruitless”, that Vygotsky (1962) 
called an “empty verbalism, a parrotlike repetition of words 
by the child, simulating a knowledge of the corresponding 
concepts but actually covering up a vacuum” (p. 83). Yet 
neither Vygotsky nor others, such as Gramsci who saw 
access to national education systems as essential if working 
people were to acquire control over their own lives, wanted 
to abandon academic knowledge. The fault lay with how 
the knowledge was taught not the academic nature of the 
knowledge. Vygotsky (1962) asked instead for a pedagogy that 
“stimulates the strenuous mental activity of the child” (p. 85). 
Such mental activity is not constructed from the spontaneous 
concepts of a child’s experience but from direct teaching 
(Vygotsky uses the term ‘instruction’) in “scientific concepts, 
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with their hierarchical system of interrelationships” (p. 92). It 
is this cognitive activity which is “the medium within which 
awareness and mastery first develop, to be transferred later 
to other concepts and other areas of thought” (p. 92). 
Students acquire the ability to understand the contradictory 
nature of modern society from the study of disciplinary 
knowledge because it is in acquiring this knowledge, in 
contrast to the knowledge of everyday experience, that 
abstract cognition develops in the hierarchical system of 
epistemic interrelationships described by Vygotsky above. 
That most abstract concept, the ‘nation’, serves as the main 
symbol upon which to build the representations of the 
modern collective. However, to identify with a collective that 
is essentially abstract goes against common-sense. Indeed 
the concept of the modern collective is counter-intuitive. It 
lacks the bonds of kinship, race, or religion whose empirically 
known materiality was the mechanism for creating and 
maintaining the traditional collective. 
This paradox at the heart of the modern nation was 
identified early in the modern period (Macfarlane, 2002) 
and remains a central question in understanding the role 
played by education. It asks the question: ‘How does a 
society cohere in the absence of traditional unifying forces, 
such as kinship and status hierarchies?’ The answer is 
‘not easily’, given that the idea of traditional collectivities 
(often highly romanticised) continues to have a strong 
claim in peoples’ identities. This can be seen in the rise 
of various forms of neo-traditionalism in the post-1970s’ 
period (Rata, 2011; Friedman, 1994). Indeed in comparison 
to the materiality of ethnic collectives, the modern nation’s 
existence as a symbolic entity is a fragile resource for stability. 
Its vulnerability as an abstract or ‘imagined’ idea is exposed 
by those nations unable to sustain the symbolic idea as a 
material fact. 
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Demonstrating W. B. Yeat’s memorable line, ‘the centre 
cannot hold’, a number of newly constructured nation-
states break down into older race or religious groups based 
on a mythologised ideology. This process occurred most 
noticeably in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but the 
rumble of older ethnic ties against the new order is felt in 
other areas too. Even the United Kingdom, with its relatively 
long history as a modern nation-state is no stranger to the 
seductive pull of racial mythologies. The persistence of 
loyalties to beliefs in an imagined ‘Anglo-Saxon’ ethnicity 
is used to provide a counter-foil to the perceived threats of 
multiculturalism, informed Brexit politics in recent years. 
Similarly, the modern nation of India exists in a dialectic 
tension with the forces of older primordial identities 
supported by resurgent neotraditionalist ideologies justified 
in religious terms (Nanda, 2003). 
The pull of a romanticised and ethnicised past is felt most 
strongly by marginalised groups in modern societies; those 
who were never fully included in the abstraction of the 
modern nation-state with its new forms of symbolic 
representations. These groups, usually categorised by 
ethnicity, religion, or as localised indigenous peoples, find 
their collective in a re-created primordial identity. According 
to Friedman (2006) progressive class politics ‘finds its source 
within the imaginary trajectory’ of the modern nation-state. 
The integration of formerly separate populations into that 
new socio-political entity led to a ‘developmental cosmology’, 
one in which action was channelled to ‘a politics of social 
transformation’ (xvi). The regression to cultural politics in 
recent decades is the result of the ‘modernism’s declining 
hegemony’, of its fragmentation into a new imaginary, 
that of pre-modern socio-political units. ‘Romanticism, 
traditionalism and anti-modernism’ are the ‘new forms of 
integration between the individual and the smaller entity’ 
(xvi).
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The purpose of national education systems had been to 
contribute to the form of social integration promised by 
modernity; one based on the dialectic of the individual and 
society in a creative but contradictory balance. These systems 
rejected older racialised identities in order to socialise 
the generations of the modern polity into new symbolic 
representations, ones freed from the fixed boundaries of 
primordial origins. The universalising democratic ideals of 
equality, freedom, and society worked fairly successfully 
during the era of industrial capitalism (an era that continues 
in a somewhat different way in the emerging developed 
countries of China, India, and Brazil). Working people have 
reason to believe that the ideals of equality, if not currently 
experienced, would be experienced by their children in 
an imagined future of wealth redistribution. Yet when the 
veracity of those symbols is tested against the lived experience 
of those who remain marginalised and ‘less equal’, the 
contradiction at the heart of the modern nation becomes a 
source of weakness rather than a source of creative tension. 
Democratic societies need to achieve balance between their 
idealised symbolic self-representation and the material 
reality of ordinary peoples’ lives if those ideals are to provide 
social cohesion. 
Durkheim (2001) recognised the delicate balance between 
how we live and how we understand that life, referring to 
“the concept that was originally taken to be true because it 
is collective tends to become collective only if it is held to 
be true: we demand its credentials before giving it credence” 
(p. 333). An educated populace which understands the 
essential contradiction at the heart of the modern nation; 
its existence as an abstraction yet also its material existence 
that continually tests the abstraction, is more likely to not 
only test its credentials, but to use its authority to strengthen 
them. Those credentials are maintained only by the modern 
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nation ‘proving’ itself by including all its people into both 
the symbolic and material collectivity. One way into the 
symbolic collectivity that has the potential to include all 
the population is the equality of opportunity offered by 
the national education system. If such opportunity occurs, 
each generation acquires the intellectual capital that is an 
economic as well as a social and political resource. 
Yet equally of opportunity is continually ‘tested’ by the 
contradictions that exist in the other institutions of the 
modern polity; the state and the citizen. The state is 
simultaneously the democratic nation’s infrastructure and 
the regulatory unit serving global capitalism. It pulls towards 
inequality and equality. This contradiction is experienced by 
individuals in the education system. Those in the working 
class are more likely to receive an instrumental education, 
one that is vocational and ‘relevant’ to their immediate lives. 
The children of the upper middle class are, on the whole, 
freed from this restricting educative function. They are 
more likely to receive the liberal education that, as J.S. Mill 
(1985) noted, provides “observation to see, reasoning and 
judgement to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, 
discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness 
and self-control to hold to his own deliberate decision” (p. 
123). It is here in the distinction between the working class 
and the privileged class that the contradiction expressed 
in the ‘powerful knowledge/ knowledge of the powerful’ 
dyad is most fully realised. Those with access to powerful 
knowledge, that is, to the type of knowledge that enables 
them to generalise, specialise, and conceptualise in abstract 
ways, are most likely to be the children of the powerful. 
Similarly, the ‘citizen’ is a contradictory status. It is the concept 
of the equal political and legal entity yet the materiality of 
that status in the individual’s experience is of the unequal 
64 Knowledge, Politics and Education
worker in the capitalist economy. Those individuals who have 
the cognitive ability to think in abstractions have the ability 
to objectify their citizen status as both an individual and a 
collective experience. This understanding means that they 
are more likely to act upon its implications. These are the 
people who take part in politics, who analyse its ideological 
interests, who understand the on-going tensions as modern 
society seeks to keep its contradictory nature in balance. But 
to do so requires a way of thinking that can only be acquired 
from the long and demanding schooling in epistemic 
knowledge, an ‘apprenticeship’ to which the working-class 
has unequal access.
The education contradiction
Is it possible for the education system to provide the means 
by which the working class can acquire ‘powerful knowledge’ 
given that it is at school that students are prepared for their 
classed position in life? The determinism of such a pessimistic 
approach is no different from the deterministic function of 
education in traditional systems. Yet while modern education 
may reproduce the inequalities of the wider system, this 
is just one of the possibilities available from a system that 
is inherently contradictory. The paradox of education, one 
located in the deeper structural contradictions of the polity 
itself, means that schools have the means with which to 
break that classed trajectory and provide to all students the 
symbolic representations of the collective (Moore, 2013). 
Whether or not that ‘interruption’ (to use Moore’s phrase), 
does occur depends upon how and to whom the school 
distributes the symbolic capital. Those students with such 
access are not only initiated into the collective thought of 
disciplinary subjects, but into the means to that thought, 
that is, into the conceptual thought that allows entry into 
society’s representations. To be excluded from conceptual 
thought is to be excluded from society because, as Durkheim 
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(2001) pointed out, “concepts are collective representations . . 
. they respond to the way in which that special entity, society, 
thinks about the things from its own experience” (p. 330). 
Yet it would be naïve to overlook or to minimise the forces 
arraigned against equalising access to intellectual capital. Even 
countries that project an image of educational opportunity 
such as New Zealand, with its national educational system 
dating back to the 1877 Education Act, wrestle uneasily 
with the paradox. The idealistic view of equal opportunity, 
one seen emerging in New Zealand during the 1890s, and 
with greater certainty in the prosperous 1940s-60s, certainly 
contained policies of greater equality. These included opening 
access to secondary schooling, the introduction of a core 
curriculum, and by the 1980s the legislative commitment 
to equitable gender and disability policies. Yet, at the same 
time, intransigent class divisions continued to influence both 
access to, and opportunities within, New Zealand education 
(Nash, 2010) exposing the underlying contradictions that 
shape both political and epistemic fields.
Along with the use of policy regulation as a means to increase 
opportunities, the use of information and communication 
technologies, often referred to as ‘21st century learning’ 
(Bolstad, 2011-2012) is seen as a way out of the inter-
generational inequalities of educational reproduction. 
However, despite the belief that we live in a more liberating 
‘Knowledge Age’, that mental-manual division is transferred 
to the new technological forces and relations of production 
in the current economic era. Mundane, low-level technology 
jobs having the same class-determining features of manual 
work. The jobs in technology may well be cleaner and less 
physical, but they have the central features of working class 
employment: low autonomy, limited or no decision-making, 
repetitive operation, low wages, and casualised or uncertain 
employment conditions. In contrast, the ‘mental’ jobs of the 
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technological era are like those of the industrial economies; 
marked by creativity, considerable employee autonomy and 
decision-making, and high salaries with relative security. 
The paradox of education which does offer promise for 
increased access to the symbolic resources of modern society, 
is located in the deeper structural contradictions of the 
democratic polity. Advanced technology without democratic 
politics cannot ‘release’ that paradox. Indeed, what it offers 
is the reactionary modernism described by Herf (1984) in 
his description of Germany in the 1930s. Herf described a 
highly developed economy, a technologically educated work-
force, and a repressive political system. This system is in the 
end self-defeating. Schools and higher education institutions 
that simply produce the new manual workers of financial 
capitalism disguise their working class status in the digital 
utopianism of Future Knowledge Age rhetoric. 
If more enlightened policies and increased technologies are 
not sufficient to enable the interrupt to education’s role in 
class reproduction, then what else is required to release the 
paradox; that is, the potential of education as a liberating 
system? My purpose in the final section is to move from 
education’s context to the system itself to ask what can be 
done within schools to increase access to intellectual capital 
and to the symbolic representations of the collective?
Knowledge and Pedagogy
The problem for education is how to overcome the alienation 
that many children from the working class and marginalised 
groups experience at school. How do these children acquire 
what Bernard Charlot (2009) refers to as the identity of the 
epistemic self, one distinct from the ‘home identities’ of 
the empirical self? In this concluding section I argue that 
the ‘epistemic self ’ requires both the ‘powerful knowledge’ 
found in academic subjects and the abstract thinking needed 
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to access this type of counter-intuitive knowledge. If the 
case for powerful knowledge is accepted, then the essential 
problem is pedagogic. How do we develop a pedagogy of 
engagement (Young & Muller, 2010; Rata, McPhail & Barrett, 
2019) so that students learn to understand mental objects 
and how they connect in non-empirical space and time? 
In other words, how do we learn to think about what is not 
encountered in experience by using concepts that themselves 
are not known in experience? This is the formidable task 
required of schools. Teachers must introduce children to 
the formal world of abstract concepts that are ‘real’ in the 
Popperian sense of a causal materiality but not ‘real’ in the 
sense of the reality of everyday experiences (Popper, 1978). 
The task of bringing students into the counter-intuitive 
world creates two specific problems for teachers and students 
alike. Firstly, students must first acquire the ability to engage 
with context-independent knowledge. Secondly, following 
on from this initial, and often alienating engagement, they 
must also engage with the long process of lower to higher 
order conceptual progression that occurs within coherent 
systems of meaning. Vygotsky (1962) addressed these 
central issues in pedagogy; does conceptual understanding 
develop from what children already know or is abstract 
understanding separate and different from experience? 
While progressivists and later constructivists take the first 
path, emphasising experience and the facilitating role of the 
teacher in connecting to this experience, Vygotsky took the 
opposing position. He distinguished between ‘spontaneous’ 
concepts and ‘scientific’ ones, how these different types of 
knowledge are acquired, and how they relate to each other. 
His most succinct comment on the distinction observes:
Concepts form and develop under entirely different 
inner and outer conditions, depending on whether 
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they originate in classroom instruction or in the child’s 
personal experience. Even the motives prompting the 
child to form the two types of concepts are not the same. 
The mind faces different problems when assimilating 
concepts at school and when left to its own devices. 
When we impart systematic knowledge to the child, we 
teach him many things that he cannot directly see or 
experience. Since scientific and spontaneous concepts 
differ in their relation to the child’s experience and in 
the child’s attitude towards their objects, they may be 
expected to follow differing developmental paths from 
their inception to their final form.
(Vygotsky, 1962, p. 86).
However, Vygotsky (1962) was well aware that scientific 
concepts are not simply acquired by rote, hence his objection 
to role-learning methods. He regarded their acquisition as 
involving “the aid of strenuous mental activity on the part 
of the child himself” (p. 86). That activity does require 
direct instruction. Here the teacher is not a facilitator but 
actively engaged in direct teaching. Indeed Vygoysky spoke 
of “Instruction [as] one of the principal sources of the school 
child’s concepts . . . [it] is also a powerful force in directing 
their evolution; it determines the fate of this total mental 
development.” (p. 85). However he also recognised that, 
although spontaneous and scientific concepts are distinct, 
they are “related and constantly influence each other” 
(p. 85). While this realisation is significant as it stands, 
Vygotsky went further in exploring the relationship between 
spontaneous and scientific concepts and the significant of 
that relationship for pedagogy. He contended that learning 
proceeds from the counter-intuitive to the intuitive, itself a 
counter-intuitive idea. 
In the scientific concepts that the child acquires in school, 
the relationship to an object is mediated from the start 
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by some other concept. Thus the very notion of scientific 
concepts implies a certain position in relation to other 
concepts, i.e., a place within a system of concepts. It is 
our contention that the rudiments of sytemisation first 
enter the child’s mind by way of his contact with scientific 
concepts and are then transferred to everyday concepts, 
changing their psychological structure from the top down. 
(1962, p. 93, italics added)
The idea that teachers start with the scientific or abstract 
concepts and then may draw on everyday knowledge perhaps 
as illustrative of the concept has profound consequences 
for teaching. It moves academic knowledge and the 
knowledgeable teacher to the central position at school, but 
does not exclude the child’s experience. 
It is difficult for students, and for many teachers, to grasp 
that concepts are material abstractions in their own right 
and that, in acquiring this knowledge we start with 
abstractions, concepts which, as Vygotsky noted, must 
be taught because they do not arise ‘spontaneously’ from 
experience. The commonsense view that we proceed from 
the known to the unknown, leads to constructivist 
pedagogies, and also justifies the variously termed ‘twenty-
first century futures approaches’. This type of instrumentalist 
education emphasises ‘relevance’ and is directed towards 
producing skills, competencies and outcomes. Indeed, in 
what appears to be a denial of knowledge itself, knowledge 
is reduced to a process. According to Bolstad and Gilbert 
(2012) 
Knowledge is rapidly created every day. Knowledge is 
the process of creating new knowledge. It is a product 
of “networks and flows” coming into being through 
interactions and intersections on a “just-in-time” basis to 
solve specific problems as they emerge (p. 13). 
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Both ‘process’ education and constructivism lack the 
hierarchical systems of meaning that enable students to 
progress from lower order to higher order concepts systems 
found in academic subjects. These systems of meaning are 
the coherent epistemologies that, if offered in a curriculum, 
are the means to intellectual development for all social 
groups (Rata, 2017; 2019). What is also required along with 
the academic concepts and content are pedagogies which 
enable teachers and students to find relationships between 
the abstract knowledge and the world of their immediate 
experience. Knowledge that is independent of a student’s 
context is not, as Vygotsky (1962) argued, unrelated to his 
or her experience. It may shed light upon contexts, and in 
this way, be highly relevant. However, the process is from 
the abstract to the concrete. The contexts illuminated by the 
ideas may be from the student’s own world, but abstract ideas 
may also be used to illustrate the experience of humanity. In 
this way, academic ideas have the potential to take students 
into a range of universalising experiences, linking their own 
to the lives of others. This is the political potential of abstract 
knowledge. 
Conclusion
A ‘curriculum in search of a coherent epistemology’ is one 
which recognises that abstract knowledge is the path into 
the “yet to be thought” (Bernstein, 2000, p. 30). Bernstein 
locates that site for alternate possibilities in the ongoing 
contradictions of education. Those alternates are found 
in the context-independent nature of abstract knowledge. 
Context-dependent meanings on the other hand, “are so 
embedded in the context that they have no reference outside 
that context . . .they are totally consumed by that context” 
(p. 30). However, “if meanings have an indirect relation to 
a specific material base, the meanings themselves create a 
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gap or a space.” The gap that Bernstein theorises, is one that 
“a potential discursive gap, one he suggests is “the site for 
the unthinkable, the site of the impossible . . .it is the crucial 
site of the yet to be thought.” (p. 30, italics in the original). 
It is this potential that arises from the strife of the dialectic. 
Deep structural contradictions within the institutions of the 
political system, including within education, are the context 
within which the material realities of life can be changed by 
the immaterial ideas. 
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The goal of this paper is to identify and justify a normative 
principle that allows for an identification of inequalities 
incompatible with educational justice. To reach that goal, 
three alternative versions of egalitarianism are discussed: 
luck egalitarianism, threshold (minimalist) egalitarianism, 
and respect egalitarianism. Respect egalitarianism can be 
closely linked to the model of epistemic justice, which was 
recently the subject of intensive, far reaching discussions in 
the field of philosophy of education. This paper argues that 
the approaches of both luck egalitarianism and threshold 
egalitarianism are inadequate to satisfy the aim of education. 
Luck egalitarianism entails the “bottomless pit problem” 
that seems to be conceptually and politically unsolvable. 
Additionally, luck egalitarians tend to interpret education 
as a positional, distributive good whose primary value is 
extrinsic. This stance ignores the fact that education is 
foremost concerned with the growth of knowledge - a non-
positional good whose worth is primarily intrinsic. On the 
other hand, threshold egalitarians do not offer a conceptual 
means of discriminating between just and unjust educational 
inequalities that lie above the capability threshold required 
by individuals to participate in the political life of society 
and/or to live a life of dignity. 
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The approach of respect egalitarianism avoids these 
shortcomings. According to this approach, the most crucial 
form of educational injustice is treating select groups of 
students with disrespect by disregarding their beliefs, 
experiences, ideals, and achievements, as well as their 
knowledge-ability. Educational injustice appears both as a 
lack of empathy and cognitive respect toward students. To 
overcome this educational injustice, educational institutions 
should design and implement forms of teaching that 
equally include the beliefs and experiences of all students. 
Teachers should use these beliefs and experiences as a point 
of departure for addressing academic classroom content. 
Social, economic, and knowledge inequalities between 
students would no longer be an issue of educational injustice 
if principles of respect in formal education were fully 
implemented.
This paper explores the relationship between equality and 
justice in formal education. More precisely, it addresses 
the following questions: which versions of egalitarianism 
correspond to the concept of educational justice (and why), 
and which educational inequalities are incompatible with 
the norms implied by this concept? 
In the last two decades, three alternative versions of 
egalitarianism have been conceptually elaborated upon: luck 
egalitarianism, threshold (minimalist) egalitarianism, and 
respect egalitarianism. The latter is closely linked to the model 
of epistemic justice, a model recently subject to intensive, far 
reaching discussions in the field of philosophy of education. 
The following considerations will comparatively analyze 
these three approaches with respect to the primary questions 
of this paper. This should allow us to develop a conceptual 
tool for identifying unjust or morally wrong educational 
inequalities. The final part of this paper will offer clues about 
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what kinds of pedagogies are required to overcome unjust 
educational inequalities. 
Luck Egalitarianism: Educational Justice as a Redistribution 
of Resources in Favor of the Disadvantaged Students 
Luck egalitarianism may be viewed as a label for the “classic” 
distributive-egalitarian model of justice. During the last 
decade, Harry Brighouse elaborately applied this model to 
topics of educational justice. According to Brighouse, because 
inequalities in education license inequalities in income, it is 
unjust when educational inequalities are caused by a family’s 
choices, background, or circumstances (Brighouse, 2003, 
pp. 473–475). Brighouse draws arguments from Rawls and 
Dworkin - probably the most prominent egalitarian theorists 
of distributive justice. 
It is important to note that the mentioned authors are not 
arguing against inequalities of income and wealth in general, 
insofar as these inequalities reflect the choices made by 
individuals on the grounds of equal opportunity. Unequal 
distribution of rewards is just, provided that the competing 
individuals deserved this distribution, that is, if this 
distribution is due to their chosen actions they can be held 
responsible for them. However, individuals are certainly not 
responsible for their family background. Hence, a schooling 
practice is unjust if it reproduces the advantages and 
disadvantages of brute luck and transforms these advantages 
and disadvantages into unequal positions in a competition 
for rewards or statuses. The principle of equal opportunity 
to lead an autonomously chosen life presupposes the 
neutralization of the “brute bad luck” (Dworkin, 2000, pp. 
285–287). 
This neutralization appears to be primarily the domain of 
school education. So Rawls argues that a just society should 
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spend more effort and resources on the early education of 
children disadvantaged by their family backgrounds, or by 
their health, or even by their talents, in order to equalize their 
opportunities to define and pursue their own life prospects 
and competing for goods and employment positions with 
other individuals without these disadvantages (Rawls, 1999, 
pp. 86–87). 
To sum up: Social justice presupposes equal education, 
understood as “a positional good, relative to the instrumental 
benefits it brings” (Brighouse, 2003, p. 475; emphasis in the 
original text). The equal distribution of this good presupposes 
a redistribution of educational efforts and resources in favor 
of disadvantaged children. 
However, this claim for redistribution entails what 
Brighouse calls the “bottomless pit problem” (Brighouse 
2003, pp. 477–478). Neutralizing disadvantages from family 
background alone would require an enormous amount of 
effort and resources since neutralization must target not 
only the unequal funding of schools but also the inequality 
of children’s pre-school socialization and upbringing. 
Moreover, the principles of luck egalitarianism in education 
seem to imply a neutralization of inequalities in the natural 
gifts of the children. Children are certainly not responsible 
for their level of talent. A complete equalization of 
opportunities between children with different natural gifts, 
for example between children with and without mental 
disabilities, seems to be an entirely utopian goal, thereby 
making the bottomless pit problem seemingly unsolvable. 
Minimalist Egalitarianism as a Threshold Model of 
Educational Justice
A prominent strategy to eliminate the bottomless pit problem 
is to define a threshold of educational equality that should be 
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reached by every child. From this perspective, inequalities 
above the threshold are deemed acceptable. I would like to 
call this approach minimalist egalitarianism. 
Generally speaking, it is possible to distinguish between the 
two different approaches to define a threshold of educational 
equality. By the late 1980s, Amy Gutmann proposed a 
“democratic threshold principle” based on the concept of 
deliberative democracy (Gutmann 1987). More recently, 
Martha Nussbaum developed a different, anthropologically 
founded argument, according to which a threshold of basic 
human capabilities should be cultivated in every human 
being (Nussbaum 2006). 
Gutmann’s threshold principle suggests that inequalities in 
the distribution of educational goods can be justified if – and 
only if – they do not limit the ability of every individual to 
effectively participate in the democratic process (Gutmann, 
1987, p. 136). Gutmann understands this process as a practice 
of political deliberation, whose performance requires the 
ability to argumentatively evaluate different values and 
options of (and for) collective political action (Gutmann, 
1987, p. 171). School education would be just if every child 
received an education that allows her to develop this ability, 
thereby enabling her to participate in the democratic process. 
An obvious weakness of the concept is that it is limited to the 
political sphere, or more precisely, to the practice of political 
deliberation. But education concerns not only one’s ability to 
participate politically, but also to provide individuals with 
the capacity to define and pursue one’s own notion of a good 
life in society. As determined in the previous section, Rawls 
and Dworkin both endorsed this broader understanding of 
education. Education is not only about politics but also about 
social participation in the broader sense of the term. Imagine 
that John received an education that provided him with 
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the ability to deliberate but did not offer to him any of the 
high professional skills. When in competition with others 
who attended schools that offered sound training in these 
skills, he would be deprived of positions and offices. Should 
the education that John received be considered “just”? No, 
obviously it should not. 
Martha Nussbaum’s threshold principle avoids Gutmann’s 
political reductionism. Nussbaum identifies central human 
capabilities implicit in the idea of a life led with dignity. 
Furthermore, she endorses the idea of a threshold level for 
each capability, “[b]eneath which it is held that truly human 
functioning is not available for citizens; the social goal 
should be understood in terms of getting citizens above 
this capability threshold” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 71). Human 
functions should be understood according to the concept 
of human dignity; that implies “[t]hat the capabilities in 
question should be pursued for each and every person, 
treating each as an end and none as a mere tool of the ends 
of the others” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 70). Nussbaum offers a 
list of ten central human capabilities (e.g. affiliation, bodily 
integrity, and control over one’s environment (political and 
material)) whose cultivation is a necessary condition for a 
dignified human existence (Nussbaum, 2006, pp. 76–78). 
One may question whether all of those capabilities can 
claim universal validity. For example, it is difficult to deny 
that there may be large groups of human beings capable 
of leading a life of dignity without aiming to control their 
environment – both in the political sense of effective political 
participation or in the material sense of being able to hold 
property. However, this question is not crucial to this paper’s 
argument. Another question seems to be much more urgent 
for the theory of educational justice: are all inequalities 
above the threshold of central human capabilities irrelevant 
to educational justice? 
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The following example illustrates this point. Ian is from a 
wealthy middle class family and attended a well-financed, 
high-performing school. Mary is from an underprivileged 
family and attended a school in her low-income 
neighborhood. The material resources in Mary’s school 
are insufficient, there is permanent fluctuation among the 
underpaid teachers, and several students are confronting 
drug addiction and crime in their families. Despite this, 
the school manages to bring its students to the thresholds 
defined by Gutmann and Nussbaum. However, this is the 
maximum result that Mary’s school can achieve.
This is not the case in Ian’s school, which offers advanced 
classes in rhetoric, sciences, economics, and foreign 
languages. Mary’s school cannot afford these advanced 
courses. Additionally, because the majority of students 
at Ian’s school are middle class, the learning atmosphere 
is much comfortable then at Mary’s school. It is obvious 
that by the end of their respective schooling both Ian and 
Mary will be able to effectively participate in the democratic 
process and lead a dignified human life. However, Mary 
will be less equipped to handle competition in social 
positions and offices. Her disadvantages are the result of 
her poorer education due to her underprivileged family 
background. 
Even if Mary manages to move beyond the capability 
threshold, enabling her to participate politically in her 
society and/or to live a life of dignity, I think that most of 
us would share the intuition that Mary’s educationally 
produced disadvantages are unjust. This paper claims that 
this intuition can be conceptually grasped and explicated 
through the approach of respect egalitarianism.
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Respect Egalitarianism and Educational Justice
Unlike proponents of the threshold model, respect egalitarians 
describe justice and injustice in terms of complete equality: 
it is understood however as a moral equality instead of as 
distributive or competence oriented. According to respect 
egalitarians, formal education cannot be restricted to 
reaching the capability threshold by everyone. The principle 
of respect egalitarianism rather presupposes that educational 
practices of discrimination or unequal treatment of children 
are unjust, even when these practices do not interfere with 
the goal of moving all children above the capability threshold 
that is required for political participation and/or for leading 
a good human life. 
Unlike luck egalitarians, respect egalitarians understand 
justice as an inner dimension of social relations and not 
primarily as an algorithm for a fair distribution of goods 
qua transferable objects. The underlying idea is that 
the development of individual autonomy (based on the 
development of self-respect) depends immediately and 
primarily on the quality of the social relations themselves. 
This refers to the social relations that the individuals are 
involved in and not the possession of distributable goods. 
Thus, justice presupposes overcoming certain forms of social 
relations, such as oppression and discrimination, rather than 
the distribution and redistribution of goods (Anderson, 
2000; Gosepath, 2004). In other words, according to respect 
egalitarians, educational justice is not primarily a matter of 
the distribution and redistribution of educational resources 
but of the respectful treatment of all students. Thus, in 
the issue of educational justice, Birdhouse’s bottomless pit 
problem loses its urgency. Respectful treatment is obviously 
not a distributive good. When a teacher “gives” respect to 
student A it does not imply that she “takes” this respect away 
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from student B, nor does it mean that treating some students 
respectfully presupposes disrespectful treatment of other 
students. 
What does it mean to treat (immature) persons with respect 
in educational contexts? Approximately fifty years ago, 
Richard S. Peters offered a description of respect in the field 
of education that remains unsurpassable in its semantic 
richness and analytic clarity. 
In general respect for persons is the feeling awakened when 
another is regarded as a distinctive centre of consciousness, 
with peculiar feelings and purposes that crisscross his 
institutional roles. It is connected with the awareness one has 
that each man has his own aspirations, his own viewpoint 
on the world; that each man takes pride in his achievements, 
however idiosyncratic they may be. (Peters 1966, p. 59)
According to Peters, to respect someone implies recognizing 
her as possessing an “assertive point of view” and being 
capable of “judgments, appraisals, intentions, and decisions,” 
or recognizing him as someone “[w]ho is capable of valuation 
and choice, and who has a point of view of his own about his 
own future and interests” (ibid., p. 210).
Thus, respect is the recognition of all features which 
constitute a person as a “distinctive centre of consciousness” 
– her feelings, purposes, aspirations, and achievements, as 
well as her capacity to make judgments. Now, the question 
is whether one can and should differentiate among those 
features and among the social and pedagogical relations that 
address them. This does seem necessary, especially in the 
context of schooling. Teachers cannot regard the judgments, 
feelings, or aspirations of children in the same way. While 
educators should seriously consider the feelings of a child in 
their actuality, they may not acknowledge a child’s judgments 
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as being fully true and justified. Educators should rather 
recognize the child’s potential to develop the ability for true 
and justified judgments. 
This difference, which seems to have enormous educational 
significance, may be best explained through Axel Honneth’s 
distinction of two different forms of intersubjective 
recognition: empathy and cognitive respect. While the 
recognition form of empathy refers to the emotional needs 
and wishes of the individual, the recognition form of 
cognitive respect requires acknowledging the individual as a 
subject capable of moral autonomy. This capability manifests 
itself basically in deliberations about the legitimacy of norms. 
These deliberations presuppose a formal, universalistic 
moral perspective. Within the process of deliberation, 
the individual’s ability to recognize others and herself as 
possessors of formal, universal, and equal rights is made 
evident (Honneth, 1992, pp. 173–185). 
Hence, Honneth describes cognitive respect as more or 
less identical with juridical recognition (Honneth, 1992, 
pp. 173–196). In his view, to respect a person in that way 
means not discriminating against him by acknowledging 
that he has the same rights as every other human being. This 
recognition of individuals as bearers of rights presupposes 
the acknowledgement of individuals as morally accountable. 
It presupposes that they are endowed with practical reason 
– that is, that they are capable of taking the universal, moral 
point of view; taking responsibility for their own actions and 
decisions; and deliberating over moral and juristic norms 
vis-à-vis the moral point of view (ibid, pp. 173–185). 
This conception of cognitive respect seems, at first glance, 
to have a restricted and/or only indirect applicability to 
education, for children obviously cannot yet be considered 
fully reasonable and morally responsible persons. The task 
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of education is precisely to help children to become such 
persons. However, treating children with “prospective 
respect” (Curren, 2007, p. 47) is a necessary condition for this 
becoming. According to the concept of prospective respect, 
even if children cannot yet be considered fully reasonable, 
adults (especially teachers and parents) should nonetheless 
recognize them as having the potential to become reasonable 
persons endowed with moral autonomy.1 This claim fits very 
well with Honneth’s understanding of a future oriented 
dimension of intersubjective recognition. According to that 
future oriented dimension, persons can develop particular 
abilities given that significant individuals in their lives 
recognize (in advance) their potential to develop these 
abilities (Honneth, 1992, p. 110). 
While cognitive respect concerns children’s futures, empathy 
addresses children’s actuality. To be empathic with children 
requires co-experience with their experiences – to feel their 
feelings as caused by their experiences and to understand 
their needs and ideals. Empathy means recognizing others 
as they are in their actual subjectivity and emotionally 
supporting them as they are in their present inner and outer 
life (Honneth, 1992, pp. 153–154).
Given that differentiation, in discussing respect 
egalitarianism, it is necessary to address both equality of 
empathy and equality of cognitive acknowledgement.
Equality of empathy does not necessarily imply that every 
teacher should equally love all pupils. It is important to 
remember that norms of justice in general and egalitarianism 
in particular address in first instance institutional 
1.  As Harvey Siegel persuasively suggests, the most significant 
justification for fostering rationality and reason, as intended by the 
educational program of critical thinking, is to treat schoolchildren with 
respect (Siegel, 2012, p. 192). 
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arrangements and not acts of individual behavior. The 
demand for egalitarian empathy does not imply an appeal 
for teachers to equally love their pupils. Rather, it requires 
modes of teaching and re-structuring curricula, including 
the needs, ideals, and experiences of all school children in the 
classroom, and treating these needs, ideals, and experiences 
as the point of departure for all teaching activities and 
learning processes. 
On the other hand, cognitive respect, as indicated above, 
means recognizing the child’s potential for rationality, that 
is, for grasping concepts, understanding, and constructing 
arguments. 
Now, when we try to think empathy and cognitive respect 
together in the context of school education, we will be 
heading to a notion of just pedagogies. These pedagogies 
focus affirmatively on both dimensions: the feelings and 
ideals of all children on one the hand and the potential of all 
children to articulate these ideals, feelings, and experiences 
conceptually on the other. Moreover, teachers who are 
engaged in this kind of pedagogy will actively initiate and 
support all children’s efforts to articulate themselves in 
conceptual and argumentative ways. 
Schools today – even in the most democratic countries – are 
still far away from implementing thus sketched norms of 
just pedagogies. These schools permanently generate what 
Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial” and “hermeneutical” 
injustices (Fricker, 2007, p. 1). These forms of epistemic 
injustices embody a lack of empathy and cognitive disregard, 
clearly illustrating what empathy and cognitive respect in 
education are about. 
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Respect Egalitarianism and Epistemic Injustice
In a recent article, Ben Kotzee persuasively demonstrates 
that the conception of epistemic injustice, initially developed 
by Fricker, enables a deeper level of identification and 
analysis of forms of educational injustice: forms that are 
likely to have more devastating effects on the educational 
motivation and success of students than the unequal and/
or unfair distribution of material resources in education 
(Kotzee, 2013, pp. 340–349). Epistemic injustice directly 
concerns (mis-)recognition of different forms of knowledge 
and access to publicly validated knowledge (ibid, 340). Since 
education is basically about the transmission and growth 
of knowledge, the concept of epistemic justice seems more 
suited to the specific domain of educational institutions than 
the approaches that focus on distribution and redistribution 
of material goods. Generally speaking, the distributive 
terminology appears to be, in principle, incompatible with 
the transmission and production of knowledge. Kotzee 
states, “Furthermore, unlike social goods such as money, 
food, or housing that are limited and that must be distributed 
according to certain priorities, there is no limit in principle 
on the number of people that can know any particular truth” 
(ibid, p. 343). One person’s knowledge of a truth does not 
prevent another’s access to that truth, such that “[p]reventing 
one person of knowing too much does not improve the 
quality of what someone else knows” (ibid, p. 343).
Hence, from the perspective of epistemic justice, the 
most crucial moral pathology in education is not the 
lack of redistribution of material resources in favor of the 
disadvantaged by bad brute luck. This pathology consists 
rather of two forms of disrespect. Kotzee, following Fricker, 
calls these forms “testimonial injustice” and “hermeneutical 
injustice” (ibid, p. 344). 
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Now, it is important to stress in advance that both testimonial 
and hermeneutical injustice entail a lack of empathy and 
cognitive respect, however in slightly different ways. While 
testimonial injustice is characterized by a lack for sensitivity 
for the specific beliefs and truth claims of certain persons, 
hermeneutical injustice is basically about neglecting the 
efforts and needs of those individuals to articulate their 
beliefs and experiences using publicly recognized concepts; 
it also concerns the deficit of social semantic resources for 
that articulation. 
Testimonial injustice occurs in cases where credibility is 
assigned based on who individuals are and not what they 
(may) know. These are cases, in which less credibility is given 
to students of a lower social status, although they may have an 
equal ability to gain and produce knowledge as middle class 
students. So, for example, several empirical surveys from 
Germany illustrate the point that teachers regularly evaluate 
children from immigrant families with a lower social status 
as only being eligible for low-performance, non-academic 
secondary schools without a college track. This holds true even 
if these children reached the same level of knowledge-related 
abilities at the end of primary school as children from non-
immigrant families who have gymnasium recommendations 
(Baumert, 2001, pp. 279–402). The main reason seems to be 
a particular pattern of thought that is apparently widely 
widespread among school teachers in Germany. According 
to the pattern, family socialization of every child as well as 
her “acculturation” determines the child’s learning ability 
and hence her knowledge-related credibility (Mannitz & 
Schiffauer, 2002, pp. 97–100). Thus, not only the level of a 
child’s knowledge but also the “quality” of her culture and 
socialization are subject to discriminatory evaluation when 
decisions are made concerning the kind of secondary school 
the child should attend in his formal education.
90 Knowledge, Politics and Education
This case is a clear example of a lack of what Fricker calls 
testimonial sensitivity. This refers to both a lack of empathy 
to students’ beliefs and a respectful readiness to fully 
include those students in the space of shared information 
and argumentative discussion. As Fricker emphasizes, not 
including someone in that space means not recognizing e 
him as a ‘knower,’ and therefore hindering him to develop 
his potential as a knower (Fricker, 2007, p. 145). 
The second form of epistemic injustice, the so called 
hermeneutical injustice, occurs when disrespect towards 
beliefs, intentions and achievements of certain people is 
embodied in the publicly (and educationally) validated 
language itself. This is the case particularly when there are 
no publicly recognized and developed concepts capable of 
adequately articulating the beliefs, experiences, aspirations, 
and achievements of members of marginalized groups 
(Fricker, 2007, pp. 5–7; pp. 147–152; Kotzee, 2013, pp. 344–
345). So, it seems to be the case that in the “official” language 
of educational institutions in Germany, no concept exists to 
express the simultaneous self-identification of students from 
immigrant families with different ethnic cultures as well as 
their multi-lingual socialization as an achievement, although 
translating between different languages and cultural 
contexts is obviously a valuable skill that can serve as a 
basis for producing new and important knowledge. Instead, 
educational authorities still place these students in cultural 
boxes thus reducing the distinctive subjectivity of those 
students to manifestation of a single “foreign culture” which 
is seen as being “deficient” with regard to German “leading 
culture”. As some ethnographic studies suggest, it is very 
difficult for those students to find verbal means (in the form 
of publicly recognized concepts) to argue against their own 
subordination via these constructed “cultures” and against 
the educational ignorance of their specific knowledge and 
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abilities (Mannitz, 2003, pp. 319–320; Mannitz & Schiffauer, 
2002, pp. 87–100). 
This situation disregards the need and demand for recognizing 
moral equality and valuable achievements (lack of empathy), 
as well as lack of support for certain marginalized groups 
of students to make their experiences intelligible and so to 
participate in the process of knowledge production (lack 
of cognitive respect). Both of these deficits are the result of 
cultural domination, largely organized upon a homogeneous 
canon of traditional knowledge. This canon is not open 
to conceptual innovations, that is, to new concepts that 
articulate the experiences and achievements of marginalized 
groups. 
It is not difficult to imagine educational institutions that 
are able to prevent testimonial injustice and hermeneutical 
injustice, lack of empathy and lack of cognitive respect. Such 
institutions would be characterized by an equal regard for 
different forms of knowledge and the knowledge related 
abilities of the students, regardless of their social status. 
Furthermore, within such educational institutions, the beliefs, 
ideals, and experiences of all students would be brought into 
the classroom. These beliefs, ideals, and experiences would 
be the focus and the departure point for teaching at schools 
claiming to be just. With regard to the issue of construction 
of school curricula this requires in first place that these 
curricula should be inclusive to the beliefs and experiences 
of all social groups and not restricted to the worldviews and 
values of the upper and middle classes and/or to cultural 
majorities. Second, the curricula should be flexible enough 
to enable teachers to use students’ experiences and beliefs – 
and not fixed “scientific truths” – as points of departure for 
their teaching. 
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Unfortunately, most schools are still ignorant of the 
experiences and beliefs of their students, as well as their 
potential to articulate these experiences and beliefs 
conceptually and transform them into knowledge. This is 
especially true with regard to students who do not belong 
to culturally and socially dominant groups. Instead, schools 
are still endorsing a top-down approach, focusing on fixed 
canonic truths that they attempt to transmit to the heads 
of the students. This is the main reason why contemporary 
school education remains unjust.
Which Educational Inequalities are (not) unjust?
The leading goal of this paper was to formulate and justify a 
normative principle that allows for differentiation between 
just and unjust inequalities in formal education. Thus far, it has 
been argued that the approaches of both luck egalitarianism 
and threshold egalitarianism fall short of this goal. Luck 
egalitarianism is associated with the bottomless pit problem, 
which seems conceptually and politically unsolvable. 
Besides, luck egalitarians tend to interpret education as a 
positional, distributive good with primarily extrinsic worth. 
This ignores the fact that education is essentially the growth 
of knowledge, which is a non-positional good with primarily 
intrinsic value. On the other hand, threshold egalitarians 
do not offer conceptual means of discriminating between 
just and unjust educational inequalities that lie above the 
capability threshold that every person needs to participate in 
the political life of his society and/or to live a life of dignity. 
In other words, simply reaching the capability threshold 
does not imply that all students have received an equally 
good education.
This leads us to a distinction that is crucial for developing 
a thorough account of educational justice. As John Calvert 
recently argued, one should strictly differentiate between 
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“equal educational opportunities” and “equal education” 
(Galvert, 2014, p. 83). While at the talk about “equal 
educational opportunities” we face actually a notion of social 
justice through education, equal education regards justice 
in education, that is, educational justice in the precise sense 
of the term. Justice in education is foremost about enabling 
the maximal growth of self- and world-knowledge for 
every student and enabling every student to participate in 
the processes of producing and transmitting knowledge in 
society. Justice in education is “only” in second place about 
the question of how this enabling of knowledge may affect 
student’s economic and social opportunities. 
The approach of respect egalitarianism is best equipped to 
answer the question of how school education can enable 
the maximal growth of knowledge and participation in 
knowledge for every student. Let us recall the great insight 
of John Dewey that growth of knowledge is carried out by 
mediation between personal experiences and beliefs on 
the one hand and conceptual contents that claim universal 
validity on the other (Dewey, 1964, p. 344 ff.; p. 351). In 
order to initiate this mediation, school education has both 
to address the personal-subjective ideals, worldviews, needs 
and feelings of the students, and to provide the students with 
opportunities, pedagogical space and skills to articulate 
these self-building entities conceptually and argumentatively 
on the ground of students’ becoming fluent in mastering 
of academic subjects. Empathy is required to fulfil the 
former task, while the latter presupposes cognitive respect, 
culminating in students’ initiation into discursive practices 
of acquiring and justifying knowledge. We face educational 
injustice in the sense of respect egalitarianism when the 
beliefs and experiences of certain groups of students are 
not represented in the classroom or curricula; when certain 
students are labelled as not having the potential to grasp 
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and apply conceptual content; or when students are not 
receiving sufficient support in their schools to become fluent 
in conceptual understanding and (self-) articulation. 
The implementation of these norms of educational respect 
(i.e. empathy and cognitive respect) would not lead to an 
elimination of all inequalities between students’ levels of 
knowledge or between social and economic opportunities 
of high school absolvents. Levels of knowledge and social 
opportunities depend on several factors, many of which are 
largely beyond the scope of formal education, such as family 
care, upbringing, or peer groups. Educational institutions 
would nevertheless become just if they treated all students 
with equal respect; this means that they would not internally 
produce epistemic injustice. 
These considerations should not be misunderstood to mean 
that distributive questions are irrelevant for educational 
justice in the respect approach. Educational injustice in the 
form of disrespect is closely linked to unfair distribution 
of material resources. When educational policymakers 
and teachers disregard the experiences and the knowledge 
ability of students with an underprivileged social and 
cultural status, they tend to spend less money and effort 
on disadvantaged students’ education as compared with 
students from wealthier circumstances who are situated in 
culturally mainstream families. It is ultimately this genetic 
link between unequal distribution of resources in education 
that neglects underprivileged children, and disrespect 
towards those children that makes this distribution unjust. 
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Education and Social Capital 
H.G. Wells presciently concluded his Outline of History in 
1920 with a warning we need to take to heart seriously: 
“Human history becomes more and more a race between 
education and catastrophe.” (Wells 2004, 1st 1920) The 
inadequacy of education at all levels is putting our future at 
enormous risk in the rapid and radical change Indian society 
is undergoing. It is failing to provide the social capital needed 
for our society to navigate this transition, that is, the social 
infrastructure of values and norms, behaviour patterns and 
interactive networks on which our Constitutional vision 
of social transformation is premised. Conscientised adult 
literacy, universal primary education, good secondary 
education in multiple streams available to all, accessible 
tertiary education for everyone qualified, with at least some 
world class institutions at the upper end of this spectrum,…
all these are crucial social capital for governments and society 
to investment in.
Already in the ideological inspiration of the freedom struggle, 
there is an inherent tension between, on the one hand, an 
envisioned future that contested colonial rule in terms of 
a “vision centred on social transformation aimed at giving 
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justice to the downtrodden,” (Kumar 1998: 10), and on the 
other, an idealised past that “gave priority to the recovery 
of Indian self-identity with the help of religious cultural 
revivalism.” (Kumar: ibid.) The dominant Nehruvian 
consensus of the early independence era was premised on 
the first, but it never could quite contain or defuse the lure 
of the second. 
Transmission and Transformation
For the sociologist, Emile Durkheim education is “the means 
by which society perpetually re-creates the conditions of its 
very existence” by “a systematic socialisation of the young 
generation.” (Durkheim 1956: 123 -124) This implies two basic 
functions for education. Firstly, transmitting an institutional 
heritage across generations as an agency of socialisation. 
This is the conservative function of education. And secondly, 
transforming this heritage through critique and creativity. 
This is the progressive function of education. In a more stable 
social context it is the first that will be emphasised, while in 
a society subjected to change and development it must be the 
second. 
Dewey’s approach to education was perhaps more nuanced 
and contemporary than the Durkheim’s: “education may be 
conceived either retrospectively or prospectively. That is to 
say, it may be treated as process of accommodating the future 
to the past, or as an utilisation of the past for a resource in 
a developing future.” (Dewey 1957: 92) Dewey would clearly 
emphasise the second without perhaps entirely dismissing 
the first. Being more future oriented than Durkheim, he was 
only too aware of his changing world: 
“For we live not in a settled and finished world, but in one 
which is going on, and where our main task is prospective, 
and where retrospect – and all knowledge as distinct from 
thought is retrospect – is of value in the solidity, security, 
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and fertility it affords our dealings with the future.” (Dewey 
1957: 178)
The future of a changing society demands a prospective rather 
than the retrospective perspective in education. But in both, 
its transmissive and more especially, in its transformative 
function education have failed our youth and compromised 
their future. Paradoxically, the schooling they get is less and 
less relevant, even as the education they need is becoming 
more critical and urgent. 
The Nehruvian state, in spite of its socialist rhetoric and its 
egalitarian promise, showed much more continuity than 
disjunction with its colonial past. The distance of the upper 
strata of society from the masses is more apparent and even 
blatant with regard to education! Here a dual system has 
been evolved, in spite of all official policy, namely a few good 
institutions to cater to the better off classes and many poor 
ones to contain the aspirations of the less privileged masses. 
(Naik 1974: 14)
However, there remained an undertone in much of the 
social and secular rhetoric of Nehruvian socialism. With 
the breakdown of the Nehruvian consensus the crisis in 
education has become increasingly acute. Yet, after more 
than half a century Independent India has not universalised 
adult literacy, let alone primary education, nor made available 
to weaker sections good quality secondary and vocational 
schools. The Right to Education Act (2010) has taken us sixty 
years to pass and already there are difficulties in its execution. 
Government does not have the institutional infrastructure in 
place and it has to fall back on private agencies. 
And yet too many private educational agencies are less 
concerned with serving a basic social need, than to “capture 
public resources for private ends” (Rudolph and Rudolph 
1972: 23) under the grants-in-aid code, while upward 
102 Knowledge, Politics and Education
mobility has become a free for all, no holds barred contest. 
A private educational mafia is now emerging that is more 
preoccupied with political patronage and economic returns 
from their investment in education, rather than with any real 
educational concerns or pedagogic interests. (Deshpande 
2000)
Earlier attempts at a more comprehensive understanding and 
holist agenda expressed by the Kothari Commission of 1964-
1966, “Education and National Development”, (Government 
of India 1966) has in practice given way to a pragmatic 
instrumentalisation of education for upward social mobility, 
whether this be in response to individual or group claims. 
However, our developmental model has brought us growth 
without equity. Stark inequalities and social tensions are 
increasing with our GDP. There is now
“a whole new class of entrants are knocking on the doors 
of institutionalised education. Denied a fair share in 
educational opportunities all these years, these new entrants 
perceive education as a key to gaining status and power, 
and not always as a means to learn.” (Kumar 1998: 10) 
Our education must confront social inequalities to bring the 
marginalised into an egalitarian and participative society, it 
must also protect the multicultural, pluri-religious diversities 
of our people, which is being undermined by a cultural 
nationalism. For too long has the economic-political agenda 
of development displaced the socio-cultural one of change. 
Our present crises needs must be addressed on both these 
dimensions for an effective holistic approach. In the past the 
role of education has been projected too much in terms of the 
first to the neglect the second.
This demands a fundamental change of perspective and 
orientation and not just in education. What we need is 
‘another development’ (Hettne 2009) and ‘another politics’ 
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and for both ‘another education’, ‘nai talim’ is a sine qua 
non. Education for justice would seem to be the only viable 
alternative for the scale and diversity of a society such as 
ours. (Wren 1977) 
Herein lies the challenge for a model of education that can 
be mainstreamed for the system at large. A large measure 
of daring innovation and energetic creativity will be needed 
for our educators as much, if not more than that of our early 
pioneers, who institutionalised Western education in pre-
independent India. Will our institutions prove open and 
equal to this? Or after having established a successful school 
model once, will we continue with it in pursuit of upward 
mobility into the middle class and a Westernised life style? In 
no area of governance is such a change of perspective more 
critical and urgent than in education.
A Critical Citizenry
John Dewey’s Democracy and Education in 1916 (Dewey 
1957,) with its problem solving approach and project method 
was intended to train an active and critical citizenry with the 
cognitive skills needed in society (Heredia 1992). Dewey may 
be taught in our B.Ed. colleges, but there’s is little evidence 
of his impact on our system in terms of the formation of a 
critical citizenry.
The imperative today is education for a just society, to create 
the social capital for a critical citizenry that will make our 
democracy work for the common good of all, where social 
structures and institutional norms are democratically 
designed and arranged to bridge the ‘justice-gap’ (Samaddar 
2009: 16) between comprehensive justice and a realisable 
one, where social structures and institutional norms must 
be designed and arranged to facilitate “Voice and Choice” 
(Sen 2009; 87- ) for each person, for at least an effective 
minimum to live a decent and dignified life, especially for 
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the vulnerable and marginalised. For justice in a credible 
democratic regime, cannot be dictated by a tyranny of the 
majority, much less imposed by the hegemony of a dominant 
elite. 
Our society has instituted democratic freedoms and civil 
liberties as fundamental rights. However, economic-political 
inequalities still remain stubbornly endemic to our system, 
further accentuated with our economic development, while 
social-cultural solidarity is increasingly undermined by 
divisions of caste, class and creed, mobilised for partisan gain, 
even erupting into collective violence. A relevant education 
must provide the social capital to create a critical citizenry to 
resist and reverse this downward spiral into dangerous and 
retrogressive extremisms and revivalisms of all kinds. 
Comprehending Justice
Contending concepts concerning justice with their rival 
claims to truth often diverge. Mapping a minimal common 
ground across these is a daunting task. For justice in a 
society must be founded on a consensus of moral values 
and implemented fairly by agreed procedures. While the 
substance of justice must be premised on these values, just 
procedures must follow due process. However, some viable 
consensus on both is essential. For then a credible substantive 
understanding of justice can be spelled out in realisable 
procedures. This will not result in a comprehensive agenda 
in our quest for a just society, but in our quest for just ends 
through just means, it will address and narrow the ‘justice-
gap’ (Samaddar 2009: 16) between the formal claims for, and 
the practical implementation of justice. 
Justice as Integral
A regime deemed to be just, but which eventually leads to 
injustice, is a contradiction in terms, for a truly just social 
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structure cannot lead to or perpetuate unjust social results. 
If it does, it must forfeit its claim to be called just. Therefore 
the talisman of a just regime must be in just outcomes, 
not merely in just procedures. In the complex context of 
a changing society, this apparent tautology is too easily 
lost sight of, especially in regard to the inequalities and 
imbalances that a supposedly just regime often precipitates. 
Moreover, justice necessarily demands an integrated 
approach, for justice itself must be integral not only 
in confronting the contradictions within groups and 
communities but also the ones between them and across 
social strata as well. In society justice for one group, or 
for a section within a group cannot amount to a denial of 
justice to other groups, or to another section in the group. 
This seems self-evident: quotas for vulnerable groups must 
be complementary not contradictory to the interests of other 
vulnerable groups and persons; what is given to dalits must 
not undermine what is meant for tribals; nor what is given to 
some within the community undermine what is due to other 
members of this community. 
But more to the point, justice in one area must not be a 
negation of justice in another. Affirmative action and 
minority rights are meant to level the field and protect 
vulnerable groups, whether economic, social or cultural. If 
one contradicts the other both will be stymied, the promotion 
of justice in society discredited, the vulnerable groups left at 
odds with each other and so worse off for the intervention. 
Affirmative action that undercuts religious diversity and 
minority entitlements would be unjust, as would minority 
rights that contradict human rights of individuals, in and 
outside the group. 
For justice as integral is a crucial test case for any 
understanding of justice. It must be equally available for, 
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and equally applied to all. It cannot be the privilege of some 
and denied to others. I cannot say: justice for us, but not for 
them, for me, not him or her. Further, justice as equality 
argues beyond an equal justice for all to a just equality 
for each, political, economic and social. This must be the 
sustainable basis for the pursuit of the other two dimensions 
of justice: liberty and fraternity or solidarity. A just society 
must integrate all three.
To grapple with this, a comprehensive and feasible regime 
of human rights is essential, one that includes fundamental 
rights, civil and political, social and economic, and equally 
the corresponding basic duties as well. For in the final 
analysis, an integral justice is not intended to legitimise a 
social quest for efficiency, much less for power, but rather 
to facilitate and privilege a people’s desire for a decent and 
humane society. 
Hence justice must be spelt out in terms of rights for minorities, 
who are culturally vulnerable but still socially valuable in 
the diversity of our pluralist society, as also for the socially 
excluded who are marginalised and oppressed, in terms of 
affirmative action and reservation quotas as instruments for 
their inclusion because this is seen as a regeneration of our 
society. How this can be done without precipitating other 
injustices to other groups and communities, is our most 
critical challenge today. 
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity
Thus liberty, equality, fraternity are three necessary 
dimensions of an integral social justice, that characterises a 
just society. (Heredia 2011) Together the three must guide 
our understanding and pursuit of justice lest we settle for a 
notional freedom, a legalistic equality, a formal fellowship. 
At the same time, we must accept that liberty and fraternity 
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are difficult to quantify and measure and so a consensus on 
optimum levels of these can be illusive and problematic, except 
at the extremes of injustice: the violation of fundamental 
rights to freedom or violent conflict threatening security and 
life. 
Equality however is more amenable to analysis. Indeed, in 
a democracy, inequalities are the most endemic cause of 
injustice perceived and justice denied. Justice as equality 
is the shibboleth of any credible regime of democratic and 
civil rights, inclusive of the political and the economic, the 
cultural and the religious domains. However, without liberty 
these are meaningless, without fraternity their sustainability 
is at risk. Yet building a consensus on equality is a challenging 
and daunting task, especially an equality that is fair, free and 
inclusive.
We know that equal outcomes for the engaged parties on 
every dimension of social interaction is simply not possible, 
even with the best intentions of equal justice for all. But 
when these inequalities add up to become cumulative, then 
inevitably a society gets stratified into unequal groups of class, 
castes, races. The exchange between these will necessarily be 
asymmetric and skewed. Moreover, as is apparent in human 
history and can be documented from a wide range of social 
experiences, unequal social exchange within societies and 
across them, becomes further reinforcing and increasingly 
pervasive. Whether this is between social groups, and 
categories, or geographical regions and economic classes … 
when left unaddressed, social relationships thus structured 
will inevitably be oppressive and exploitative. 
No matter how much goodwill and charity, unequal 
exchange only amounts to a benevolent paternalism at best, 
and patronising debilitation at worst. It fails to contend with 
structural anomalies at the origins. Downstream effects are 
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never really remedied until upstream causes are tackled. 
Treating symptoms does not heal the disease. Hence in any 
society where economic class, social caste, political power, 
occupational and educational opportunities, legal access, 
gender bias, racial privilege … are mutually reinforcing, 
then this necessarily leads to increasing inequalities and 
inevitable injustices. 
Justice as equality, where equality is the touchstone of justice, 
requires that though some inequalities in society might very 
well be inevitable, these do not become cumulative and 
embedded in its social structure, or in the interrelationships 
between and within communities and groups and other 
societies. Rather, equal justice demands that such multiple 
inequalities on various dimensions, rather than becoming 
cumulative, are so structured as to neutralise and defuse 
each other. This is a difficult conundrum for any democracy 
but it must be confronted if liberty, equality, fraternity are 
not to be compromised. 
For justice as equality for society means that equity and 
equality must not be in contradiction. This necessarily 
implies redistribution in an equitable manner, of inequalities 
and assets, of advantages and disadvantages … to create a 
level playing field where winners are not always winners and 
no loser always loses. The returns on their performance must 
be so structured as not to be self-perpetuating or the playing 
field will no longer remain level. As far as possible this field 
must be levelled before that can happen, not after it has. This 
demands effective protection and promotion of the weaker, 
more vulnerable in society, but not at the cost of political 
rights and civil liberties of others. 
To constructively confront such a dilemma, this ground 
must be levelled at the bottom of the climb, not flattened at 
the top into an “egalitarian plateau” (Dworkin 1977 179-183) 
109Transformative Education for a Just Society
for those advantaged enough to be able to get there in the 
first place. For the exclusion of the most disadvantaged at 
the very start only leaves an ever more exclusive group to 
compete for scarce opportunities at the peak. 
The Just Society 
A credible understanding of social justice must be premised 
on an integration of the social values, among which liberty, 
equality, solidarity are definitive as necessary conditions for 
a just society. This goes beyond the righteousness of persons 
and fairness in society, whether in exchange or distribution, 
to provide a structural framework for fundamental rights and 
basic needs as essential entitlements for human identity and 
dignity. For basic needs represent the minimum required to 
live with some dignity, and fundamental rights underwrite 
the human agency needed to affirm one’s identity. Both these 
must be guaranteed and extended in a just society. 
All too often the injustices in a society are the unintended 
and unanticipated consequences of ill-adapted institutional 
structures and consequently a skewed implementation of 
justice. However, intended or not, untoward outcomes must 
be addressed if not in anticipation at least in retrospect. 
For implementing an idea of justice that eventually brings 
injustice in practice is a cruel contradiction. A stable and 
sustainable justice must carry over from the ideal to actual. 
Moreover, if justice is to be understood as credible and is to be 
seen as implementable, we need to look at in the context of its 
distinct but not separate dimensions: individual behaviour, 
exchange transactions, the distribution of social goods and 
services, and institutional structures and relationships.
These dimensions and levels of justice are complementary 
and so must be integrated and balanced in a society to be 
just. This demands a justice premised on liberty, critiqued 
by equality and affirmed in solidarity, so that an inclusive 
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solidarity provides the context for social equality that is 
respectful of civic liberties and democratic rights. In other 
words a fraternal solidarity that is a co-responsibility for 
each other in a commitment to a life of dignity and identity 
for all. But this is still a vision for a just society, not a blue-
print for its social structures.
A just society attempts to steer the difficult course past 
libertarians, socialists and communitarians, who privilege 
one or the other dimension of justice at the cost of the others. 
For “justice is our critic, not our mirror” that calls us to 
“always ask of some settled institutional scheme whether it 
is fair” (Dworkin 1985: 219). A vision of justice is not meant 
to mirror back to us the way we are, but to critique it and 
challenge and us to be the way we ought. This cannot be 
decided by majoritarian opinion or even by majority vote, for 
then might would become right, whereas justice must speak 
truth to power, in the public domain. 
This then is the understanding of justice on which the 
argument of this presentation is premised: justice must protect 
and promote liberty, it is best measured and authenticated 
by equality, it can only be sustained and extended with 
fraternity. Any critique of affirmative action, whether in 
terms of reservation quotas or protective discrimination; 
any discussion of minority rights in terms of Constitutional 
guarantees or Directive Principles, must be premised on a 
justice that is defined by all these three: liberty, equality, 
fraternity.
Education and Change 
The relationship of education to society is a problematic one. 
Earlier an optimistic philosophy prevailed:
“It was uncritically assumed that education could cure all 
kinds of social problems and, particularly, that it could 
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bring about more equality among men. As the sociology of 
education developed, this was progressively reversed and a 
new philosophy, a pessimistic one, emerged more and more 
convincingly. It may be summarized in the statement that 
schooling is unable to reduce to any considerable extent the 
inequalities among individuals which result from social 
background.” (Boudon 1974: xii)
The Education Commission Report (1964-66) subtitled 
“Education and National Development” reflected this earlier 
optimism when it emphatically affirmed, that for “change on 
a grand scale....there is one instrument and one instrument 
only, that can be used: Education.” (Government of India 
1966: 79).
In the pessimistic neo-Marxist view, best expressed by 
Gramsci (1957) education becomes the ideological instrument 
of class domination and control. It merely produces “officers 
of the ruling class for the exercise of subordinate functions 
of social hegemony and political government” (Gramsci 1957: 
124) Thus the modern school replaces the medieval Church 
as the dominant ideological state apparatus. 
The new critical sociology of the sixties and seventies, 
provided the basis for an incisive critique of the relationship 
of education and society. It “provided a discourse for re-
examining the relationship among knowledge, culture, 
and power, on the one hand, and schooling and the issue of 
control on the other.” (Aronowitz and Giroux 1985: 144)
Education was now seen as a dependent variable, not a 
causative one in the social system. It reflected and reproduced 
the social structure and culture of the dominant groups that 
controlled it. The school institutionalized the distribution of 
knowledge and skills so as to perpetuate the relative class 
status of different groups in society. The pedagogic process 
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internalized and legitimized the values and disciplines that 
sustained the status quo. Hence the urgency of Deschooling 
Society. (Illich 1973) and developing an alternative Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed. (Freire 1972)
Some versions of this critique were so deterministic as to 
leave little room for an authentic “human praxis”. Historical 
necessity seems to displace hope and struggle. But the process 
of domination is never stable or complete in a society. There 
are “spaces” where subordinate groups do confront and 
can contest superordinate ones. People do resist and the 
“ruptural effects of conflict and struggle”, (Foucault 1980:82) 
often arise among the marginalized and then flow into 
and affect the mainstream. It is not just the reflection and 
‘reproduction’ of the old in society, that we must critique; 
there is also the production and creation of the new, that we 
must make possible.
In the complex, multi-causal situation of a changing society, 
neither of the two extreme positions sketched above are very 
helpful. The reciprocity between these various subsystems 
in modern society cannot be ignored by policy-makers and 
social-planning today, even while conceding that one or the 
other is the dominant system. Moreover, it is hardly possible 
to deny all causal efficacy to education, especially in the 
Third World. For “when we have clear evidence of the role 
of education creating conditions of change, it is usually from 
the Third world rather than the West.” (Di Bona and Singh 
1987: 126)
Approaches to Education
There are two levels at which the role of education can 
be analysed. At the socio-psychological level of analysis, 
educators favour a pedagogic approach. This would focus on 
teachers and students, teaching-learning methods, .... These 
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must be studied and implemented in the classroom and the 
school. However, teaching is a relationship that concerns 
more than just individual teachers and learners. The 
classroom is not meant to be a closed laboratory experiment, 
for the teaching relationship is always situated in the real life 
context of a group located in the institution and in the larger 
society, in which this teaching-learning takes place. Hence 
this pedagogic approach to education must be opened to 
other approaches that take these into consideration.
The socio-cultural approach goes beyond that of social-
psychologists who study individual behaviour in the group. 
They focus on institutions in society. Thus educational 
sociologists are more concerned with the relationship 
between an education system and social structures like the 
family, class stratification, caste hierarchy, the state, etc.. 
Anthropologists who focus on education are more concerned 
with the relationship of education to cultural values and 
norms, social traditions and local customs etc.. Similarly, 
economists and political scientists, focus on the relationship 
between the economic-political system and education in 
society, particularly the role of the state and its governance.
These approaches must complement each other. A social 
analysis of structures of a society would be incomplete 
without a corresponding analysis of its social institutions and 
cultural traditions, as also of its political systems. Further 
an historical approach broadens the context by situating it 
in a timeframe. An adequate understanding of education 
in society must embrace in some measure all these and 
more. Thus an inter-disciplinary approach must integrate 
the pedagogic, the socio-cultural, and the historical, or else 
perceptions and understandings will inevitably be inadequate 
and one-sided. At the critical juncture at which education in 
this country finds itself, nothing less will do.
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Effective classroom pedagogy, must consider not only such 
socio-cultural circumstances of the student in the school, but 
also those of the school in the community and the community 
in society. Obviously, an upper class, English medium, urban 
school will be very different from a lower class, vernacular 
medium, rural school. Religion and caste further complicate 
the differences and historical circumstance further nuances 
this impact. An education for an inclusive participative 
society of critical and sensitive citizens must contribute 
minimising the differences not accentuating them. All this 
brings into play economic and political forces that condition 
the school and the student, often with unintended and 
unanticipated consequences. The resources and goodwill 
needed for a viable education cannot be independent of any 
of this. 
In a formally democratic system, what legitimates the blatant 
inequality is “the ritual of mass examinations” which
“carry a symbolic message – that all individuals have an 
equal chance. Thus, while emphasis on early selection ensures 
special treatment to the children of those who can afford to 
make extra inputs, mass examination promises total parity 
among all the candidates.” (Kumar 1987:32)
This makes for “sponsored” not “contest” mobility. 
(Turner 1961) Such supposed ‘equality’ between ‘unequals’ 
perpetuates and legitimates the status quo even while 
keeping “the confidence and aspirations of the masses alive.” 
(Kumar 1987: 32) Elementary education in India, and now 
pre-primary kindergarten classes in our cities, provide a 
stark illustration of this. 
There is within the system a “key dialectic” that operates 
through two crucial mechanisms: “early selection and 
mass examinations.” (Kumar 1987: 27-41) already at their 
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point of entry into the education system the children are 
streamed at two levels: on the one hand the rather expensive, 
and generally privately run, urban based English medium 
schools which prepare them for an elite status in later life; 
on the other hand, the freely offered, generally rural based, 
vernacular medium schools run by local government bodies, 
that prepare young people to accept lower status occupations. 
J.P.Naik’s remark on Indian education is pertinent: 
“In fact, the primary object of the system is not to spread 
education among the people but to function as an efficient 
and merciless mechanism to select individuals who should 
continue to remain in the privileged sector or enter it afresh.” 
(Naik 1982: 170) 
Raymond Boudon, postulates “a two-stage filtering process” 
for the social status of individuals: “In the first they go from 
a given social background to a given educational level. In 
the second stage they go from educational level to achieved 
status.” (Boudon 1974: 21) Here the endemic divisions and 
prejudices of caste and class, of ethnicity and race, even 
the canons of our secular society stymie the translation of 
personal education into social achievement. 
Dilemmas and Contradictions
This results in a dual system of education: one for the haves – 
mostly but only run by private agencies – and another for the 
have-nots – for those mostly, but not only run by government 
departments. Here we indicate some of the basic dilemmas 
confronting education in our country today: pedagogic, 
cultural, societal, political, economic.
The pedagogic dilemma concerns the humanist versus the 
instrumental perspectives on education. Is education an end 
or a means? Is it a value-in-itself or a means-to-a-goal? Is 
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its purpose to draw out the best in persons, help them grow 
to their full potential as human beings, and become good 
citizens of society? Or is it to be concerned with skills and 
techniques for individual advancement in a professional 
career, with promising economic returns, prestige and 
security. In other words, should education focus on bringing 
out the creative potential of students and motivate and equip 
them for some larger cause or on training them for the job-
market for gainful employment? 
The societal dilemma centres on the emphasis given to 
mass versus elite education. Is education to be freely and 
equally available to all or accessible on the basis of merit? 
Must education be a leveller that opens equal opportunity 
and for all or do we create islands of excellences and talent? 
Do we strive to level playing field for all or wait for a rising 
tide to lift all boats? Should we prioritise the higher levels of 
education and research, or the more basic and mass-based 
ones? A scientific-technical education, or a liberal-humanist 
one?
The cultural dilemma focuses on the stress given to cultural 
orientations, whether Indic or Western, modern or traditional, 
and most especially in terms of language, whether mother-
tongue or regional, or on one that gives access to the world 
on the national and international stage. Should students 
be grounded in the local and rooted in their own culture? 
Or open to the global and vitalised by a multiculturalism? 
Socialised into a collective uniformity or prepared for a 
cultural pluralism? Isolated in their ethnic communities or 
integrated into a larger secular pluralist society?
The political dilemma is the orientation of the education 
system to civic duties and democratic rights, whether citizens’ 
duties and obligations are to be prioritised for its students 
or rather their civil rights and liberties stressed. Should 
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educational institution discipline students in the prevailing 
social customs and mores, regulations and laws? Or should 
a concern for social justice and equity, sensitivity to human 
rights and compassion for the under-dog be instilled as a 
priority? Should citizens be socialised into being orderly and 
disciplined or made aware of their rights and responsibilities? 
Similarly, the economic dilemma concerns the allocation 
of scarce resources to prioritised goals. Given the limited 
resources and different levels of individual achievement and 
talent, are the available resource to be used on the basis of 
efficiency for the greatest advantage of society by allocating 
them to the most talented and meritorious as we wait for the 
benefits to eventually trickle down to others less able and 
gifted, or are these resources to be allocated on the basis of 
equity to the most needy to enable them to live with dignity 
and purpose. 
A Creative Dialectic
These dilemmas are not mutually exclusive contradictions 
that force an either/or option on us. Rather they represent 
tensions between polarities both of which must be affirmed 
in a creative dialectic. For such tension are not resolved, they 
must be lived through as we situate our own option among the 
alternatives available to us. It is the practical and prudential 
choices we make that will create the new institutional 
alternatives which must be replicable models for an education 
for a future that is confronting us already. Our postcolonial 
education system must do today what once the precolonial 
one did earlier: create and stabilise a new institutional model 
for the country to meet the new challenges confronting us in 
building a socialist, secular, democratic nation. 
The challenge is to find a creative composite that will combine 
both polarities of the dilemmas. For the education we need 
is one that is truly humanist and also useful, training good 
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citizens and competent contributors for our society. It must 
include the masses of our people, education them for a 
participative and critical citizenship, even as it strives to raise 
standards of excellence by rewarding real merit and true 
talent, combining this with a noblesse oblige that will give 
back from the largesse received. It must be rooted and open, 
culturally authentic and genuinely multicultural. It must 
balance responsibilities and rights, critique and discipline. 
This must be an on-going process, a project continually 
in the making, and where the clarity of our vision and 
our commitment to the goal will assure a periodic course 
correction and a sure, if gradual incremental progress. 
A critical and creative response to these dilemmas must 
address the underlying contradictions and our persistent 
ambiguities. We want our teachers to be creative and we 
rail against government rules and regulations. But our 
administrators exercise a strict control over them and 
replicate the government bureaucracy in our institutions. 
Officially we publicise an integral, humanist education but 
in practice we allow the compulsions of the system and 
the requirements of good examination results displaces 
this as a prioritized goal. We want to prepare our students 
for a multicultural, globalizing world while our faculties 
and institutions are enmeshed in local prejudices and 
ethnocentrisms. Publicly we stand for human rights, but our 
managements are often at odds with just claim and fair dues 
in our own institutions. We proclaim our preferential option 
for the poor, and then rationalise our elitist institutions with 
a top-down understanding of leadership and a trickle-down 
theory of social change and so compromise proclaimed 
egalitarian commitments and our preferential option for the 
poor. 
These ambiguities are not moral lacunae so much as 
structural dysfunctions of institutions unable to respond 
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to the contradictions of the system they are caught up in. 
Accepting the contradictions and addressing our own 
ambiguities in this regard will require a willingness to invest 
in new institutional models that runs counter to the old 
familiar ones. This is new wine and it will not go into old wine 
skins. It is bound to meet with difficulties and opposition 
from the status quo, both educators and beneficiaries of our 
schools. Before we measure the cost of change against the 
loss of not changing, we would do well to recall the courage 
and confidence of the early pioneers in the country and feel 
part of their saga before casting the dye. 
A Transformative Pedagogic Paradigm
The transmission of a society’s social heritage to future 
generations, could well lead to stagnation without the 
transformation of this inheritance. Both conservative and 
creative functions are basic to education: the first without 
the second would mean stagnation in the present status 
quo; the second without the first, would be reinventing 
the wheel again and again. In creative interface the two 
functions could add up to Paulo Freire’s Cultural Action for 
Freedom. (Freire 1973). 
To break through the securities and constraints of the 
present into the challenge and uncertainties of the future 
will demand a new paradigm for education to counter 
the prevailing institutional culture of the system. This 
can only be viable with correspondingly transformative 
pedagogies. Specifying some of these will help articulate 
a new model for the future, one that will seek to change, 
rather than just to interpret the world for our students; 
one that will inspire them to change the world they find 
for the better rather than just adjust to, and succeed in it. 
Most institutions have not always shown the internal 
resilience or sought the external cooperation to generate 
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such a counter-dynamic for transformative pedagogic 
paradigm. 
Alternative transformative pedagogies can have a crucial and 
cumulative impact on some of the critical dimensions of the 
system, eventually contributing to changing it. Here we will 
sketch a few these: teaching as an art implying a personalised 
and creative relationship between teacher and taught; the 
development of human potential for more authentic and 
fulfilling living; a value formation and commitment that will 
build a counter-culture and make for the goal of a contrast-
community. The liberative potential of education in such a 
community will depend on some fundamental pedagogic 
options: against pedagogies of violence and silence; and for 
those of subaltern affirmation, of relevant contextualisation 
and creative critique.
Pedagogy as a Creative Art
As with creative art, creativity pedagogies cannot be 
standardised. For teaching as a relationship will obviously 
imply something of the uniqueness of the persons involved: 
teachers and learners. This is why it is more an art than 
a technique, and art is learnt by practice not in theory. 
Moreover, teaching necessarily implies a relationship which 
depends on the competence and credibility of the teacher, and 
the preparedness and openness of the taught. To be a creative 
relationship teaching needs must be both a personalised and 
a contextualised one. It must be sensitive to the personal 
freedom and social circumstances of both the teacher and 
taught. This will be the precondition for a creativity that is 
both personally and socially transformative.
Pedagogy as a Humanist Discipline
The development, “drawing out”, of human potential the 
student is the humanist goal of education, (from the Latin 
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educare to lead out). For the humanist this in the order of 
ends, a value-in-self and not to be instrumentalised by 
lesser interests. When these become the goal of education 
then means displace ends and the fundamental humanising 
potential of education is severely compromised. Moreover, 
institutionalised means have unintended consequences that 
can be very different from their original purpose, sometimes 
the very opposite of what might have been intended. Thus 
examinations are meant to monitor pedagogic progress. But 
now they perform a gate-keeping function screening access 
to further opportunities in life. Studying for examinations 
becomes more important than learning the subject, the 
emphasis on high marks stymies creative teaching…. 
Such an instrumental approach to education can be 
transferred to other areas of life, where public success and 
the recognition it brings becomes the motivating force, rather 
than human growth and the achievement it represents. This 
adds up to a colossal failure of our education system, and the 
consequences are already apparent in the stresses and strains 
that are undermining our social order.
Pedagogy as Ethical transformation
Further, at the institutional level, the organisational climate 
constitutes the context in which this individual interaction 
takes place. For the ethical atmosphere of an institution is 
made by the values experienced in its decision-making. 
Syllabus construction and teaching methodologies are most 
concerned with the development of skills and disciplines. 
These are an essential dimension of any pedagogic process 
in any education system, but underpinning this must be a 
foundation of ethical values. A value-free pedagogy can only 
make for a ‘valueless’ education! Value-neutrality implicitly 
supports established values and consequently the status quo. 
The critical challenge is to integrate value-formation and 
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value-commitment This is surely a crucial and urgent matter 
for a humanist education, especially in this country today 
where social changes have precipitated nothing short of a 
moral crisis.
Moreover, if the change we seek to initiate is to be 
transformative, it must be value-premised in terms that 
operationalise our vision and mission and integratged into 
the pedagogic process with the priority of goals, not just 
as means. This can only be done in the actual practice of 
individuals, especially the significant ones, and the actual 
allocation of resource, especially the scarce ones. Moreover, 
a contradiction between action and word is seen by young 
people as hypocritical and evokes cynicism. Hence the 
integrity of life and example of the educator is most crucial.
The Pedagogy of Violence
Stressing the conservative function of pedagogic transmission 
to the negation of the liberative one of transformation, 
reproduces the dominant culture, while subordinating 
and co-opting the non-dominant ones. Moreover, once 
this culture of oppression is internalised it appears to be 
the naturally given, and hence the uncontested and the 
incontestable order of things. The potential of people to learn 
from their experiences even the negative ones is perverted by 
excluding liberative experiences from the learning process, 
or forcing them into an interpretive grid of the dominant 
culture. This precisely is the violence of such a pedagogy, and 
the more pernicious for not being overt. 
For as Habermus rightfully remarks: “not ‘learning’, but 
‘not-learning’ is the phenomenon that calls for explanation at 
the socio-cultural level of development”! (Habermus, 1975) 
Lele illustrates “The Political Appropriation of Bhakti” with 
regard to its egalitarian potential, particularly of the Varkari 
Pant in Maharashtra and more generally of the bhakti 
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movement in medieval India, and he goes on to argue, that 
at present this is precisely the role of “Hindutva as Pedagogic 
Violence”. (Lele 1994) Thus in our education system “the role 
of strengthening group solidarity among the educated” is 
far more prevalent than the one “of disturbing traditional 
hierarchies”. (Kumar 1991) Our educational institutions 
trapped in the system must swim against the tide, or they 
will go with the flow.
The Pedagogy of Silence
A culture of protest may remain subterranean for long 
periods. It may find expression in low-intensity continuing 
encounters or dramatically irrupt in violent clashes. It may 
find expression in a people’s movements that can precipitate 
sudden, even violent change. Till then an adaptive pedagogy 
of ‘silence’ results in a more passive, but all the same alienating 
violence, including that of the victims against themselves in 
self-deprecation and hate. This easily leads to repression and 
inhibits the healing process. 
Most often we fall into such a pedagogy of silence by default. 
We have nothing to say or are afraid to say it. But one cannot 
be neutral in the face of such pedagogic violence. Silence at 
such moments from significant persons in their lives, leaves 
an unexplained emptiness, a sensitive space with which the 
young have to cope with on their own. The vacuum is readily 
‘colonised’ by other explanations and interpretations so 
easily available with the overload of today’s communications 
media. (Kumar 1996) 
The Pedagogy of Subaltern Affirmation
The earlier two pedagogies either by design or default 
negate subaltern culture or leave it open to manipulation or 
subversion. As such they can hardly make for transformative 
cultural change. This demands a pedagogy that will not do 
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violence to, or silence the subalterns, but one that will affirm 
them in their identity and dignity, in their quest for a place 
in the sun; a pedagogy that will eventually replace the need 
for positive discrimination for the disadvantaged with a 
level playing field for all. Exclusions only reinforce negative 
identities and social alienation, whether these be deliberate 
options, or part of the hidden agenda in our education 
system. (Taylor 1992) 
In all human societies this is a continuing need for an 
authentic affirmation of the cultures of non-dominant groups, 
not an uncritical idealisation or a romantic indigenism. 
Idealisation glosses over the negative aspects of a culture that 
need to be purged. Indigenism easily becomes regressively 
isolationist. In a globalising world this is disastrous if it is 
possible at all. Only a constructive critique of these cultures 
can lead to a critical affirmation of underprivileged groups 
and a humanising counter-culture. Tokenism is counter-
productive. It obfuscates the real challenge of including the 
knowledge and skills, the values and lore of groups, exiled 
from the formal learning process.
Gandhiji’s ‘nai talim’, or basic education, had the potential 
for reversing this subjugation of subaltern knowledge and 
skills by giving them a central place in the school system. 
‘Nai talim’ was too threatening to vested interests to be 
acceptable to them. (Heredia 2000) So it was marginalised 
and diluted, then co-opted as a token concession in a 
completely ineffective form, and now laid quietly to rest! It 
survives if at all as lesser education for less other people’s 
children. 
The Pedagogy of Creative Critique
If the subaltern affirmation sets the socio-cultural context, a 
creative critique addresses the inter-personal one within it. 
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For it is here that the teaching relationship is best expressed 
as an art at the inter-personal level of the learning experience. 
Now if the teacher-student relationship is at the centre of the 
pedagogic process, then it must be given a corresponding 
priority in the educational system. To be creative this 
relationship must involve the active and free participation 
of students and teachers. Internal passivity and external 
control cannot make for creativity of any sort. Autonomy 
and competence are the most basic conditions for a creative 
pedagogy, but they are far from being a priority of any kind 
in our system. (Kumar 1992)
Our teachers at most levels are confined to standardised 
and narrowly defined roles. The compulsions of the 
external examination system, with its pre-set syllabus, its 
standardised and opaque evaluation processes, destroys 
whatever innovative and creative urge that would otherwise 
be possible. No wonder in our system the educational 
administrator has far more status and influence than the 
pedagogue or the scholar.
Rote learning and mechanical reproduction are at a high 
premium, while critique and creativity at a disheartening 
discount. Even science is still taught with the authority of the 
textbook commanding acceptance and not the excitement 
of the laboratory experiment leading to personal discovery. 
Such ‘indoctrination’ cannot encourage the scientific temper. 
It only allows superstitions and uncritical traditions to 
survive and thrive.
With the humanities, even within the confines of the 
conventional canon, there is scope to contextualise and focus 
on those aspects that make for a sensitivity and openness to 
counter-cultural concerns and subaltern aspirations. This 
is more directly possible with the social sciences, provided 
they eschew the pretended value-free stance of positivist 
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science, as also the prevalent value-relativism espoused by 
post-modernism, and opt for a broad and humanist value-
premised critique. An inter-disciplinary approach can 
further broaden and deepen their perspectives.
The Pedagogy of Relevant Contextualisation
This is the final and necessary step in a pedagogy of change. 
For divorced from the social context teaching cannot be 
made relevant. However, without a deliberate effort by the 
teacher to relate the subject matter taught in the classroom 
to the world outside, this will not automatically happen. If 
anything the rote learning and mechanical reproduction 
encouraged by our education system disengages the students 
from their social situation. The preoccupation for individuals 
and institutions to return good exam results does not help to 
understand and cope with the world around. 
Some subjects lend themselves to this contextualising more 
readily than others. Thus environmental sciences cannot 
ignore the ecological crisis that threatens us all today. The 
same can be done with social sciences and our social crises 
by contextualising constructed meanings in their social 
situations, and in literature studies by demonstrating the 
relationship between writing literature and writing culture. 
Furthermore, we can identify and study new and relevant 
initiatives, and support and learn from them wherever 
we find them. Some innovative and competent voluntary 
agencies, like Eklavya in Hoshangabad district of Madhya 
Pradesh, have already blazed a new trail.
In all this, alternative understandings can be made to 
question conventional wisdom and suggest more relevant 
contextualised responses. The classroom is often too 
divorced from the real world of our students. If it helps them 
to comprehend and critique their world, we will already have 
begun a transformative change of lasting effect. In helping 
127Transformative Education for a Just Society
students thus to understand and interpret their world the 
teacher can also help them reconstruct it in more creative 
and humane ways. A relevant contextualisation of learning 
can address contradictions between academic learning and 
practical life, raise questions, pursue issues and challenge the 
young to create a brave new world.
Practical Possibilities
Much of what is being proposed here is possible even within 
the constraints of the present system. The more recently 
moves to greater flexibility are in the right direction: 
institutional autonomy with experimental school, the open 
school system, autonomous colleges, deem universities, … 
The principle of subsidiarity can serve as practical guideline 
to devolve such academic authority and consequent freedom 
downwards to reach the teacher in the classroom, to devolve 
decision to lower levels to those competence there, ...This must 
be complemented and co-ordinated from higher levels by a 
practical solidarity to enables competent decision-making at 
these levels and facilitate implementation as required….
The transformative paradigm with its counter-cultural 
options, both individual and institutional, can eventually 
have a cumulative effect and change the system, if not 
completely, then at least in parts. Surely we can use the vast 
goodwill some of our prestigious institutions, not to get more 
of the same, but to give credibility to, and get acceptance for 
such creative ventures. The temptation to postpone decisions, 
until there is no need to make them, allows circumstances to 
get beyond our control so that decisions are finally happen 
by default and drift. This can only lead us into the dustbin 
of history! 
Habermus rightfully observes: “truths which are to have 
consequences require a consensus prudently attained.” 
(Habermus 1975) Hence it is important for a pedagogy 
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of change to contest, and provide alternatives to the 
conventional ‘truth’ which is all too often nothing but the 
imposed conventions of hegemonic groups. It is precisely in 
this sense that Giroux wants teachers to be “transformative 
intellectuals”. (Giroux 1988: 121) For then “Teaching as a 
Subversive Activity” (Postman and Weingartner 1975) can 
further advance a consequent learning, and challenge the 
status quo to build communities of solidarity, of sharing and 
caring in our society.
Our practical, even pragmatic focus cannot be just to teach 
the three ‘r’s to fit students into a cybernetic world, but to 
read that world and understand it, to interpret and change 
it, to claim and share it. These transformative pedagogies 
must be institutionally situated lest they be dismissed as 
impractically utopian. This will require a new model for a 
transformative education. 
A Model for the Future 
In a rapidly and radically changing world, this will not be 
the one to which their teachers and parents belong, but or 
one still unfolding. Margret Mead called this a prefigurative 
culture for which the models of learning are not in the past 
as with a post figurative culture, or even in the present as 
with a configurtive culture, but rather in the future. (Mead 
1970: 67). In such a society education cannot be premised on 
‘models of ’ oriented not to the past or even to the present but 
rather on ‘models for’ that anticipate the future crashing in 
on us. (Geertz 1793: 93)
A Working Consensus
An effective model for such change must be premised on 
some common ground on which can be built a consensus 
for collective action, a vision and mission within the larger 
social context of the education system. Here we indicate in 
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a few broad brush strokes as a point of departure for this 
endeavour to create and establish a model for education that 
is true to our history and able to carry forward this saga into 
the future, where it can once again seize the significant role 
it once played in the making of modern India. 
Today we need a new institutional model that can then 
be stabilised and replicated in the larger system to meet 
the educational demands of a changing society. It must be 
perceived as leading the way and calling other educators to 
where we are going, and where they know they ought to be. Its 
effectiveness must be measured not in terms of the old criteria, 
like examination performance, institutional prestige, ..., but 
on new more pertinent ones for the changed circumstances, 
like preparing students to be other- not self-oriented, critical 
and creative, to be self-employed entrepreneurs rather than 
employable job-seekers, equipping them with the skills for 
problem-solving in a complex and inter-connected world not 
applying old solutions to new problems, empowering them 
with the ability for a continuing self-education and skills 
up-gradation not leaving them with a self-satisfied sense of 
closure.
Practical Possibilities
We cannot completely deschool our society, as Ivan Illich has 
urged. (Illich 1973) But we do need to exorcise our institutions 
from the banking pedagogy that Paulo Freire (Freire 1972) 
decried, which rote learning foregrounds, and our evaluation 
system rewards. Here viable expansive possibilities have not 
been imaginatively adapted to our changing contemporary 
situations and creatively mainstreamed into it. However, 
there are some who have already started out on the path of 
pedagogic innovation with alternatives schools that have 
demonstrated that a total alienation from the mainstream is 
neither required nor viable. 
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(see http://www.alternativeeducationindia.net/altschools.
htm)
In their six-nation review of School and Community in the 
Third World, Sinclair and Lilis offer three possible strategies 
for educational change which are here quoted at length: 
“the first is thus the stepwise development of a subpopulation 
of innovating institutions. This would be the preferred policy, 
if political and other pressures allowed such choice. The 
second model offered for consideration is that of universal 
adoption of a relevance orientation but with a two-tier 
system permitting stepwise development of high-quality 
programmes in an expanding group of selected innovative 
schools. This policy would have much to commend it where 
political pressures necessitated immediate system-wide 
adoption of some kind of relevance venture. A third strategy 
involves the omission of any special relevance programmes 
but attempts to reorient the existing curriculum towards 
activity methods and local relevance. An attempt to build 
on its strengths and overcome its weakness would be 
appropriate where the government was unwilling to provide 
the resources and organisational infrastructure for a major 
relevance programme.” (Sinclair and Lilis 1980: 164) 
Given their spread through many locations in this country, 
there are strategies most institutions can adopt with some 
systematic planning and inter-institutional cooperation 
in a particular region or area. But if we set our sail against 
the wind we must be able to stay the course and brave the 
storms. For
“while it is comparatively easy to introduce educational 
reforms that support the existing social structure, it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement radical 
educational reforms which threaten the existing social 
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structure or run counter to its imperatives.” (Citizens for 
Democracy 1978: 35)
More than half a century after ago we pledge ourselves as a 
“sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic Republic … to 
secure for all its citizens:
justice, social, economic and political;
liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; 
equality of status and of opportunity;
and to promote among them all,
fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity 
and integrity of the nation”.(Preamble to the Constitution)
The challenge of education for justice is to create a viable 
model for such a society towards fulfilling this tryst with 
destiny. No doubt we cannot wish away the constraints 
under which our education institutions labour. And yet in 
the interstices of all the contradictions and anomalies of our 
society there are spaces of freedom still available, which must 
be seized and creatively used.
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How different systems of inequality are interconnected 
is not well understood. The 66th NSS round (2009-10) is 
analysed to show the importance of grasping class, caste 
and gender together to visualize inequalities in higher 
education enrolments in India. Certain classes dominate 
enrolments across different caste groups and the proportion 
of women from a particular class itself varies across 
castes. These patterns call for theoretical explanation. The 
ways in which class, caste and gender have been theorized 
suggest certain common elements – work, kinship and 
culture – which may serve to connect them up. These offer 
analytical tools that help us to see how intersectionality 
comes into play. Changes in one system may reverberate 
through these elements into other systems. This may lead 
to the cascading of a reduction in inequality, but there is 
also a relative autonomy between them. It may happen 
that the decline of obstacles in one domain does not 
necessarily lead to a decrease of inequality in another. There 
is a pressing need to rethink how we describe and analyse 
the sources of inequality so as to build a more integrated 
understanding.
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Our understanding of inequality and injustice in society 
has grown in spurts and bursts and not in a smooth, 
systematic manner. Sometimes one particular approach 
seems to give us new insights and directions for action 
and sometimes it is another aspect of social inequality that 
opens fresh doors. The integration of different approaches 
usually lags behind as the energy that provides a particular 
insight tends to focus itself on the problem at hand, rather 
than worry about conceptual holism or tidiness. At one 
time class processes seemed to explain shared conditions 
and experiences in a way that older discourses of race and 
nation did not. In recent decades the study of ethnicity and 
community has returned with new vigour and is revealing 
forms of domination that the class lens had swept under 
the carpet. We are also beginning to realize that the politics 
of gender shapes many of the basic processes of exchange, 
culture and social organization. The problem of an integrated 
and multi-dimensional understanding of inequality and 
injustice faces the challenge of bringing together these 
diverse theoretical strands. It is not a new challenge, with 
Max Weber’s famous section on the role of class, status and 
party on the distribution of power (Weber 1978: 926-938) 
being an early attempt to use multiple concepts together. 
Cultural Studies has since the last forty years been interested 
in the way race, class, gender and ethnicity intertwine with 
each other (Hall and Jefferson 1976, Hall 1997). The way 
class and culture are intertwined has been remarked upon by 
E.P. Thompson amongst many others. In India the problem 
of the relation between caste and class has attracted much 
interest (Mukherjee 1999, Srinivas 2003) and it is now being 
emphasized that caste and gender must be seen together 
and not separately (Guru 1995, Chakravarti 1995). The 
feminist tradition has given a name, intersectionality, to this 
problem (Crenshaw 1991), through its “third wave” emphasis 
that people do not just stand across socially constructed 
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boundaries of gender, but at the intersections of the barbed 
wire fences of race and class as well. 
There is sometimes a resistance against acknowledging 
the complexity and multi-dimensional character of social 
inequality. Perhaps this is because the argument of multiple 
identities has often been used by the existing order to 
attack and weaken protesting voices. Against that a 
rhetorics of conceptual distinctiveness has helped in 
gaining acceptance and visibility. However there is still 
the imperative to examine inequality in its more complete 
and interwoven form and not in fragments. Apart from the 
creation of more comprehensive theory this agenda may 
also guard against situations like for example generalizing 
from the oppressions which upper caste and middle class 
women face to those faced by lower caste and agricultural 
labour women. There can be many other practical offshoots 
like the building of a composite index of social disadvantage 
which can be used for targeting individuals for additional 
support in a variety of domains. A sound theoretical 
understanding of how inequalities interweave, for instance, 
can help to build a disadvantage index in education 
which would be more accurate and representative than 
the contemporary practice of using caste as the basis of 
affirmative action.
Intersectionality as a way of interpreting interwoven 
inequalities has itself been understood in different ways. The 
way Kimberlé Crenshaw wrote about it conjured a vision of 
the meeting of roads at a crossing and then the carrying on 
of the roads down their own separate paths. A better way 
may be to talk of integration of the roads into a common 
subjectivity or the intertwining of of the different systems of 
inequality into a new complex form, which does not show the 
trajectory of it progenitors alone but takes a different route. 
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Leslie McCall (2005) distinguishes between anti-categorical, 
inter-categorical and intra-categorical perspectives. Anti-
categorical approaches tend to dismiss traditional categories 
of social analysis like class and caste altogether. Inter-
categorical approaches accept these categories at least in 
a temporary fashion to ask how they interact with each 
other. Intra-categorical approaches interrogate why and 
how the boundaries between categories exist. This paper is 
an exploration which starts with traditional categories and 
seeks to ask what it is that actually cuts through and 
across them. It thus tries to move from an inter-categorical 
perspective to suggesting ways to improve our grasp of 
the categories and to revising the categories of inequality 
themselves. 
 The approach this paper takes is to examine key processes 
and relations of different systems of social inequality and 
asks whether a better understanding may be had through 
combining some of them together. It suggests that a focus 
specifically on the themes of work, kinship and culture, 
rather than on class, gender and caste helps in seeing how the 
latter three systems are inter-connected. Taking a step back 
from the three systems of inequality may help to see what 
is common acros them and what is different. It may offer a 
way to integrate an understanding of these three systems, 
enabling a conceptual and not only an empirical grasp of 
their intersections. 
The emphasis here is to search for a way of imagining 
inequality in India which can take not just an intersectional 
but an integrative perspective. It is argued that merely 
speaking of the intersectionality of class, caste and gender 
does not enlighten us much, since these can each mean a 
very large number of things. Instead it is suggested that a 
more specific focus on three elements – work, culture and 
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kinship – may be more productive and direct our attention 
better. This is because they spell out specific processes which 
cut across different sources of inequality. 
The approach suggested here takes the nominalist stance of 
drawing out analytical concepts which help to understand 
the real world, even while those concepts may not correspond 
to unique real objects. This analytic re-formulation of the 
categories of social inequality, asking how they are actually 
integrated with each other by reaching across particular 
systems, may help us to delineate and then counter-balance the 
operation of structural injustices. The nominalist approach 
is not a new one in the social sciences (Weber 1978/1922: 20-
22; Beteille 2007: 288) and moves away from seeing social 
groupings as tangible objects which are expected to be visibly 
different and self-aware, towards seeing them as tendencies 
produced by processes. Many social relations which produce 
patterned behaviours and cultures may actually not be 
part of the self-consciousness of the grouping which gets 
constituted by them. It is the analytical labour of researchers 
which identifies those subtle processes and relations. Thus it 
is not necessary for, say, a class to be conscious of itself for 
its members to behave in a common way. More important 
is what leads to a certain degree of common behaviour, 
feelings, values and actions, even when that process which 
creates commonality is not consciously articulated by the 
involved people.
The categories of caste, class and gender can then be looked at 
afresh to ask whether they are indeed the best way to describe 
a complex reality or whether a different tack may give some 
new insights. The task of constructing an integrated view 
of multiple systems of inequality would, unsurprisingly, be 
a long and onerous one. Perhaps that task may find useful 
the small suggestion which this paper tries to make: an 
exploration of where there are overlaps and also disjunctions 
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between them. The overlaps and disjunctions may vary in 
different domains, the focus here being mainly on education. 
It is aimed to ask, to put it in a sentence, why it is that we see 
interconnections between different systems of inequality in 
education.
What is common across systems of inequality?
It is possible to start identifying some connecting elements 
by asking how class, caste and gender have been theoretically 
delineated. To begin with caste, an immense body of 
literature has explored the caste system’s impact on political 
and economic affairs. The theorization of its basic features, 
though, has been a concern of a relatively smaller corpus 
within that. The caste system has usually been conceived of 
as a ranked ordering of endogamous groups, whose exact 
composition and pattern may vary across diverse cultural 
and linguistic zones. The importance of endogamy for caste 
has meant that marriage rules and the regulation of women 
have been a key aspect of reproducing caste (Senart 1896, 
Ambedkar 1917). The structuralist turn in the study of caste 
has paid more attention to the role of culture in maintaining 
and expressing it. In the work of Louis Dumont (1999/1970) 
this has meant the generalization of caste processes to an 
opposition between purity and impurity, though he also 
acknowledged the possible role of locality as well as political 
and economic factors (ibid.: 38-39). Veena Das (1980) 
distanced herself from a bipolar view of caste culture and 
emphasized triangular oppositions of categories instead. 
Richard Burghart (1978), too, sought to understand the caste 
system through an opposition between the cultural meaning 
of being a king, an ascetic and a brahmin. Meanwhile the 
connection of the caste system with hereditary occupations 
has often led to the question being asked what the difference 
is between it and social class.
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Classes have been conceptualized, if anything, in an even 
greater variety of ways than caste. The convention is to 
keep work activities at the centre of what it means to be 
of a particular class. It is what people do to make a living 
and how they consume and exchange goods, services and 
meanings that seems to shape their class experience. Many 
economists think of class structure in terms of levels of 
consumption, with what and how people consume being 
seen as leading to the biggest class differences between them. 
The sociological tradition has tended to pay more attention 
to what people actually do in production and exchange, 
looking at the beliefs, values and orientations that their 
occupation leads to, thus using an occupational basis of 
distinguishing between classes (Lockwood 1958). A distinct 
tradition within sociology has emphasized the importance 
of relationships in shaping human classes, particularly those 
of exploitation (Marx 1974) or power (Dahrendorf 1959) or 
both (Wright 1996). In the works of people like Erik Olin 
Wright (ibid) this has been articulated through the notion 
of people not being characterized by just one class identity, 
but as actually standing at certain locations in a multifarious 
web of relationships. Individuals can have simultaneously 
contradictory and intermediary class relations. John 
Goldthorpe’s (2000) work has emphasized in this the relation 
between workers and the owner in terms of the former’s 
powers to negotiate, as well as commitment and trust. He 
has contrasted the relationship of a labour contract with an 
orientation of service to the firm, and has spelt out the widely 
varying consequences on the everyday experience of work, 
identity and remunerations. Education is deeply implicated 
with the class structure, serving to exclude or to allocate 
various roles and to participate in the cultural politics of 
class.
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Pierre Bourdieu and others (Bourdieu 1992, 1996; Bourdieu 
& Passeron 1979, 1992; Godelier 1986) have highlighted the 
importance of inheritance in reproducing class relations 
across generations. What gets inherited is not just economic 
but several other forms of capital, too, which may increase 
or decrease the advantages which the next generation has 
in a particular field. Culture and networks of marriage are 
crucial to shaping as well as reproducing class structures. 
The relation between men and women is thus an important 
element in class relations, too.
The gendering of society has been seen as a way of bending 
women to domination by men. It has been argued that this 
represents a primeval form of exploitation (Lerner 1986) 
and a form of power sui-generis. A somewhat different but 
often intertwined perspective has seen gender as a way of 
getting women to support the stratification system of men 
(Engels 1962). Women may be ensocialized or bullied into 
contributing to the patterns of class and caste domination 
(Chakravarti 1995). This operates through the control of 
their sexuality, roles within the family, culture and even the 
uses they are expected to make of education amongst other 
social processes.
It is possible to see many connecting lines between the three 
systems of inequality outlined above. For the present at least 
three analytically central tropes are proposed that cut across 
them and can be helpful in seeing the connections and 
disjunctions between various systems of inequality: work, 
kinship and culture. An analytical focus on these three 
tropes would help to identify intersectionality and trace its 
pathways. These tropes cut across systems of class, caste and 
gender and hence offer a way of seeing them in an integrated 
manner. They do not replace the need to understand each 
system on its own, but highlight and draw our attention to 
what is common across the various systems.
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Intersecting systems of inequality in higher education 
enrolments
This paper will explore their interconnections mainly through 
tertiary or higher education. This is not to say that primary 
and secondary education are not sharply constrained by our 
political economy, culture and institutional processes. They, 
after all, filter who goes on to tertiary education. The most 
obvious and easily seen connections between education and 
social structure, however, are at the tertiary level. To the extent 
that education shapes adult roles of privilege and power, that 
is most directly through tertiary education. Educated classes 
in India are defined by tertiary education and not so much 
by secondary education or by primary education where we 
are approaching universal enrolment. The number of people 
moving to a tertiary education at 17.2% is a rather small 
fraction of the Indian youth. These, however, are the children 
of the topmost sections of the stratification system and they 
are the ones who will occupy most of the higher strata of 
status, power and wealth. Of course, education alone is not 
responsible for differences of rank and political power or 
the inheritance of wealth. Tertiary education, too, is highly 
differentiated, with for instance a vast gap between IITs and 
Delhi’s elite undergraduate colleges on the one hand and arts 
colleges in mofussil towns on the other. A focus on higher 
education, it is submitted, is still valuable, for it can tell us 
something significant about power and rank in this country. 
Inequality and domination in higher education is most 
easily measured through enrolment and access, though that 
hardly constitutes its only or even most important aspect. 
Surveys and tabulations of enrolments are readily available 
for analysis, while studies of the lived experience of injustice 
in education are still rare in India (Deshpande and Zacharias 
2013). The use of survey data, we know, must be done with 
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great caution. Apart from a host of issues related to sampling, 
any survey tends to count only what its categories are able 
to theoretically imagine. Further, large-scale surveys tend 
to represent only what is relatively easy to count, whereas 
we know that many of the most important aspects of social 
inequality can only be recognized through sensitive processes 
of dialogue and interpretation across cultures. Yet, it is 
submitted, they provide advantages of scale, generalization 
and comparison, which even multi-site ethnographies are 
still struggling to move towards. The broad contours of 
intersectionality would be thus drawn through a large-scale 
survey dataset, whereas the subsequent discussion would be 
on the basis of ethnographies and smaller scale studies.
That gender, class and caste show interconnected patterns in 
enrolments in higher education has been noted by several 
observers (Chanana 2004, Raju 2008, Arora 2012, John 2012). 
In this paper relatively recent data is presented to further 
strengthen the argument, calculated from the Employment 
and Unemployment Survey in the 66th round of the NSS, 
done between July 2009 to June 2010, covering 100,957 
households. Along with using the conventional survey 
categories of social inequality, this analysis differs from the 
majority of literature by applying occupational categories of 
class rather than consumption-based categories, since the 
former show a sharper contrast in choices and circumstances. 
Table 1. Caste-wise Current Enrolments of Undergraduates 
in Percent (17-24 age group) 
In sample Agriculture Engineering Medicine Arts, 
Com., 
Sci
ST 8.5 6.6 0.7 0.3 4.7
SC 20.4 15.0 5.3 14.3 14.3
OBC 40.4 37.1 35.9 36.5 41.0
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Others 30.7 41.3 58.2 48.9 39.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Calculated by author from 66th NSS round (2009-10)
Castes in India are conventionally clubbed together for 
most legal matters into the categories of Scheduled Tribes, 
Scheduled Castes, Other Backward Classes and Others. 
The categories are not perfect and there can be a good deal 
of variation in the social and educational conditions of 
different endogamous groups within any particular category. 
In spite of the untidiness of these categories, they still reveal 
quite substantial inequalities in enrolment patterns. The 
“Others” are about 30.7% of the 17-24 year olds in the sample 
(Table 1). However they are disproportionately represented 
in all the different streams of tertiary education enumerated 
in the survey. The percentages here are of all the forms of 
tertiary education together, including post-senior secondary 
school diploma and certificate courses and not just degree 
colleges. If there were no systemic processes leading to 
advantaging certain communities and disadvantaging 
others, we would expect the percentage of a category in 
the general population to also be reflected in enrolments. 
For instance, the ST are 8.5% of all 17-24 year olds and if 
there were no systemic discrimination they should have 
also been 8.5% of, say, all engineering students. However 
the observation that they are only 0.7% of engineering 
students in the sample strongly indicates that some 
exclusionary processes are at work. The ST are the most 
under-represented in all the academic streams, followed 
by the SC. The OBC are slightly under-represented and 
the “Others” are substantially over-represented. This is an 
important pointer to how structures of education as well as 
society are tilted in favour of some castes and differentially 
against others. Systemic discrimination need not mean 
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a deliberate, conscious act of exclusion, but can operate 
through structural forces as well. 
A reduced eleven class framework has been used in this 
paper to get a picture of occupational class as an organizing 
principle of social inequality in higher education. The 66th 
NSS used categories available in the National Classification 
of Occupations (2004), from which the below reported 
occupational classes were calculated. The clustering of 
NOC categories into classes has been done through a mix 
of relational and occupational principles (Goldthorpe 2000, 
Wright 1996, Dhanagare 1983), trying to arrive at a set 
which was not too unwieldy and fragmented. Here we have 
clubbed owners, managers and professionals together as 
groups with some affinities that distinguish them from lower 
ranking educational workers who do more routine work 
and are at lower levels in organizational hierarchies (Table 
2). These are the two main classes within educated or white-
collar workers. In the non-agricultural sector, skilled and 
unskilled non-agricultural workers are demarkated from 
each other. Shopkeepers and moneylenders are clubbed as 
a separate class. Agricultural landowners and tenants have 
been counted together and distinguished into three classes 
on the basis of the amount of land which they hold: 0-2 
hectares (small), 2-4 hectares (medium) and greater than 4 
hectares (large) respectively. People who are primarily doing 
animal husbandry are treated as a distinct class. Subsistence 
agricultural workers and agricultural workers who are 
integrated into markets are counted as two separate classes. 
As the various tables in this paper show, the differences 
amongst these classes are tangible, which at least partially 
validates this kind of categorization. It also shows itself to be 
useful in understanding the interactions between class and 
other systems of inequality.
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Table 2. Occupational Class-wise Current Enrolments of 
Undergraduates in Percent (17-24 age group) 




















































































































































































































































































Young people from families which are mainly white collar 
workers and owners are the most over-represented in all 
the academic streams. At the bottom of the heap are the 
children of families of unskilled non-agricultural workers 
and of landless agricultural labour. Youths from families 
classified as managers, professionals and owners are 11.3% of 
the sample, but 41.8% of those enrolled in engineering, over-
represented by a ratio of over 3:1. In contrast youths from 
agricultural worker families are 18.6% of the sample, but 
only 3.0% of the students of engineering streams, an under-
representation of over 1:6. The children of white-collar and 
owner families are together a whopping 62.4% of all students 
in engineering and 50.1% of medical, the most sought after 
undergraduate courses.
Table 3. Gender-wise Current Enrolments of Undergraduates 
in Percent (17-24 age group)
In 
Sample
Agriculture Engineering Medicine Arts, 
Com., 
Sci.
Men 52.2 67.6 72.1 53.5 58.0
Women 47.8 32.4 27.9 46.5 42.0
Calculated by author from 66th NSS round (2009-10)
Gender differences are also pronounced in higher education. 
Women are 47.8% of the sample, but only 27.9% of the 
engineering stream (Table 3). They are approximately 
equivalent to the sample’s sex ratio in the medical stream, 
contrary to popular belief of the women filling up medical 
education. Data was not available for the arts, commerce and 
science separately but only in an aggregate manner. There, 
too, men were disproportionately enrolled (58.0%), though it 
could not be said whether there was a difference between the 
arts and the rest.
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Table 4 Occupational Classes Within Various Castes in 
Undergraduate Engineering in Percent (17-24 age group)











































































































































































































































































































































































Class and caste are undoubtedly linked but it is not 
helpful to treat them as one. Their relationship as well as 
difference can be seen through a breakup of students from 
each caste category into their occupational class origins. 
Table 4 depicts this for the students in engineering stream. 
Clearly it is not possible to speak in a generalized manner 
that the upper caste family’s child also comes from a white 
collar background. The “Others” from white collar and owner 
families are 27.6% of all the “Others” youth in the sample. 
The rest come from various other occupations. Of course, 
the proportion of the “Others” which is from the white collar 
and owner class is much greater than among all other caste 
groups. Only about 9.8% of the SC youth, for instance, in 
the entire sample survey are from white collar and owner 
families. 
An important question is whether caste (or class) alone is 
enough to help us understand educational advantage or 
disadvantage. The SC youth who are from professional, 
managerial and owner families are just 5.3% of all the SC 
youth. However, they are 27.3% of all the SC youth in tertiary 
engineering courses. Clearly merely looking at the caste 
is not enough, we need to look at the family occupational 
class, too, to understand educational inequality. While the 
SC youth from professional, managerial and owner families 
are over-represented among the SC engineering students 
by a ratio of about 5:1, the SC youth from agricultural 
worker families are the opposite, under-represented by about 
1:5. 
Similarly it is the “Others” youth from white-collar and 
owner families who have the lion’s share of engineering 
enrolments (70.8%) in spite of being only 27.6% of all the 
“Others” youth. About 9.5% of the “Others” youth are from 
agricultural labour families, but they are only 2.1% of the 
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“Others” enrolled in engineering. That shows them to be 
much more disadvantaged than the upper caste youth from 
white collar and owner families. What, incidentally, this tells 
us is that the “creamy layer” phenomenon is not restricted 
to the SC, ST and OBC, but extends to the upper castes, too. 
Certain classes are dominating enrolments across all the 
castes.
Importantly, class effects are not constant across different 
caste groups. In other words class effects by themselves 
are not sufficient to understand inequality. The proportion 
of youth in engineering from a particular occupational 
background changes as we move from one caste group to 
another. The ratio of owners, managers and professionals in 
engineering to the actual size of that class in a caste group 
is about 8:1 among the ST, 5:1 among the SC, 3:1 among the 
OBC and the same 3:1 among the Others. The advantages 
given by class background for admission to engineering are 
greater amongst the ST and the SC compared to the Others 
and OBC of the same class. It seems that when a community 
has greater social disadvantages then being from a white 
collar or owner background makes a much larger difference 
to a family’s life chances.
What this re-affirms is that caste origins are connected 
but not synonymous with occupational class and within a 
particular caste group what occupation one’s family follows 
can differentiate considerably the kind of educational 
trajectory one follows. Class and caste need to be understood 
as separate while connected processes.
The gendered enrolment of men and women also appears 
to be influenced by class and caste in complicated ways. For 
instance, amongst the owners, managers and professionals 
there is an interesting variation in men and women’s 
enrolments into engineering across different castes (see 
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Table 5). In this class, the ST have a similar number of men 
and women in engineering, being 27.4% and 27.8% of ST 
engineering students respectively. However, amongst the SC 
and the OBC being from an owner, manager or professional 
family seems to make it much more likely that a woman 
will join engineering tertiary education. The women in 
engineering from this class are far greater amongst the SC, 
with 46.6% women compared to 17.8% men, respectively out 
of the total SC women and men enrolled in engineering. The 
class effect on OBC women is less dramatic but still visible 
with 35.2% of OBC women in engineering from the owner, 
manager and professional class, in comparison to 29.3% of 
OBC men students being from that same class. Amongst the 
“Others”, however there is a greater proportion of men from 
this class, compared to women in engineering, 57.4% and 
41.3% respectively. 
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Table 5. Gender Differences in Undergraduate Engineering 
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The statistical patterns are sufficient to show a series of 
interconnections which bely claims of simple generalizations 
about caste or gender inequality. Speaking about say, women 
in higher education is incomplete without also talking about 
which class and caste they belong to. But how does one 
begin to understand these interlinked patterns? They call 
for a way to understand how gendered choices of education, 
selfhood, career and marriage are being influenced by class 
and caste dynamics as well. These need appropriate ways of 
theoretically imagining the processes within each of these 
systems of inequality.
Common Themes: Work, Culture and Kinship
The exploration of intersections and seaerch for ways of a 
conceptual integration of these systems of inequality may be 
helped by asking what are the tropes which are common to all 
of them. It is submitted here, to begin with, that one central 
trope cutting through the various forms of inequality is that 
of work and occupation, affecting the expression of class and 
caste as well as the way gendering takes place, though each 
of them in a somewhat different manner. The character of 
the work and the relationships and experiences it puts us 
through is shaped through several processes, coming from 
different origins. It may be influenced, for instance, by the 
logic of capitalist development, which may involve exploiting 
others or becoming onself the object of exploitation. Or it 
may be shaped by occupational specialization, as the need 
to cultivate technical skills over several years. It configures 
our life experience in a foundational manner and is an active 
ingredient of many forms of social inequality. 
Specific castes no longer share internally the identically same 
work pattern (if they at all ever did so), but there are still 
pronounced caste linkages to various occupations, not least 
because of the inheritance of property. Often what appears 
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to be a caste trend is actually the expression of its class 
relations. Thus the upper castes’ overwhelming presence in 
technical education nowadays may not be the consequence 
of their caste ideology as much as the fact that they dominate 
the educated wage labour of contemporary India. Fuller 
and Narasimhan (2010) studied Tamil Brahmins and 
argued that their educational strategies did not reflect their 
traditional caste roles as much as their desire to capture 
the new opportunities which were emerging. This provides 
us with a possible explanation of the pattern in Table 4 of 
the children of all white collared workers and owners being 
disproportionately represented in higher education. This is a 
pattern which is strongest in the SC and ST, rather than the 
OBCs and Others. The drive to make the current generation 
into higher level educated wage labour is at least partially 
that class’s attempt to reproduce itself and maintain, if not 
improve, its position vis-a-vis other classes. It cannot be seen 
as purely and only an attempt to maintain the caste system. 
If that were so, the Others in engineering education should 
have shown a far greater ratio of parents from white collar 
origins, than the OBC or the rest. Instead they are only at 
par with the OBC and below the rest with white collar social 
locations.
The fact that the Others are far more numerous in white 
collar work to begin with, even though that work is still a 
smaller part of the occupations they are spread across, may 
be the result of initial occupational advantages given by 
their castes. However the much larger ratios of children of 
ST, SC, OBC white collar workers tells that the advantage 
of parental occupations is not restricted to the upper 
castes alone. Clearly work can act as a source of social and 
educational advantage across different caste groups and 
it is worthwhile examining its character in an analytically 
autonomous manner. 
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In a similar vein, the trend within these castes to support 
the higher education of their daughters may also be at 
least partially a process of work related strategies and the 
reproduction of a class itself. Karuna Chanana (1993) for 
instance described how Punjabis who migrated to India after 
the Partition began to encouraged their women to acquire 
education as a means of having careers outside the home. In 
the new and difficult circumstances they found themselves, 
this was consistent with the expectation that women should 
serve to maintain the family. It was not a break with the 
traditional expectations of women’s work being that of 
caring for the family and they were supposed to combine 
that with the earning of a cash income. In other words, it 
was part of a work or class related strategy. Radhika Chopra 
(2005) has described educational strategies as a means of 
equipping a woman with the appropriate characteristics for 
marrying into a suitable class. Apart from one of the main 
features of gender being a separation of spheres of work, it 
also takes up specific forms according to the kind of work 
being reproduced (e.g. Natrajan 2005). The patterns of work 
in one system may echo through the way inequality is shaped 
in other systems, leading to a common thread uniting them.
The work aspect of gender helps us to understand the 
differences in enrolments across different occupational 
groups in Table 5. The proportion of Others women in 
engineering education from white collar and owner families 
is very close to that of men from the same kind of families 
(2.6 to 1 and 2.5 to 1 respectively). However, when it comes 
to non-agricultural skilled workers, the proportion of Others 
men in engineering education drops, but that of women 
drops far more drastically (.5 to 1 and .17 to 1). A theoretical 
and empirical attention to work patterns does help us to 
understand matters across gender as well as caste.
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The example of skilled labour above shows that it may also 
happen that occupational processes may introduce divergent, 
rather than convergent, trends into caste and gender 
processes. These systems of inequality are not homologous 
and contradictions are inevitable. It may also happen, for 
instance, that the aspiration to join the educated wage labour 
through education may lead to weakening a caste identity 
whose ideology is based on agriculture and landlordism 
(Bose 2001: 290). It may similarly cause an accelerating 
tension with the traditional homemaker’s role as more and 
more educated women with jobs provided by their degrees 
are discovering (Chanana 2000). Gendered occupational 
identities may pull away from the logic of occupations in the 
growing economy or may colour them in unique ways.
A second central trope is that of culture, seen as loosely 
integrated symbols and practices, which plays a crucial 
role, although in different forms, in markets, a caste society 
and a patriarchy, respectively. It acts, among other things, 
to organize social groupings, which can be quite dynamic 
in a market society with an emphasis on open-ness and 
meritocracy so as to permit a continual re-configuration 
of resources and processes. This may resound through 
caste cultures leading, for example, to a greater ideological 
emphasis on being flexible according to the era one is in 
and thus justifying and encouraging participation in new 
educational opportunities (Fuller and Narasimhan 2010). 
Cultures of elitism originating from the history of certain 
castes may influence the stratification system in another way. 
They may interweave with the belief of being special and 
provide a boost to those who imagine themselves as superior 
in studies and encourage them to orient themselves even 
more closely with academic goals and processes. Conversely, 
identities that see book learning as alien may contribute to 
identity processes that slow down students’ acceptance of 
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school authority and may lead them to internalize a sense of 
being “weak” students (cf. Velaskar 2005). Anuradha Sharma 
(2014) has described the construction of cultures of gender in 
school classrooms and playgrounds which become the basis 
of consolidation of a distinct gender identity and naturalize 
choices of adult roles. 
An interesting aspect of Table 4 is that there appears to be 
greater education inequality across classes than across castes 
within the same occupational group. The cultural aspect 
has been an important highlight in the literature on caste, 
including the impact of humiliation on the lower ranked 
castes. Cultural differences coming from caste origins 
should have been visible through differences in enrollment 
ratios across different caste groups but within a similar 
occupational group. However these do not show a greater 
advantage for the Other castes. If anything, within the 
owner and white collar workers, non-agricultural skilled 
labour and amongst small famers, which are amongst the 
larger occupational groups, the Other castes are not doing 
any better than the rest, even doing worse than certain other 
groups. That culture does matter in educational access is 
substantiated by many studies, but this evidence seems to be 
more consistent with the argument that the culture which 
comes from occupational groupings may perhaps be more 
important than the culture of caste ideologies per se. 
Cultures of class, caste and gender may pull in opposite 
directions, too, within education. Patriarchy and caste’s 
ideological emphasis on maintaining a stable rank order is 
basically in a state of tension with the market-based class 
system’s pull towards recombining resources and moving 
them to new positions through education, among other 
things. Caste and gender cultures often resist the messages 
of consumerism which are an important driving force of the 
new re-combination of educated labour in liberalizing India. 
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On the other hand, cultures of individualism may reinforce 
market inequality, while destabilizing traditional forms of 
both caste as well as gender. These would have corresponding 
consequences on aspirations for various levels of education 
by young people and for what they expect education to 
eventually provide them. 
Cultures may also serve as boundaries of exclusion in 
the most advanced of capitalist firms, the boundaries 
sometimes acting as a useful resource for group functioning 
and simultaneously as an obstacle for recruitment of new 
group members (Collins 1971, 1979). It may be the basis of 
excluding both women and other ethnicities and castes from 
the circles of power. Caste and male cultures invisibly form a 
substantial part of the cultural identity of many groups that 
first get formed in highly competitive schools and colleges. 
These cultural identities define who joins an informal group 
and who is kept out of it as not quite the right sort. These are 
dynamics which the NSS data, unfortunately, is not designed 
to reveal or reflect.
The third central trope here is that of kinship, which 
refuses to disappear even under the most advanced 
capitalism. It shapes the inheritance of property and of 
work cultures, though the form that it may take may be 
different in aggressive corporate circles, with their mantra of 
meritocracy, in comparison with the explicit support it gets 
in the context of the need to maintain social rank in caste 
and an acceptance of gendering amongst men and women. 
Kinship bonds deeply impact the distribution of cultural 
knowledges and practices which provide the ability to use 
the education system to access higher positions in corporate 
and state bureaucracies. Children of educated wage labour 
– more often of certain castes and more commonly male – 
would be familiar with the phrase told to them repeatedly 
by fathers that “if you don’t study, how will you eat?” For 
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many young men this becomes a milestone in the formation 
of their identity as a committed and enterprising educated 
wage worker. The way to hold oneself vis-a-vis others, 
cultivation of a love of reading, learning to negotiate with 
teachers to gain their attention and so on, for all of these 
one important site where they are learnt is in the family and 
in intimate circles. The obscurity of their roots in kinship 
for the self-consciousness of these groups is not an obstacle 
to their effectiveness in distinguishing who gets ahead in 
competitions. For women meanwhile, the importance of 
marriage as a social goal keeps kinship relations a central 
influence in their lives. It is they who must carry the bulk of 
the burden of reproducing and maintaining kinship bonds, 
often translated into reproducing caste cultures and caste 
identity. This deeply influences their ability to access and stay 
on in education and also the kind of subjects and eventually 
class positions they may aspire to. 
Kinship may become a site of enormous tensions where the 
other two tropes of occupation and culture intersect with it. 
The need to reproduce the class of educated wage labour, as 
mentioned earlier, is an important force pushing families to 
look for suitable matches outside the old caste networks. This 
causes kinship networks to break and take up new forms 
in ways which we are still struggling to understand. The 
individualism of the educated wage labour clashes with the 
expectations of kinsfolk that older collective traditions be 
maintained. Women are often the ones who have to negotiate 
both the old and new and try to somehow keep the bonds 
alive. At the same time, for women from white-collar worker 
families, the pressure to keep their existing occupation going 
through teaching their children and keeping them focused 
on educational success may become a site of new tensions 
and split loyalties (Belliappa 2014).
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Kinship provides us a powerful way to understand why 
caste has the patterning influence on enrollments in higher 
education seen in Table 1 and also in understanding why 
occupational patterns have an impact reaching across caste 
groups, as is clear from Tables 2 and 4. When we look 
within one particular occupational group then what kinship 
systems and along with them cultures of hierarchy and group 
superiority offer us is a way to make sense of the differences 
in gendered enrolments in undergraduate engineering 
across different caste groups. To take the example of the 
upper white collar workers and owners, among the ST the 
genders are relatively similarly represented (both nearly 8 
times the size of that class amongst the ST), while there is a 
substantial difference amongst the SC (men over-represented 
by 3:1 and women over-represented more than 8:1). The 
sharp difference in patterns between the ST and the SC are 
difficult to understand unless one brings in differences in 
culture and kinship systems. The cultural constructions of 
masculinity and femininity appear to be different within and 
without the caste system and appear to be interwoven here 
with educational choices. 
The OBC have a more balanced gender distribution within 
this class, with men and women both being over-represented 
by about 3:1, with women showing a slightly greater 
inclination towards engineering higher education. However 
amongst the Others, a reversal of patterns emerges, with 
women (over-represented 2:1) of this class being less than 
men (3:1) in engineering education. While this class is over-
represented all through, the differences in caste and gender 
patterns within it call for explanations. It is argued that by 
keeping in mind the cultural dimension of hierarchy and the 
way kinship systems are structured may provide a vigorous 
way of understanding these patterns. These are central to 
both the caste as well gender system.
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While arguing for an analytical isolation of these three 
concepts, it is of course acknowledged that each of these 
three moments is integrated into particular systems, like 
those of gender or class or caste, and shows patterns which 
express that systemic integration. The cultures of hierarchy, 
for instance, take up the idiom of purity and impurity within 
brahminnical orders, serving to express and reproduce the 
caste structure. What the above suggests, however, is that it 
is also useful to draw them out and speak of these tropes in 
isolation, which is in a purely analytical sense of isolation. 
Doing so helps us to explain and understand the ways in 
which different systems of inequality meet and also how 
they diverge. The caste culture of hierarchy, thus, may see 
ideas and values merging with those coming from patriarchy 
or from class inequality and reinforcing them. Or at times 
contradicting them, as may happen when children from 
trading castes begin to accept the values of open competition 
and meritocracy. An uneasy truce gets struck, with a hybrid 
interpretation of meritocracy which is both hierarchical and 
exclusionary and open at the same time. 
As has been illustrated above, these tropes serve to draw out 
patterns that cut across the parent systems of inequality. We 
may find that kinship leads to strong synergies between class, 
caste and gender by virtue of its shaping social networks 
and the boundaries of marriage and affinity. This may lead 
to strong boundaries emerging in social groups even under 
capitalism which serve to keep individuals locked in and 
unable to access knowledges and support systems that are 
necessary for a higher education. Similarly, they may make 
available role models and guidance which teach how one is 
supposed to build the daily rhythm of study and revision so 
as to get higher marks in board exams. 
Yet, the systemic character of class, caste and gender, 
respectively and on their own right, may still persist. The 
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way kinship, for instance, is treated by different systems is 
an important point of divergence between them. Classes 
in contemporary capitalism emphasize an openness and 
allocation of roles on the basis of achieved abilities. The caste 
system sets strong lines which cannot be crossed on the 
basis of birth and relationships of blood and marriage. The 
influence of kinship on deciding roles and relationships is 
even stronger when it comes to women. Nepotism and familial 
bonds remain an important tension point in contemporary 
societies. The fundamental ideals of contemporary education 
systems rest on this contradiction in values, that achievement 
and merit should be the decider of roles, not blood. And 
yet blood and marriage continue to be significant factors, 
sometimes covertly and sometimes in open displays as in the 
anointment of heirs to corporate empires.
To explore the integrations within different systems to create 
patterns of social inequality and the way such integrations 
are manifested in education it may be useful to spell out 
some more ways in which these three moments overlap 
with each other across the different systems of class, caste 
and gender. Some of these are summarized in table 6. It is 
of course not implied that they may always reinforce each 
other. Contradictory and divergent trajectories are also 
possible, where one form of inequality may even cancel out 
another (table 7). 
Table 6. Principles of Overlap: Some Examples
Class under  
capitalism
Caste Gender
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Kinship Shapes social networks 
and inheritance of 
property
Forms patterns of 






Culture Cultures of  
specialization in work, 
of rank and of  
occupational identity
Cultures of caste 
identity, ranking 






Table 7: Principles of Divergence: Some Examples
Class under  
capitalism
Caste Gender
Work Based on relations of 
inter-dependence, on 









Kinship Open to non-kinship 
relations in most  
situations
Kinship defines 





Culture Cultures of occupa-
tional specialization 
and work-related 
identity, open markets 
and competition









What is being suggested here is that an emphasis on asking 
how work, kinship and culture are played out becomes a way 
to see continuities across class, caste and gender and also the 
oppositions amongst them. The focus on tropes instead of 
complete systems helps us to understand, for instance, why 
in spite of a decreasing emphasis on and consciousness of 
caste identity amongst the upper castes, they still dominate 
the higher wage labour. One process behind this may be the 
fact that work roles that directly use education in the Indian 
economy (white collar work) are in a relative minority, 
which greatly magnifies the impact of kinship and culture 
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in accessing them. When there is a scarcity of opportunities, 
any asset that may give advantages in accessing them leads to 
the cultivation of that asset and also leads to disproportionate 
numbers of those with that asset taking control of those 
opportunities. This is consistent with the observation that 
a surprisingly high proportion of upper castes and even 
women from those castes are present in higher education 
that provides white collar work. 
A disaggregation into tropes to recombine them into a 
composite understanding of inequality also helps us to see 
the significance of the entry of women into higher education 
in greater numbers. This is not necessarily an expression of 
the emancipation of women from their traditional gender 
roles, though that, too, may be a slowly growing tendency. To 
understand this trend, we can point out that agriculture is 
stagnating in India in comparison to the service sector and to 
informal manufacturing, leading even farmers’ children (but 
only those with sufficient income to afford it) to turn to an 
education that has little to contribute towards reproducing 
their own kinship groups’ traditional occupations. This is 
creating a demand for a new set of abilities to reproduce the 
emerging class position. The more a group is oriented towards 
education and white collar work, the greater the emphasis 
on education as a means of reproduction of class. And 
consequently a greater acceptance of the seeking of education 
by women from those groups, which is the new class culture 
which is being aspired to, whose cultural reproduction it 
remains women’s responsibility to perpetuate. Women begin 
to enter higher education alongside men in rising numbers, 
but that is not a statement necessarily of liberation, being 
more of an expression of a transition from agricultural or 
artisanal social reproduction to the social reproduction of 
white-collar work instead. 
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This is not a trend restricted to old agrarian communities. 
A clerical worker in a market economy no longer has the 
same social rank as his or her father who may have been a 
hereditary leather worker of the caste system. The roles that 
a wife of a leather worker in a market economy may have to 
play would be different in several ways from her roles in the 
caste system. Instead of participating in leather production, 
she may be pushed into being the housewife who looks after 
the home while the husband moves into a pattern of working 
in a distant factory. It is in this context that an education that 
provides access to jobs in the new emerging economy is then 
interpreted and made use of. 
Many more examples may be multiplied of the usefulness of 
understanding how class, caste and gender are interwoven 
through a focus on cultures, occupations and kinship 
networks. But the above are perhaps enough to illustrate 
the point being made: looking at caste or class or gender 
as integrated systems as a way of describing inequality 
and guiding our understanding of it is not adequate, but 
instead their disaggregation into their constitutive processes 
helps us to better understand the convergences and 
divergences of processes of social inequality in education. 
It is these which carry across from one system into another 
and provide the grounds for converging and diverging 
trends. An analytical focus, in particular on work, culture 
and kinship may lead us to a better understanding of the 
processes of intersectionality and the new structures it is 
erecting. They provide us a way of undersanding why there 
is intersectionality and of moving beyond an empirical 
depiction of it. The questions of the relative importance 
of these constituent processes and how they combine into 
various forms of social inequality may lead us to transcend and 
revise the categories of class, caste and gender individually, 
indeed how to formulate integrated and elementary forms of 
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inequality themselves anew, all these are frontiers that need 
to be worked upon.
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Is teaching a profession, a semi-profession or a skilled 
occupation? The technical and moral bases for professional 
authority in modern society have been the focus of a long 
line of sociological research (Parsons, 1954; Weber, 1947; 
Wilensky, 1964; Hall, 1968; Etzioni, 1969; Abbott, 1988; 
Lortie, 1975). Sociologists debate whether teaching meets the 
primary requirements of a profession which include:
  A specialized knowledge base and shared standards of 
practice
  A strong service ethic and commitment to meeting 
clients’ needs
  A strong personal identity with and dedication to the 
occupation
  Collegial [versus bureaucratic] control over entry, 
performance evaluations, and retention in the profession 
(see Talbert & McLaughlin 1994:126). 
Academics portray primary and secondary teaching in 
the United States as weak on each condition of professional 
status (Cohen, 2011). Teaching has long lacked the 
organizational and professional controls fundamental to 
professional standing. Neither professional socialization 
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nor educational policies provide clear definitions of 
teachers’ roles and standards of practice; neither schools 
nor collegial bodies have much capacity to meaningfully 
evaluate practice or sanction poor teaching. In the United 
States, for instance, once teachers are granted lifetime tenure 
it is almost impossible to dismiss them on the grounds of 
incompetence.
Evidence about teaching in American classrooms places 
the occupation at considerable distance from these primary 
criteria of professional status. Challenges to teachers’ 
professionalism are many; primary among them is 
teachings’ incoherent occupational infrastructure. 
Educational settings in the United States display divergent 
conceptions of quality instruction and little shared 
technical culture. Even within the same school, teachers’ 
ideas about academic progress and standards of ju 
dgment about student outcomes can and do vary widely 
in the absence of any valid, agree-upon set of methods or 
frameworks for teaching. Instead, debates continue among 
researchers, educators, and academics about “best practices” 
and the standards by which to assess them. The social-
normative context of teaching undermines the professional 
status of teaching. In particular, privacy norms undercut 
shared standards of practice and expectations for students 
(Little, 1990; Lortie, 1975; McLaughlin & Talbert, 2006).
Fueling to this occupational disjointedness are deep-
seated disputes about the means and ends of schooling, 
disagreements that extend back to the beginning of public 
education in America. Is the primary aim of schooling to 
promote democracy, or is the production of better workers 
the motivating goal of schooling? 
Despite this discouraging overall assessment of teachers’ 
professional status, positive evidence about teachers’ 
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professional standing and authority can be found in 
strong, site-based teacher learning communities. Based 
on this research, I argue that teaching can meet the 
primary conditions which distinguish a profession from 
a semi-profession or skilled occupation if it is conceived 
of as a learning profession that is socially-constructed, not 
bureaucratically derived. Sustained and meaningful teacher 
professionalism, I argue, is a product of an active, school-
based teacher learning community that exhibits high levels 
of inquiry-based collaboration, shared responsibility, and 
mutual support. 
This paper first delineates among the different forms a 
school-based teacher community might assume, a learning 
community being only one. I then consider the features 
fundamental to the design, functioning, and outcomes of a 
teacher learning community. Next, I provide evidence that a 
teacher learning community positively benefits students and 
engenders the primary requirements of professional status. I 
conclude with lessons for policy and practice about teaching 
as a learning profession. My goal is to provide a descriptive 
theory to better understand the functions and contributions 
of a teacher learning community, and the conditions that 
support it.
Forms of Teacher Community
Teacher learning communities are characterized by 
collaborative, evidence-based learning about how school 
and classroom practices affect student learning. They are 
the exception within and across American schools. Most 
typically, American schools are characterized by weak 
teacher communities in which teachers practice “behind 
the classroom door” according to their individual beliefs 
and values about instruction and expectations for students. 
In weak teacher communities, little shared knowledge base 
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exists and accountability for student outcomes is understood 
in individual terms. In weak teacher communities, teaching 
has few hallmarks of a profession.
Forms of Teacher Community
(McLaughlin & Talbert, 2001:62)
Strong teacher communities, in contrast, support a 
community of practice within the school, but not all strong 
teacher communities meet primary criteria of a profession. 
Teacher communities organized around traditional practices 
often exhibit shared standards of practice and instructional 
strategies, but do not necessarily subscribe to a service ethic or 
commitment to meeting students’ needs. This type of strong 
teacher community is often found in many of America’s 
high-performing, elite schools where mainstream students 
do well in coursework and on tests. Students from different 
cultural or economic backgrounds often struggle in these 
school settings because traditional instructional practices 
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do not meet their learning needs. Teachers develop strong 
commitments to “upholding traditional standards” in the 
face of widespread student failure. Assessments of students’ 
academic shortfalls in such communities frequently explain 
these outcomes in terms of insufficient student motivation or 
ability. Often heard from teachers in these settings is some 
version of the exasperated comment: “I am teaching but they 
are not learning.”
Features of a Teacher Learning Community
Teacher learning communities can and do take different 
forms in primary and secondary schools. Some learning 
communities involve teachers from the same grade level 
and engage them in examining how students with similar 
academic or demographic characteristics perform in different 
classrooms. Secondary school teachers often organize by 
subject area and consider the different classrooms teaching 
similar material as opportunity for a natural experiment in 
different pedagogical or instructional strategies. In small 
schools, a teacher learning community can engage the 
entire faculty in thinking about patterns of student learning 
outcomes across grades (McLaughlin & Talbert, op cit.).
Bransford, Brown and Cocking’s landmark 1999 volume How 
people learn details four features fundamental to an effective 
learning community, whether that community is composed 
of children and youth or adults. Productive, vibrant learning 
communities are learner centered, knowledge centered, 
assessment centered, and community centered.
Learner centered environments. A requirement that a 
learning community be learner centered draws upon a 
strong body of evidence that learning is most powerful and 
successful when it is connected to learners’ experience and 
needs. Learner centered environments help learners, teachers 
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in this instance, make connections between their previous 
knowledge and their current problems of practice. 
A learner centered perspective acknowledges that productive 
knowledge use within teacher learning communities is 
path dependent—it builds on what teachers know and 
can do. Teachers use their current knowledge to construct 
new knowledge and interpret its significance for practice. 
Sometimes teachers’ existing knowledge facilitates new 
learning, and sometimes it obstructs it. Nonetheless, many 
researchers have pointed out that learning is most powerful 
when the knowledge that promotes it is tightly tied to 
learners’ context. As Bransford, Brown and Cocking (1999: 
49) point out, “Learners of all ages are more motivated when 
they can see the usefulness of what they are learning and 
when they can use that information to do something that has 
impact on others.” 
Knowledge centered environments. Knowledge centered 
settings place a premium on generating, building upon and 
using knowledge of various stripes. Knowledge that is of high 
quality, accessible, well-organized and relevant to learners 
provides the content for an effective learning community 
(Bransford, Brown & Cocking op cit.). 
What kinds of knowledge motivate and enable teachers’ 
learning? Marilyn Cochran-Smith and Susan Lytle 
(1999) usefully distinguish among three substantively 
and strategically different conceptions of the knowledge 
associated with teachers’ learning and change: knowledge for 
practice, knowledge of practice, and knowledge in practice. 
Cochran-Smith and Lytle define knowledge for practice as the 
formal knowledge and theory generated by researchers and 
university-based scholars. Some of this external knowledge 
comprises new programs or strategies– Success for All, or 
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Reading Recovery programs are examples of such university-
produced knowledge for practice. Other externally-developed 
knowledge for practice involves new theories of learning 
or instruction, such as reciprocal teaching, cooperative 
learning, or peer instruction. Knowledge for practice also 
includes assessments, strategies for research and evaluation, 
or other inquiry tools such as running records to score 
students’ reading progress.
Knowledge of practice involves yet another form of 
knowledge and resource for teachers’ learning. This second 
form of knowledge comprises neither formal nor practical 
knowledge. Knowledge of practice is generated when teachers 
treat their own classrooms and schools as sites of inquiry and 
examine them in terms of such broader social and political 
issues as equity, patterns of student achievement, or school 
supports for students’ futures. Knowledge of practice may be 
produced by teachers themselves, or may involve data and 
analysis provided by outside evaluators or researchers—
working with or without teachers’ involvement.
Knowledge in practice—a third kind of knowledge—is 
what teachers come to understand as they reflect on their 
practice, generate different forms of data about it, and is 
situated in their own classrooms. It is practical knowledge. 
Action research and other forms of classroom-based inquiry 
support teachers’ learning of this sort. Knowledge in practice 
is knowledge about individual students, stimulated by 
teachers’ questions about their own classrooms. 
Each form of knowledge is mutually reinforcing and essential 
to teaching as a learning profession. Without knowledge for 
practice, teachers lack the new ideas, skills and perspectives 
they need to evaluate, enrich or change their practices. Yet, 
without knowledge of practice, teachers are constrained in 
their ability to exploit external knowledge, situate it in their 
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particular school workplace, or even understand the need 
for new ways of doing things. Knowledge of practice enables 
teachers to see problem areas in their practice, and to identify 
opportunities for inquiry and innovation. Knowledge of 
practice points a faculty to needed external resources and 
areas for internal improvement.
However, absent teachers’ knowledge in practice, new ideas 
may have only uneven or marginal effects on individual 
classrooms, since they may not reflect the needs and issues 
specific to any one classroom setting. Knowledge in practice 
informs individual teacher action and reflection, and guides 
teachers in tailoring resources to best support their everyday 
work. 
Assessment centered environments. Strategic inquiry into 
students’ performance serves as the ‘engine’ of a strong 
teacher learning community, focusing teachers’ attention 
on students’ responses to instructional practices, how to 
modify them to improve student outcomes, and how to learn 
from their collective experience. Strategic inquiry involves 
teachers in nonjudgmental examination of student work and 
exploration of the connections between classroom or school 
practices and student outcomes. 
Collaborative discussions are most productive when they 
involve data and concrete examples of students’ work to 
inform teachers’ sense-making and identifying connections 
between practices and student outcomes. Researchers from 
diverse perspectives agree that that data and the process of 
inquiry form the foundation for teachers’ learning (Daly, 
Moolenaar, Der-Martirosian &Liou 2014; Mandinach & 
Honey, 2008; McLaughlin & Talbert, op cit.; Panero & 
Talbert, 2013).
Panero and Talbert (2013) employ the term strategic inquiry 
to distinguish the process and product of a teacher learning 
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community from generic approaches of ‘data-based decision 
making’ or collaborative examination of student outcomes. 
It is strategic because it is based upon specific concepts 
about student learning goals, concrete ideas about what 
gets in the way, and detailed evidence about gaps in 
struggling students’ foundational skills, such as literacy 
and mathematical operations. “Starting small” is a central 
feature of strategic inquiry because it focuses inquiry on 
specifics and assumes that “a part represents the whole” 
of a problem of practice and makes manageable the 
otherwise overwhelming challenge of change (Panero & 
Talbert op cit., 11 ff.).
Strategic inquiry based upon various types of student 
work and learning outcomes requires both formative and 
summative assessments of where students are, how they are 
progressing and what they have accomplished. Formative 
assessments use many different forms of data—homework, 
writing samples, classroom participation, student journals 
for example. Final grades and standardized test scores 
typically comprise summative assessments examined by 
members of the learning community. 
Teacher learning communities employ a variety of strategies 
to focus their inquiry on explicit problems of practice. In 
some instances, teachers have identified a small group of 
students for whom existing practices are not successful. 
Concentration on focal or target students forces teachers 
to be explicit about problems identified, learning goals 
and measures of progress. Teachers follow focal students 
closely over a period of time, attending to their work and 
learning using a variety of formal and informal measures 
and indicators. 
A Low Inference Transcript (LIT) is another formative 
strategy; LIT involves a teacher observer scripting the student 
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engagement and learning evident during a particular lesson. 
This transcript then becomes data used to draw connections 
between what a colleague observed in terms of students’ 
responses and the instructional practices employed in the 
classroom (see Panero & Talbert op cit. for a full discussion 
of the LIT strategy). These and other formative strategies 
enable teacher learners to see their classroom and the school 
from the perspective of struggling students and make visible 
the associated learning gaps problems of practice.
Teacher learning communities use summative assessments to 
identify patterns of success and underperformance in student 
outcomes at classroom, department and school levels. Does 
one subgroup of students consistently fall behind? Are there 
school structures or routines associated with disappointing 
student performance? What are student pathways through 
grade levels? Is there at point at which students fall behind? 
Which students?
Teachers use both formative and summative assessments 
as part of their strategic inquiry to identify problems early 
and consider pedagogical or curricular responses that could 
be beneficial. To be meaningful, assessments of students’ 
learning must correspond to the specific learning goals 
established by the teacher community and make deliberate 
use of the many practical experiments that are part of their 
everyday practice.
Community centered environments. It takes a community 
of practice to support teaching as a learning profession. 
Assigning “community” a foundational place in the operation 
of an effective learning environment references the long line 
of research that demonstrates that learning is most effective 
when it is the result of an interactive and social process, 
rather than as something an individual undertakes on his 
or her own.
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Teams of teachers form the foundation of a learning 
community be they organized by grade level, subject area, 
department or include the whole faculty; over time they create 
the social-normative basis for strategic inquiry, learning and 
change. Learning communities provide the opportunities for 
collegial reflection and problem-solving that allow teachers 
to construct knowledge based on what they know about 
students’ learning and progress. When teachers examine 
students’ work together, it helps them consider how practice 
has been successful or fallen short of expectations for 
particular students. Norms of shared responsibility developed 
in strong teacher learning communities encourage teachers 
to report rather than hide disappointing student outcomes, 
and collectively to make the most of that experience through 
a critical review of practice (Young, 2008).
Teams of teachers examining student work bring different 
perspectives on instruction and problems of practice. In its 
collective wisdom, the ability of a teacher team to identify 
performance gaps and possible reasons for disappointing 
student performance exceeds that of even the most gifted 
teacher.
The “community” aspect of teachers’ learning environment 
serves several functions critical to teachers’ engagement with 
strategic inquiry and using the resulting knowledge. For one, 
the collective building and managing of knowledge develops 
a “collective mindfulness” among teacher participants and 
sense of shared responsibility, language and vision within 
the teacher learning community. 
Also, a strong teacher learning community provides a 
powerful collegial strategy for socializing new teachers 
and administrators to the schools’ norms of practice and 
professional expectations for both teachers and students. 
In this sense, a strong teacher learning community serves 
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as a “rudder” for maintaining agreed-upon goals and 
commitments to practice.
But perhaps the most important contribution of a strong 
teacher community lies in the relational trust and sense of 
shared responsibility it fosters and sustains among teachers 
(Bryk, Sebring, Allensworth, Luppescu & Easton, 2010). 
Arguably without mutual trust and respect, strategic inquiry 
could never take place to any meaningful extent. The inquiry 
stance central to teaching as a learning profession requires a 
huge cultural shift for most teachers who typically are asked 
to deliver instruction not to examine it critically. Learning 
involves making oneself vulnerable—acknowledging 
shortfalls in practice, gaps in professional knowledge or 
experience. Rethinking practice or assumptions about 
student engagement and outcomes requires risk-taking of 
the most fundamental kind, especially for veteran teachers.
Collegial buy in and support are essential if teachers are 
to take these risks voluntarily. Comfort with inquiry and 
the necessary trusting relationships take time to build and 
deepen. In this sense, the process of inquiry is a product 
when it creates positive relational capital among teachers. The 
most effective teacher learning communities engage trained 
facilitators to keep that process moving forward, comfortable 
and on task (McLaughlin & Talbert op cit.; Panero & Talbert 
op cit.; Talbert, Cor, Chen, Kless & McLaughlin, 2012).
All of these features of a strong teacher learning community—
most centrally, shared language, values and responsibility, 
collective mindfulness, relational trust—function together to 
support creation of knowledge and learning about practice. 
What happens to knowledge produced by and brought into 
a community of practice depends fundamentally on the 
character of that community and the relationships among 
its members.
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Teacher subject area networks and professional associations 
in principle provide other important communities of 
practice, and provide knowledge for practice. But they 
do not and cannot serve the function of a school-based 
learning community. Knowledge resources imported into a 
professional community that lacks these connections to on-
going practice and problems of practice have limited if any 
utility. The knowledge produced and managed by teacher 
communities serve as a filter determining relevance and 
value. 
This observation highlights the critical role of prior 
knowledge in teachers’ ability and inclination to use external 
resources—what Cohen and Levinthal (1990) call “absorptive 
capacity” or the ability to recognize, assimilate and apply 
new information. To this point, research into teachers’ 
knowledge use and collaboration consistently support 
Yasumoto, Uekawa and Bidwell’s (2001) conclusion about 
“the importance of strong ties in the workplace, which ease 
the flow of information, provide collective ability to respond 
quickly and flexibly when problems of practice occur, and 
create capacity to ensure consistent performance throughout 
a work group.” 
Benefits of Teacher Learning Communities
For students’ learning. Teachers associated with a strong 
learning community continually examine the fit between 
instruction and student outcomes, and modify practices 
where they are found to fall short. Not surprisingly, their 
students benefit—most especially students traditionally 
unsuccessful in school. Students learn more when their 
teachers work together and when strategic inquiry is the 
medium for that collaborative work. Researchers find positive 
effects of teachers’ learning communities for both regional 
and nationally representative samples (see for example, Bryk, 
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et al., op cit.; Daly, et al., op cit.; Panero & Talbert 2013;Pil 
& Leana 2009; Talbert et al., op cit.; Yasumoto, Uekawa 
& Bidwell, op cit.). Likewise, researchers report strong 
correlations of teacher learning communities with teacher 
practices associated with students’ learning gains, students’ 
positive experiences with their schools and classrooms. 
Students report that learning is fun, that they feel connected 
to school, and that their teachers care about them.
For teachers’ professionalism. The primary requirements 
an occupation must exhibit to achieve status as a profession 
include: a specialized knowledge base and shared standards of 
practice; a strong service ethic; strong personal identity with 
and commitment to the occupation; and collegial control 
over entry, advancement and retention to the occupation. 
How do teacher learning communities enable teachers to 
achieve professional status through the processes of inquiry 
and collegial work around students’ learning they embody?
Teacher learning communities shift the focus within 
schools from adults to students—how are they learning? Are 
they engaged? In doing so teacher learning communities 
create common language and expectations—a shared 
technical culture. The strategic inquiry characteristic of 
teacher learning communities shifts responsibility for 
student outcomes from individual teachers to the teaching 
community, responsibility that operates according to shared 
professional norms. 
In strong teacher learning communities, conversations 
reference “our” students rather than “my” students and 
teaching becomes a “team” activity rather than an solely a 
solo one Practice in a strong teacher learning community 
moves from routinized presentation of texts, or text-driven 
instruction, to student-focused instruction and academic 
supports—evidence of a strong service ethic. 
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Finally, our research finds that teachers associated with 
strong teacher learning communities have a stronger sense of 
professional efficacy and satisfaction, increased professional 
commitment and identity—hallmarks of professional status. 
Conversely, we saw that teacher “burnout” and departure 
from teaching was associated with a lack of teacher 
community and sense of professional isolation (McLaughlin 
& Talbert, 2001;2006.).
Teaching as a Learning Profession: Conclusion and 
Implications
Research on teachers’ learning communities provides 
lessons about how and under what conditions teachers use 
knowledge to inform practice; it underscores the point 
that learning to inform change in practice and support 
professional authority requires local knowledge. Teachers 
learn through their up-close, on-going interactions with 
colleagues. Professionalism and the criteria that define it 
cannot be bureaucratically mandated or organizationally 
controlled. In the absence of all-encompassing professional, 
organizational or institutional standards for practice, it is 
socially constructed and locally negotiated within school-
based learning communities. 
The strength and benefit of teachers’ professionalism 
so constructed is evident in its effects for students and 
teachers. But the essential localness of the site and sources of 
teachers’ learning profession also contains its vulnerability 
to leadership change or the imposition of punitive, rigid 
accountability schemes that reward or sanction individual 
teachers’ performance.
Although evidence supports the claim that both students 
and teachers benefit when teaching is supported as a learning 
profession through school-based learning communities, the 
uptake on this approach has been slow. While many districts 
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and schools across the United States have bought into the 
general concept of a teacher learning community as a 
powerful educational reform strategy and one that especially 
benefits struggling students, implementation has been at best 
spotty and at worst, unsuccessful. Several factors explain this 
observation.
For one, too often basic understanding of the issues involved 
with teachers’ learning is limited or misconstrued. The 
academic or policy communities seldom make problematic 
the question of what a specialized knowledge base should 
include and what teachers need to know to improve their 
practice. Reformers and impatient publics disappointed with 
student outcomes often cast teachers’ learning requirements 
in relatively the relatively simple terms of more or different 
content knowledge. Certainly, knowledge of new practices 
is essential for teachers to improve instruction for today’s 
classrooms, but more or better content knowledge by itself 
cannot necessarily accomplish much. Experience shows that 
simply having more and better knowledge resources available 
does not mean that teachers will or can use them effectively 
in their classrooms. 
Likewise, research on teachers’ learning typically is more 
concerned about the content of teachers’ learning than 
with the processes that stimulate, support and sustain it. 
The one-shot workshops that gather teachers somewhere 
off-site for a day and send them home with a notebook are 
antithetical to what we know about how teachers learn and 
use knowledge. These strategies aim to push “knowledge” 
into the system through meetings and informational 
resources. This approach finds support in efficiency-based 
arguments. Teachers may acquire new information in these 
sessions, but its significance to practice is questionable. 
Despite the fact that these approaches have been consistently 
193Teaching as a learning profession
found to be ineffective, many professional development 
practices continue to center on supplying content rather 
than promoting learning; unfortunately they continue to 
dominate the professional development landscape (Webster-
Wright 2009). 
Similarly, although we see that knowledge that informs and 
animates a teacher learning community is adapted to existing 
practices, problems of practice and professional capabilities, 
reformers continue to pursue “silver bullet” responses to 
poor student outcomes and problems of practice. Regardless 
of evidence that “solutions” cannot be imported wholesale 
into classrooms, unrealistic expectations about the power of 
“best practices” persist at national, state and local levels. Yet 
we know that the usefulness of so-called best practices or 
theories of instruction and learning depend on the extent 
to which teachers are able to situate this knowledge in their 
own instructional contexts. 
Another obstacle to successful implementation of school-
based teacher learning communities has to do with the 
insufficient attention given to the features essential to an 
effective learning community. Teachers’ knowledge use and 
learning depends fundamentally on the rigor and reach of 
the cycle of inquiry at work within their learning community. 
Teachers’ knowledge use and learning is a social process, 
problem-based and data informed; it requires the support, 
collegiality and perspectives of a healthy community. 
Yet, research on teachers’ learning generally is 
decontextualized and silent on the question of environments 
that stimulate or frustrate it. Relatively little research looks 
at how sites and sources of teachers’ learning affect teachers’ 
ability and motivation to learn and use new knowledge. 
Practical and political support for developing and using 
the multi-faceted forms of knowledge essential to a teacher 
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learning community also is limited because of this incomplete 
research base, but more importantly because of reluctance to 
invest the required time and resources.
Implications. Several implications for practice and policy 
emerge from a perspective that frames teaching as a learning 
profession. One is that an inquiry stance must be central to 
the role of the teacher and that development and deepening of 
these skills and habits of mind require intentional attention 
by preservice and in-service teacher educators, practitioners 
and education policy makers at all levels of the system. 
Pre-service teacher education programs serve a critical 
preparation and socialization function for teachers. 
Introducing aspiring teachers to the skills and collegial 
settings required by inquiry as part of their pre-service 
education could make a substantive contribution to the 
ways in which new teachers understand their role and the 
value of a teacher learning community. Preservice education 
programs have a vital function to play in preparing teachers 
to assume an inquiry stance on practice and equipping them 
with the skills to undertake it.
Practicing teachers receive scant support in developing 
comfort and skill in generating and using data. Available 
evidence suggests that those competencies need to be 
fostered in the context of investigating concrete problems of 
practice and familiar predicaments. In-service resources for 
teachers’ professional development as inquirers and learners 
will have the most impact when they are available at the 
school-level. Support within the school for data collection 
and sense making, acting on identified problems of practice, 
and assessing the consequences for students’ learning 
provide critical resources for teachers’ strategic inquiry and 
the healthy functioning of their learning community.
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Administrators play a crucial role in the development, 
operation and contribution of a teacher learning community 
(Young, 2008). Administrative support for evidence-based 
teacher learning supplies an essential sense of professional 
safety around strategic inquiry—that disappointments and 
shortfalls are opportunities for learning rather than cause 
for sanction. Administrators make the time, space and 
resources available for teachers’ learning communities—
“business as usual” at the school site cannot accommodate a 
teacher learning community. Administrators, like teachers, 
would benefit from professional development focused on the 
role and operation of teacher inquiry and implications for 
administrators.
Data systems seldom are developed with teachers’ use in 
mind. Administrative data about student outcomes typically 
includes summative measures such as end of semester 
grade point averages, school enrollment and completion, or 
attendance figures. These data furnish essential information 
for school and district administrators but are less useful to 
teachers engaged in real-time inquiry about student learning. 
Teachers need formative data that are provided regularly and 
in accessible formats. Most school systems currently provide 
data only at mid and end of year—too late to be useful to 
teachers’ instructional decision making except as grounds 
for retrospective reflection.
The fruitful implementation and support of a teacher learning 
community requires a developmental perspective. Building a 
strong teacher learning community takes time; few if any 
faculties are willing or able to launch into the activities and 
conversations found in a mature learning community. Time 
is needed to develop shared understandings and language, 
agreements about the process of inquiry, and mutual 
responsibility—and the relational trust that underpins it. 
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A developmental perspective on implementation of a teacher 
learning communities acknowledges the substantial cultural 
shift involved in moving from the traditional “stand and 
deliver” teacher role to an inquiry stance. It means starting 
with activities and expectations that are manageable, that 
teachers are [more or less] comfortable with and capable of. 
Our research found that faculty new to strategic inquiry often 
were more comfortable starting with generating knowledge 
of practice—inquiry focused on school level patterns of 
student outcomes and connections to structures, practices, 
and resources within the school and across classrooms. 
Only then were teachers willing to put aside their anxieties 
and engage in up-close examination of their classroom 
practices—knowledge in practice (McLaughlin & Talbert, op 
cit.).
A developmental approach also recognizes that a vigorous, 
productive teacher learning community is not a temporary 
arrangement that can be convened and disbanded at will. 
Teacher learning communities are not ad hoc committees 
assembled to take on a specific task. They require significant 
relational capital to operate—collegial bonds that are 
continuously being built, rebuilt and reaffirmed. Likewise, 
once formed, teacher learning communities cannot be 
regrouped or recombined without attention to the [re]
building of shared understandings and language. 
A developmental approach to teacher learning communities 
also understands that the process of undertaking and 
acting on strategic inquiry is not self-winding, but will 
experience frustrations and unanticipated interruptions. 
Effective teacher learning communities, as do collaborations 
more generally, need someone to be in charge of managing 
the data, tracking logistics, and keeping the conversation 
going. Most effective is the presence of a trained facilitator; 
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however teachers on special assignment also can take on this 
important role. 
* * *
Research and experience support the proposition that 
teachers’ professional status depends to a significant extent 
on the nature and character of teachers’ school-based 
communities, and that the challenge of enhancing teachers’ 
professionalism is a local matter. The social, normative and 
organizational resources required by a productive teacher 
learning community are locally constructed and cannot 
be bureaucratically imposed. By implication, then, there 
are few quick fixes to enhancing teachers’ professional 
status—to elevating teaching from a skilled occupation to 
a learning profession. Achieving that goal requires a major 
shift in technical, organizational and political conceptions 
of teaching and implicates all stakeholders in that process—
educators at all levels, leaders and the public. The descriptive 
theory developed here about the form and function of teacher 
learning communities can inform that work.
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This paper locates the current crisis in teachers’ work and 
identity in the context of market led reform and restructuring. 
It maps the current discourses on education as a discipline 
and understanding of teaching as a profession and the 
implications of these for the nature of teachers’ work and 
professional development. Drawing upon recent research 
it discuss the impact of the changing notions of teachers’ 
work and quality on issues of teacher identity and their 
knowledge base. Based on an understanding of the self in a 
moral framework, it then argues for the conceptualisation 
of an authentic knowledge base for teachers that validates 
their identity and experience and incorporates an ontology 
of value based action. 
The ongoing education reform process is characterised by 
two parallel discourses that reflect the international trends 
over the last decade or so. The first is a call for preparing 
teachers to become professional and humane individuals 
(NCFTE, 2009). The other is the adoption of state policies 
and interventions based on arguments in favour of efficiency 
and outcomes. It appears to be the case that the discourses 
are at odds with one another. To begin with, the notion 
of humane may be understood within an ethic of care 
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(Noddings, 2002), very often held up as an ideal by teachers, 
it is potentially problematic as it projects and reinforces the 
traditional roles of women in their domestic space into the 
arena of their work. The notion of professional too has been 
a highly contested one in the history of teaching (Lawn cited 
in Smyth, 2014) and there is very little clarity on what being a 
professional actually entails. There is then an inherent tension 
between the notions of humane and professional. While the 
former may entail individual attention to students, the latter 
would require the very opposite, which is to focus on overall 
outcomes (Kumar, 2011). In order to meet the demands of 
being a professional, the teacher is often required to redefine 
her relationship with students in ways that are contrary to the 
demands of being humane. The second discourse is in many 
ways consistent with changes occurring world over towards 
making schools more efficient and outcome oriented. This 
is particularly evident in specific actions at the national and 
global levels that are, camouflaged under the language of 
efficiency, performativity, measurable outcomes and quality 
(Apple & Jungck, 2013; Ball, Thrupp, & Forsey, 2010; Kumar, 
2011). An emerging perspective from the so called developed 
and developing countries conceptualise these changes within 
the broader framework of globalisation and the hegemonic 
nature of the neoliberal regimes.
There is also a discernible move towards ‘destatalisation’ 
(Jessop in Nambissan & Ball, 2010) which underlies the 
increasing legitimacy for neoliberal answers to the issues 
confronting education propelled by advocacy networks 
that operate across national borders (Nambissan & Ball, 
2010). While these discourses gain momentum in India in 
a manner similar to the global trends, the contextual factors 
are bound to have effects that may well be very different from 
those seen elsewhere. The postcolonial reform measures have 
been largely unsuccessful in affording teachers the voice and 
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agency required to meaningfully engage with issues that 
impact them the most as they continue to remain outside 
institutions of higher education and viewed as nothing 
more than transmitters of pre-designed curricula. Despite 
several progressive policy reforms in education in recent 
years, teachers themselves have remained marginal in these 
discussions (Batra, 2012). Teachers are subjected to the 
rising trends of managerialism that has led to ‘trivialisation 
of teachers’ work and identity’. Their long standing low 
professional status and reductivist view of their knowledge 
leads to teachers being treated as resources to be developed 
and not as intellectual beings with agency and capacity to 
learn from experience (Kumar, 2011). This clearly marks 
the current crisis in teachers work as one of their identity 
and calls for the need to establish a conceptual basis for this 
identity which is under threat from neoliberal forces. 
Neoliberalism and Education: Neoliberalism is an economic 
doctrine that in the latter part of the twentieth century 
became a widely adopted framework for social, political and 
economic governance. It works on the central idea of classical 
economics that a free market is an essential prerequisite for 
a free society (Peters in Chopra, 2003) but as noted by David 
Harvey (2005), the freedoms embodied by neoliberalism in 
fact reflect the interests of private property owners, financial 
capital, large corporations and businesses. The distinguishing 
aspect of neoliberalism is that it departs from the laissez-faire 
approach of liberalism to co-opt the state to act in favour 
of private capital. It directs the state apparatus meant for 
human well-being to act in favour of global high finance and 
corporations to effectively reconstitute society in terms of its 
economic relations (Davies & Bansel, 2007). Neoliberalism 
has undeniable implications for education. Studies in the 
Indian context have further highlighted specific issues 
such as dilution of commitment to quality education due to 
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informalisation of teachers’ work (Batra, 2012; Pandey, 2006), 
the problems in instituting pedagogic reform agendas based 
on the promise of child centred education (Sriprakash, 2011), 
the flaws in the very conception of education as evidenced 
in the growth of low cost private schooling in urban India 
(Sarangapani & Winch, 2010). The common thread here is a 
distinct tilt in the reform policy in a neoliberal direction along 
the twin ‘axes of parental school choice and privatisation’ 
((Nambissan & Ball, 2010) sought to be justified by citing 
poor learning outcomes without recognition of the ground 
realities of the social factors that affect learning in schools 
for the underprivileged (Bhattacharya 2009 in M. Majumdar, 
2011). The responsibility for the current ‘crisis’ in government 
schooling has been pinned rather too readily on teachers 
while the real issue of the conditions under which these 
teachers function, the wide variation in terms of resources, 
infrastructure remain largely masked (Majumdar, 2011). 
These are but examples of a certain common paradigmatic 
view about the goals for society at large, aims of education 
in particular and thereby the kind of schools we provide for 
and the nature of teachers’ work. I would conceptualise these 
policy changes broadly as restructuring of education which 
as noted above has several parallels with the restructuring 
happening in varying degrees across the developing and 
developed world. One of the most significant and fundamental 
ways in which these processes have impacted education is 
the way in which the nature of teachers’ work has been recast 
to align with the new language of accountability (Madan, 
2012)locating its intellectual and institutional dimensions of 
getting public institutions to function. Extending the control 
vs. commitment argument posed by Rowan, the paper argues 
that the notions of teachers’ work shapes the organisational 
aspect of a school. underlying one kind of organisational 
approach is the technical instrumental ones that dictate a 
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specific set of choices to be made by the actors, and these 
draw largely from the set of doctrines termed as New Public 
Managament (NPM. 
The accountability framework is closely linked with the 
technical instrumental approaches that shape and define 
organisations pushing them towards certain choices. 
In schools, these choices are dictated by the notion that 
improved school functioning and teacher efficiency can 
be achieved not by appeals to teacher identities, cultures 
and sense of professionalism but through applying strong 
managerial tactics. This in turn presupposes certain 
conception of teachers’ work as mechanistic rather than 
organic, routine rather than involving new challenges that 
have to be handled contextually rather than by referring to 
a rule book. The ‘control and command approach’ of the 
accountability framework may result in effective schools and 
teachers but it is the ‘commitment approach’ that recognises 
the cultural identities and professionalism of the human 
actors that go into the building of better schools (Rowan 
in ibid). There has been a concerted move towards three 
kinds of policy technologies namely, market, managerialism 
and performativity that constitute a reform package (Ball, 
2003). These are posed as alternatives to and often overlaid 
upon the older policy technologies of professionalism and 
bureaucracy. Though these are interrelated, the notion of 
performativity has the greatest implication for teachers’ 
life and work as this changes one’s subjective relations with 
one another and alters the social identity. Performativity 
outwardly encourages a sense of individualism and greater 
freedom for self-regulation and improving productivity. In 
reality however it signifies not the withdrawal of control but 
the institution of a new form of control where values such 
as commitment and service held by individuals are of little 
worth. 
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This establishes two things. First, the neoliberal regime 
with its overriding focus on efficient functioning of schools 
has a direct consequence for conceptions of teachers’ 
work and professionalism. Second, there is an urgent need 
for unravelling the connection between the emerging 
conceptions of teachers work and the attendant negotiation 
of their identities. 
Teacher Professionalism: The concept of a professional being 
a contested one, a preliminary understanding of what it 
is to be one, is needed. The notion of professional or 
professionalism is not a static concept and has evolved over 
time. A professional has been defined mainly as someone 
who possesses skills or expertise that proceed from a 
broad knowledge base, strong technical culture and shared 
standards of practice (Downie, 1990; Hargreaves, 2000). She 
provides service through a special, legitimised relationship 
with clients; speaks out on broad matters of public policy and 
justice; is independent of influence of state or commerce; is 
educated as distinct from merely being trained (Downie, 
1990). The allegiance to a specialised knowledge base, and 
autonomy stand out as the key defining characteristics of a 
professional. This of course is an ideal, evaluative and not a 
sociological characterisation. On the contrary, a Weberian 
characterisation of profession wherein the rise of rationality 
in society corresponds with the rise of bureaucracy and 
professions particularly in the occident (Ritzer, 1975). 
Weber’s notion of profession is unique in that he does 
not position professionalisation and bureaucratisation as 
antithetical to one another. In fact his conception combines 
all three sociological approaches to defining professions, 
viz., structure, process & power. Structure is the ahistorical 
and static characterisation of professions vis-à-vis the non-
professions; process denotes the historical trajectory of 
professions or the stages they go through before they attain 
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the status of professions; and power denotes the monopoly 
the professional has over their work. More importantly, 
professionalization and bureaucratisation are aspects of 
rationalisation of society. 
Coming to teachers as professionals and teaching as a 
profession, the knowledge base of a teacher especially 
knowledge that, must be grounded, broad based and the 
teacher must have the ability to communicate the knowledge 
how through humane practice (Ibid, p155-6). That is, convey 
the value of the subject along with its content. This is possible 
for a teacher who is educated rather than narrowly trained 
and is inclined to develop her knowledge and skills within 
a framework of values (Ibid, p157). One can therefore see 
how the introduction of market forces and competition in 
education could threaten the independence of the profession 
(Ibid. 158).
In the neoliberal regime where the market forces shape and 
dictate organisational choices, a professional is compelled 
to engage in relationships that are primarily economic. In 
this schema, with the focus on effective delivery of products 
and services, education becomes more of a commodity 
relationship than a social cultural one (Smyth, 2014: 284). This 
notion of education as a commodity raises several conceptual 
issues for teaching as a profession. Most significantly, it 
comes in direct conflict with one of the core ideal of teaching 
upheld by most teachers which is the emotional dimension 
of teachers’ work, caring for their students and their learning 
((Lasky, 2005; Woods & Jeffrey, 2002; Zembylas, 2010). This 
is an important dimension to analyse as increasing numbers 
of women are entering the teaching profession in India 
(Manjrekar, 2013) and this trend towards feminisation of the 
teaching workforce has implications for changing notions 
about the profession and the demands placed on teachers, in 
contrast to those placed on their male counterparts (Apple, 
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2013). Particularly, the child friendly pedagogies evoke 
the imagery of the nurturing role traditionally associated 
with women in their domestic spheres. In India, there 
is now greater participation in Education by the private 
sector, through corporate houses entering the space to 
provide infrastructure and even personnel to poorly staffed 
government schools. It becomes crucial to study what these 
policy packages mean for women teachers’ lives and work 
during neoliberal reforms given the critical role of education 
in social reproduction and identity construction in modern 
societies (Manjrekar, 2013). 
Given these factors, an understanding of teacher 
professionalism becomes all the more challenging. I will 
divide this broad concept (Calgren in Kompf, 1996) into 3 
distinct aspects for further analysis.
1. Professional knowledge of teachers- what is it, how it is 
organised, how can it be developed? 
2. Professionalisation of teachers – process by which an 
occupation becomes a profession including professional 
autonomy, long university education, control of the 
development of professional knowledge
3. Teacher professionalism – quality of the teachers’ work.
Professional Knowledge of teachers: It is established that a 
professional in any field enjoys a certain monopoly over a 
specified body of knowledge that forms the basis for certain 
obligations and privileges she enjoys. This knowledge lies 
at the base of how the profession itself is defined and to a 
large extent is also the source of status that the profession 
occupies. The status of teachers in society has varied across 
time and cultures. The most familiar discourse in the Indian 
tradition is of the guru/shishya which many teachers use as 
a point of reference to this day. The guru in this tradition 
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was the repository of all knowledge the base of which was 
predominantly scriptural which only a select few had the 
privilege of accessing. There were other models too, of 
patron/ client that prevailed among artisans or parent /
child (Sarangapani, 2003). These conceptions are frequently 
invoked to suit the organisational framework of schooling 
that is being promoted. Other cultures have had similar 
conceptions that have changed over time including some 
unflattering ones. For example, Montaigne in his essay titled 
‘On the schoolmasters learning’ (Montaigne, 2004) talks of 
the contempt with which teachers were regarded in Roman 
and Greek times. This contempt stemmed primarily from 
what was perceived as the need teachers had to ‘debase’ 
themselves by having to peddle their knowledge in exchange 
for material gain. These traditional conceptions with the guru 
on the one end of the spectrum and the peddler of knowledge 
on the other end are no doubt discordant with modern value 
systems. The bureaucratisation of education in colonial times 
had the biggest impact on the status accorded to the village 
schoolmaster in India. Increased centralisation and the 
resulting need for regulatory and monitoring mechanisms 
lessened teachers’ engagement with curricular issues and 
allowed for the text book culture to take over (Kumar, 1986) 
and the resulting loss of autonomy led teachers to become 
‘meek dictators’ in the classroom (Kumar, 2005). This could 
arguably mark the point where the ‘deintellectualisation’ 
(Wilson in Hartley & Whitehead, 2006) of teachers began. 
The question that remains then is what is the source and body 
of professional knowledge that teachers should claim? This is 
inevitably connected with the status of education itself as a 
discipline. Basil Bernstein as a sociologist of knowledge has 
analysed the status hierarchies of disciplines (Middleton, 
2008), and his concepts have been used by researchers (Beck 
& Young, 2005; Moore & Muller, 2002) to further explain 
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the contemporary processes in educational knowledge. For 
Bernstein, there are two types of knowledge structures, 
hierarchical and horizontal (Bernstein, 2000). Hierarchical 
knowledge structures typified by natural sciences 
progress through integration of knowledge propositions. 
Horizontal knowledge structures on the other hand are 
not unitary but plural and consist of series of parallel, even 
incommensurable concepts that defy incorporation into a 
more general theory (Young & Muller, 2007). Furthermore, 
the horizontal knowledge structures have weak verticality 
i.e., internal relations among ideas as well as weak grammar 
i.e., external relation to data. By these criteria, educational 
knowledge could very well be characterised as having a 
segmented horizontal knowledge structure with a weak 
grammar. Bernstein did not hold out much hope for the 
growth of knowledge in education as it lacked the verticality 
of the hierarchical knowledge structures such as physics. 
Countering such a such a deficit view of the growth of 
knowledge in education, others like Maton (2010) have 
argued that the key to understanding knowledge structures 
in fields such as education is by recognising that the 
cosmology of these modes of theorising are less 
epistemological and more axiological. I will return to this 
argument a bit later. 
It has also been argued (Sarangapani, 2011) that education 
may be considered a ‘meta discipline due to the interactions 
with the constituent disciplines although it is this very 
nature of the discipline that weakens its structure providing 
multiple points of entry into its discourse’. The existence 
of a community of practice that enables the transmission 
of tacit knowledge, the ability to think through problems 
in a complex manner that reveals a complex epistemology, 
may lead one to regard education as a discipline ‘albeit one 
with a weak structure’. There is also the familiar divide in 
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education between this theory and practice that has led to 
a deep disconnect that is experienced especially by student 
teachers between the disciplinary knowledge and classroom 
practice (Pope in Kompf, 1996).
Professionalisation of teachers: The second aspect of 
professionalisation is equally problematic. One challenge 
of being a teacher is navigating the pathways chartered 
by educational reformists (Stickney, 2012). Unlike other 
professions, where the professionals have autonomy and 
control over the development of professional knowledge 
in their respective fields, teachers do not enjoy the same 
autonomy or control. Historically, experts from outside 
the field of education with no background in teaching have 
decided these parameters. It has been argued that, despite 
a perception of classroom and teaching as unchanging 
entities, aims and purposes of school education change with 
the changing society. One aspect of professional knowledge 
is also being able to lean on tradition and continuities in 
professional experience which is denied to teachers and 
for this reason, teaching profession has been described as 
a ‘rupture’ profession (Calgren in Kompf, 1996:22). In this 
‘rupture’ profession where the experts decide to change the 
goals at regular intervals, there is constant change in teacher 
tasks and they are rendered without competencies in the new 
context. 
Teacher Professionalism: The third aspect namely, quality 
in teachers’ work or teacher professionalism is the area that 
has received the greatest amount of attention both in terms 
of policy and research. This is closely connected with the 
previous aspect in the sense that teachers are not considered 
sufficiently professionalised to determine the parameters 
of quality in their profession. As a result of this, there is a 
constant change in what constitutes quality in teachers’ 
work and it is determined by those outside the profession. 
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Also, professionalism, which is the process of raising 
standards of a given profession may often be contradictory to 
professionalization which denotes the process of improving 
the status of the profession. In other words, the technical 
ways of defining teaching which accompanies moves 
towards professionalism might undermine the other 
important dimensions such as devoting more time for 
individual student attention or the emotional aspects 
(Hargreaves, 2000). 
Analyses of the notion of professionalism from a social 
critical perspective (Smyth et. al. 2000) have noted the 
rapid intensification of teachers’ work in the name of 
professionalisation of teaching. Among the processes 
that characterise what is being termed as a contemporary 
crisis in teachers’ work, are the “damaging of the student 
teacher relationship through the intrusion of market” 
and a subjugation of teachers’ knowledge (Ibid: 146). Smyth 
et.al. have gone so far as to term this experience of teachers 
as alienation to describe their increasing powerlessness 
and negative feelings about the self. Studies of teachers’ 
lives from the interactionist perspectives too have brought 
to light the everyday struggles of teachers who have to 
contend with the conflicting expectations from them 
(Middleton, 2008; Zembylas, 2010). While there is a 
demand for teachers to adapt to the changing social demands, 
there is a lack of recognition of the inherent conflict between 
the strictly professional and emotional demands on the 
teacher.
It is evident that notions of quality in education change 
with changing sociocultural conditions. By the turn of the 
century, didactic teaching had been replaced by the discourse 
on reflective practice which has become the dominant 
discourse in teacher education today but there has been 
very little critical examination as to why this should be so. 
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It has been argued (Smyth, 1992), that such an overemphasis 
on reflective practice has occurred in contexts where there 
have been moves towards greater centralised control that 
leads to loss of autonomy and undermining of the dignity 
of teachers by forcing them to subscribe to a prescriptive 
paradigm. This is but an example of processes that operate 
in subtle forms to invalidate teacher knowledge about their 
own work and contexts resulting in teachers undermining 
their own valid conceptions in favour of those that are 
prescribed. Any discourse on teacher professionalism must 
therefore begin with an authentic construction of what 
constitutes teacher professional knowledge. 
If one is to engage productively with the creation of such 
an authentic knowledge base for teachers that would be the 
foundation of the creation of their selves, it is important 
to acknowledge that teachers construct their knowledge 
in action and within a value laden framework. The notion 
of disembodied knowledge has a long tradition in western 
philosophy that locates value outside of the human realm. 
The self turns inward more and more till such a stage where 
mental states are located within a so called inner space 
removed far from the realm of action (Frisina, 2012). This 
Cartesian disengagement and rationality employed to remove 
subjective experience from thinking about the natural world 
becomes extended to the concept of self. Sensory and other 
experiences of the world must now be subject to the strict 
control of reasoning. This move towards interiority is in a 
manner the objectification of all things external including 
the body. Unsurprisingly, this move parallels the triumph of 
objective knowledge of the natural sciences as the model of 
true knowledge. 
An alternative position is that of the new sociology of 
education that argues for a notion of knowledge that is 
constructed socially. This is really an epistemological position 
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that sees knowledge as being relative to culture as opposed 
to knowledge as an independent universalist phenomenon 
where the latter is identified with privileging certain power 
structures. While it may be true that knowledge is constructed 
socially, but when it is argued that all forms of knowledge are 
a matter merely of social convention with no valid basis for 
differentiation, it becomes alarmingly relativist (Blackledge 
& Hunt 1985). This is recognised by Young, himself a critic 
of the hegemonic nature of knowledge who is known to 
have revised his position. While he continues to believe in 
the historical and social construction of knowledge, but 
opines that the new sociology of education that began with 
a commitment to truth undermined its own project by 
rejecting any idea of truth (Young, 2007). 
Teacher Identity
The notion of teacher identity is admittedly a complex 
one. The concept of identity has itself been a topic of many 
philosophical, sociological and psychological explorations 
but has eluded an easy definition. As for teacher identity, 
its importance for teacher education and development is 
acknowledged widely in literature but there is very little 
convergence on its components, sources and relationship with 
related issues. Teacher identity is viewed as being dynamic, 
almost organic in nature, conceived of as something that can 
be formed, shaped and can shift according to the context 
(Beauchamp & Thomas, 2009). It is regarded as embodied, 
which is to say that the construction of identity cannot be 
regarded as removed from the material conditions of teaching 
but as continuously negotiated through experience (Alsup, 
2006). It is at the same time consistent with the ideal or moral 
conceptions of teaching. One of the most significant aspects 
of identity is however the relationship with the self or self-
concept. While the moral aspect of the self-concept is widely 
recognised, what is probably overlooked or less evident is the 
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sense of dignity that is inalienably linked to the moral aspect 
of the self. 
Earlier, it was seen that theorising in education can be 
regarded as being more axiological than epistemological. 
This view is in consonance with the fact that for philosophers 
and thinkers from Plato to Kant to Dewey, education has 
been regarded first and foremost a moral act and these moral 
aspects have clear implications for a conception of teachers’ 
self. Following Charles Taylor (1992), any description of the 
self must acknowledge the extent to which the understanding 
of the self is linked to an understanding of the good. Taylor’s 
moral framework consists of three axes viz., respect for and 
obligation to others, understanding of what makes a good life 
and notions of dignity. If one were to apply this framework 
to teachers, it would be constituted by subjective notions of 
how a teacher might fulfil her respect for and obligations to 
her students, her notion of what makes for a good teacher 
and how while accomplishing these, she might maintain her 
sense of dignity. As all moral frameworks are understood as 
fundamentally social, these notions too would be constituted 
essentially in a social context. 
The obvious question then is regarding the source of this 
identity or moral framework and it appears that it is the 
teacher’s knowledge base. Goodson posits that forms of 
knowledge defines the “kind of people teachers are and believe 
themselves to be” (2003: 4). It is the systematic erosion of this 
knowledge base or even the inadequate understanding of its 
constitution that has contributed to the contemporary crisis 
in teaching referred to earlier. It has impacted teachers’ work 
in deep ways, the curriculum, their forms of instruction, 
ways of working, ways of relating to pupils, how they are 
seen by others and by themselves. The challenges to teacher 
identities as professionals have been many but the core of 
the challenge lies in the fact that the close connect between 
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their knowledge base and identities has not been sufficiently 
acknowledged and in fact they are perceived to have no 
distinct knowledge base. 
There is equally ‘disrespect for teachers’ professional 
knowledge; it is seen as either non-existent or wrong’. They 
should be doing not what they think they should be doing 
but what they have been told is paradigmatically appropriate 
as determined by the latest set of goals and conditions for 
their work (Calgren in Kompf, 1996:25). Therefore we see 
oversimplified solutions being offered to the problems in 
education that include school choice initiatives, replacing or 
‘teacher proofing’ (Giroux, 2012) classrooms. The method 
and aim of such packages is to legitimise what might be called 
‘market-driven management pedagogies’ (Ibid). These new 
management regimes have a de-humanising effect leaving 
little scope for the teacher to negotiate her multiple roles and 
identities (Kumar, 2011: 38).
Studies in different contexts have focused on teacher 
identity as one of the most complex and crucial aspects 
for research and find that teachers devise strategies to 
negotiate with the identities imposed from the outside. 
It has been found that (Sachs, 2001) in response to the 
managerial professionalism imposed by the authorities, 
teachers form new professional identities that are often 
not in consonance with the imposed identity. Studies on the 
impact of educational restructuring on teacher identities, 
find that the disintegration of self-identity from the social 
identity results in teachers having to engage in what is 
termed ‘identity work’ (Woods & Jeffrey, 2002) to negotiate 
some consistency between the two. This identity work was 
found to be largely emotional work that required teachers 
to expend considerable amount of energies in forming, 
shaping, constructing and re constructing notions about 
themselves as teachers to keep up with the change in 
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context, expectations from society etc. The conflict between 
the role expectations ensuing from the restructuring and 
teachers’ self-identities have led to the adoption of strategic, 
instrumentalist identities (Ibid). Studies have also shown 
that teacher autonomy and agency can play a pivotal role 
in professional learning so as to offset the negative policy 
impact (Bodman, Taylor, & Morris, 2012). 
The long standing recommendation (Batra, 2012),to relocate 
teacher education with the systems of higher education as a 
way to end the intellectual isolation of the teacher implicitly 
links the issue of teacher agency with the strengthening of 
their intellectual standing. What is being emphasised here is 
the urgent need to address issues of teacher professionalism 
and identity that have the potential to impact the very reform 
agendas. The micro studies of teachers’ work lives in India in 
the recent years have brought out the relevance of grassroots 
perspectives emerging from the actual school life experience 
of teachers (Majumdar, 2011) while stressing the importance 
of connecting with the broader structural frameworks that 
leads to robust theorizing. 
I will now briefly return to the earlier discussion on the nature 
of educational knowledge. If we are to engage productively 
with the creation of an authentic knowledge base for teachers 
that would be the foundation of the creation of their selves, 
it is important to acknowledge that teachers construct their 
knowledge in action and within a value laden framework. 
The notion of disembodied knowledge has a long tradition in 
western philosophy that locates value outside of the human 
realm. The self turns inward more and more till such a stage 
where mental states are located within a so called inner space 
removed far from the realm of action (Frisina, 2012). This 
Cartesian disengagement and rationality employed to remove 
subjective experience from thinking about the natural world 
becomes extended to the concept of self. Sensory and other 
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experiences of the world must now be subject to the strict 
control of reasoning. This move towards interiority is in a 
manner the objectification of all things external including 
the body. Unsurprisingly, this move parallels the triumph of 
objective knowledge of the natural sciences as the model of 
true knowledge. I submit therefore that the task of building 
an authentic knowledge base of teachers is an ontological one 
that necessarily integrates value and action. 
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In Democracy and Education (2004/1916), Dewey charts 
out the democratic ideals of education, which forms the 
foundation for his philosophy of education. He begins 
with firmly stating the primary goal of education is aimed 
at ‘social continuity of life’, in turn binding democracy and 
education inexorably. Here, democracy is not understood 
only in terms of governance but also as a way of life. This 
understanding of democracy has deep affinity with the 
idea of learning, as we need the foundation of democratic 
spirit for mutual learning to take place among diverse 
communities of the society. If instead there is an authoritative 
spirit present in the social, learning loses it mutuality and 
becomes one-sided didacticism. Such a unidirectional 
understanding of education comes along with several 
problematic notions, primary one being the static hierarchy 
between the learner and the teacher, where the teacher 
seems to have nothing to learn from the student, or one 
identity group from another in the social context, 
problematized insightfully by Paulo Freire in Pedagogy 
of the Oppressed (2000/1970). Therefore, a truly democratic 
society needs to be fundamentally open towards mutual 
learning and participation. If at any point, a group asserts 
themselves in exclusion to other group(s) and disrupts 
mutual learning, the democratic spirit vanishes, as both 
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Dewey and his student Ambedkar highlight in their germinal 
works.
Dewey problematizes the breakdown of democratic spirit 
in society, which occurs when groups become exclusive and 
isolated. This exclusivity suffocates possibilities of dialogue 
among different groups. Dewey states that 
[i]n order to have a large number of values in common, 
all the members of the group must have an equable 
opportunity to receive and to take from others. There 
must be a large variety of shared undertakings and 
experiences. Otherwise, the influences which educate 
some into masters, educate others into slaves. And the 
experience of each party loses in meaning, when the 
free interchange of varying modes of life-experience is 
arrested. A separation into a privileged and a subject-class 
prevents social endosmosis. The evils thereby affecting 
the superior class are less material and less perceptible, 
but equally real. Their culture tends to be sterile, to be 
turned back to feed on itself; their art becomes a showy 
display and artificial; their wealth luxurious; their 
knowledge overspecialized; their manners fastidious 
rather than humane. (2004: 90)
Here, Dewey introduces the concept of social endosmosis 
which is at the core of a democratic learning spirit. Such 
an exchange among different members and groups keep 
the dynamic nature of social alive, as they “learn from 
one another, and thereby to expand their horizons” (ibid.: 
92). However, this democratic spirit can easily get hijacked 
by the selfish interests of groups who become isolated and 
exclusive in a desire to hold onto their own privileges. 
This anti-social spirit may allow for material benefits 
for the upper classes, but also stagnates them at the same 
time. Dewey goes onto elaborate that it is the isolation 
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of people and groups based on class, race and national 
identities, which is antithetical to the spirit of democracy 
and education.
Ambedkar, who draws substantially on Dewey in 
Annihilation of Caste locates the anti-social spirit in India 
with the isolation of groups based on caste and gender. 
Ambedkar argues that caste system is the worst form of 
exclusivization of groups as it divides based on labourers, 
instead of labour, and arranges them in a rigid graded 
hierarchy (2014/1936: 47). Moreover, there is no space for 
individual preference or choice in deciding or changing 
one’s occupation, but instead it’s based purely on the “dogma 
of predestination” (ibid.: 48). He further highlights the 
complete absence of a social or democratic spirit among the 
different castes as they want to keep themselves exclusive, 
and only in cases of Hindu-Muslim riots that there is a 
feeling of affiliation between the castes. However, Ambedkar 
argues that for a democratic society what is required is not 
merely physical proximity but also associated living, which 
can arise only through shared activities in which different 
communities participate together. For this kind of associated 
living, the caste groups need to rise above the interests 
of their own groups, and challenge the exclusivity that 
has isolated them from each other. Thus, for Ambedkar, 
the precondition for a democratic and associated living 
was annihilation of caste, without which exclusion and 
discrimination would continue unchallenged. 
It is in this context that I place the problem of identity based 
discrimination and violence in contemporary India, and 
its damaging repercussions on breaking down the spirit of 
democracy and mutual learning. Following Dewey, Freire 
and Ambedkar, I argue that if a democratic society implies 
shared and associated living, then the current isolation of 
communities and deep rupture in their relationships due 
227Teaching democracy
to discrimination is antithetical to the democratic project. 
What is the role of education in such a context? Is it merely 
to train the students in particular fields of knowledge and 
skills without bothering about the increasing fissures in the 
social setup? Romila Thapar (2016) and Avijit Pathak (2009: 
23) strongly argue against such an attempt of imagining 
formal education as merely concerned with technical skills 
without an ethical component, as it can easily allow for the 
skills of a doctor, engineer, scientist or historian to be used 
for disastrous purposes, most notably observed with the 
Nazi regime. Philosophers like Dewey and Ambedkar would 
instead place democratic ideals at the heart of educational 
aims, as public education has civic responsibilities towards 
nurturing the relationship between different groups for 
a healthy democracy. Such an inculcation of democratic 
spirit would encourage us to address the problem of ever-
increasing tension among communities, as they attempt to 
scurry for selfish interests and use any available prejudice to 
discriminate against other groups. 
Education here is not only understood as a domain for 
inculcating democratic values for ‘social continuity of life,’ 
but also as the space where the contestation and fissures 
among different groups play out in arguably their most severe 
forms. The Thorat Committee Report of 2007 underscored 
this problem of caste discrimination in the most prestigious 
medical institute of the country. The report highlighted the 
severity of the discrimination problem when they interacted 
with the SC/ST students of All India Institute of Medical 
Sciences (AIIMS). Clearing the entrance examination and 
getting into the Institute, which is considered the toughest 
part for most, is only the beginning of problems for SC/ST 
students. As they get harrowed throughout their time in 
the college, right from ragging to examination to cultural 
and social activities and job placements. This results in 
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many students undergoing trauma because of exclusion and 
humiliation, which can also make them drop out of college or 
take the extreme step of committing suicide. The problem of 
exclusion is not only restricted to students but continue even 
when they become teachers, professors or administrators 
(Kumar 2016).
This problem finally blew into national and international 
visibility with the suicide of a Dalit PhD Scholar, Rohith 
Vemula, at Hyderabad Central University (HCU) on 17th 
January 2016. Rohith was an active member of Ambedkar 
Students Association (ASA) at HCU and was vocal in 
highlighting the problems with Brahminical forces that 
have increasingly targeted marginalized communities with 
exclusion and violence, especially Dalits, Adivasis, women 
and religious minorities. A systematic and institutionally 
sanctioned discrimination finally led Rohith to commit 
suicide, but not before writing about his struggles in a poetic 
and philosophical tenor, which touched the hearts of people 
across the world and initiated a strong student’s movement 
against identity based discrimination in educational spaces.
In the language of protests against HCU administration’s 
role in Rohith’s exclusion, one can observe a distinct legal-
political approach, especially because of the critical nature of 
the problem and the immediacy required to address it. Khora 
(2016) articulates this position by arguing for a separate 
law required for educational spaces, which is particularly 
cognizant about indirect forms of discrimination. In 
addition to an anti-discrimination law which is a reactive 
measure, Khora argues that there should be proactive 
measures too such as Discrimination Audit (ibid). However, 
he doesn’t deliberate on what should be the role of education 
itself in engaging with discrimination, if any. Pathak (2009) 
also raises this concern when he states that “education is 
understood as too much of a ‘soft’ domain, and hence without 
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revolutionary changes in the ‘hard’ domain of political 
economy, an attempt to alter discrimination is useless, or at 
best a utopian/idealistic venture” (ibid.: 9-10). Pathak goes 
on to argue that education actually has a central role of play 
in the moral transformation required to address the most 
crucial ethical problems of our times.
However, what Rohith’s case has emphasized is that our 
Universities, which should ideally be the fountainheads for 
spreading democratic ideals in the society, are themselves 
plagued by the worst forms of exclusions that undermine 
democracy. Tagore claimed that Universities ought to be the 
centre of Indian culture which should sustain and keep the 
culture dynamic and alive in contrast to being preserved 
as a fossilized entity of the past. But in a society where the 
University themselves aren’t able to uphold fundamental 
democratic and humanitarian ideals, what are we to 
expect in the rest of the society? Therefore, the recent 
protests for justice at Universities has to be understood in 
this context, where democratic education needs to first and 
foremost address the exclusion within Universities and other 
educational spaces. However, at the same time, we can’t 
isolate the University from its social context and focussing 
on them alone is not sufficient. University can never remain 
in isolation from its socio-political surroundings as that 
creates another kind of fissure in society. Dewey (2008/1899) 
understood the importance of this continuity between The 
School and Society and, therefore, problematized any kind 
of isolation of school from its social milieu. For this reason, 
education has the dual responsibility of making both the 
University, as well as the society a democratic space. In the 
absence of either of this, both the society and the University 
would descend into group conflicts and cultural stagnation, 
which we are witnessing now in arguably the most acute 
form. 
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Thorat (2013, 2016) along with many other educational 
thinkers claim that education should be an instrument of 
bringing about change in the society if we emphasize on 
“unlearning undemocractic values”. According to Thorat, 
most of our efforts have gone in giving legal safeguards to 
people who are discriminated, like the Anti-untouchability 
Act of 1955, Prevention of Atrocities Act of 1989 and 2015, 
and Vishaka Guidelines Act of 1997 and 2013, which are 
essential but not enough. He claims “[l]aws help to prevent, 
but not cure” (2016). Therefore, he argues that we need to 
think of discrimination not only as a legal problem but 
also as a pedagogical issue to be addressed through civic 
learning and engagement. Thorat advocates for a third goal 
of informed and engaged citizenship as an educational aim 
apart from “imparting knowledge and career preparation” 
(2013). 
Causal Ontology of Discrimination
Although Thorat problematizes an extremely important 
lacuna in education but he doesn’t elaborate on how these 
undemocratic values can be avoided. He does highlight 
few attempts in the US to bring in “education for diversity,” 
which includes inter-group dialogue and desegregation 
that can help address one’s prejudices about members of 
other groups. He hints at the vast amount of educational 
literature on prejudice, which has been inspired primarily 
by psychological development theories in the second half 
of the twentieth century. In this conception, prejudice is 
understood as a problematic cognitive state that can arise 
due to negative stereotypes about other identity groups, 
resulting in discriminatory action. Such prejudices can 
either be conscious or unconscious, often followed with 
reasonable justifications which makes it hard to address 
them. Therefore, for educators the “ultimate, practical 
objective of understanding both prejudice and tolerance 
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is to reduce discrimination” (Witenberg 2000: 1). In the 
context of contemporary multicultural societies, she claims 
it is imperative to engage with problems of racial and colour 
discrimination in the attempt to become a more tolerant 
society, a sentiment which other psychologists like Banks 
(2002) and Camicia (2007) agree as a key dimension of 
multicultural education. Camicia argues that “[p]rejudical 
attitudes and beliefs undermine principles of social justice in 
a liberal democracy” (2007: 219). He further problematizes 
the presence of prejudices in the educational space where 
it can severely affect the student who perceives prejudice 
against her, both in explicit and implicit forms.
Different pedagogical strategies like increasing interaction 
and dialogue among groups, cooperation, and equal status 
have been proposed to reduce prejudices. Terming it as ‘The 
Contact Hypothesis’, Blum (2009) explains that under this 
strategy it is assumed that once people get into contact with 
the other, their pre-existing prejudices are challenged by 
observing the complex behaviour of the individual which 
can’t be reduced to a simplistic ideological box. Over a period 
of time by meeting different people from other groups, it is 
expected that the person will be able to challenge her pre-
conceived notions and come to accept the futility of her 
prejudices in understanding the other.
Although it seems like a plausible strategy to counter 
prejudice, Blum argues that its underlying assumption has 
been challenged by psychologists for a long time. They argue 
that holding prejudices about the other is a more complex 
phenomenon than mere ignorance. It is also observed that 
people even after having friends from the so-called ‘other’ 
group, continue to hold their prejudices while not linking 
it to their friends. Blum states that “there is not a tight fit 
between the individual and group level; persons can be 
prejudiced against group X while nevertheless thinking 
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well of and liking particular members of group X. And on 
the other side, persons can change their conscious view of 
group X, while nevertheless continuing to react to particular 
encountered members of group X in prejudicial ways” (2009: 
463).
Instead, Devine (1989) claims that it is a better strategy 
to bring about conscious interventions in an otherwise 
automatic prejudicial response. Thus, if we can impart 
egalitarian and non-prejudiced beliefs to the students 
as norms for action then the deeper prejudices may be 
overcome. In a sense, Devine argues that our interventions 
should focus on conscious response of the agent rather 
than her ignorance or knowledge about the other. By acting 
in respectful ways, it is hoped that the person herself can 
address the bad habits that she might have imbibed in 
the socialization process. Blum adds that all educational 
strategies to reduce prejudices have their own set of problems 
and the least we can do is “enforce rules that promote civil 
and respectful conduct toward out-groups” (2009: 468). 
Here it becomes important to interrogate this psychologi-
zation of discrimination that the dominant educational 
literature presents. Is prejudice, as a problematic cognitive 
state, the cause behind the outward discriminatory action? 
This causal ontological explanation points us to the larger 
theory where action is understood as being caused by either 
a conscious intention or an unconscious desire/belief of the 
subject. Hence, it becomes important to critically examine 
this claim that the two dominant theories of action present 
viz. rational choice theory and normativism. The common 
assumption that both models work with is the presence of 
a rational and autonomous self, separate from its socio-
historical intertwinement with the world, who chooses to 
make decisions based on certain cognitive states of desire or 
beliefs. In this picture, the self makes its decisions independent 
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of its socio-historical embodiment that it is situated in. In 
the rational choice model, the decision to act is made based 
on desire or belief-system of the agent, where rationality 
directs the agent to maximize the utilitarian benefit from the 
action. Thus, action itself has only an instrumental value for 
fulfilling the desires of the agent, which can be manipulated 
through positive and negative incentives. In this way, certain 
actions can get priority over others, as they are associated 
with more positive benefits than others. Similarly, one can 
prevent certain actions through deterrence by punitive 
measures, orchestrated by legal mechanisms. However, 
rational choice theorists like Lahno (2009) and Bicchieri 
(2006) find out in their experiments with game theory that 
rational choice is not the only motivation for action. Apart 
from selfish interests of seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, 
agents also choose to act for their commitment towards duty, 
which leads us to the model of normativism.
Normativism too works on a similar assumptions of atomic 
individualism and a causal ontology of action. However, it 
critiques the utilitarian conception of action as the choice 
based on desire or belief may not necessarily to the morally 
right decision. In the social theory of action, it is Parsons 
(1978) who identified these problems and argued for a 
different approach towards moral action. He developed on 
the Kantian model of categorical imperatives for a social 
theory of action, which allows one to overcome desire as 
the prime motivation for action through a higher cognitive 
faculty, which is that of the will. It is the autonomous will of 
the person that can supersede desire and commit to action 
based on public reason. Thus, the focus in Normativism 
is on rational deliberation of norms, which can guide the 
agent in doing the right action. Korsgaard (1996), drawing 
on Kant, argues that reason allows for a distance from 
one’s impulses and desires, which helps in evaluating the 
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decision more accurately. This detachment allows the person 
to escape her particularistic perspective and reason from a 
universal standpoint. Habermas (1996) and Brandom (1994), 
emphasize the intersubjective nature of norm deliberation, 
which allows for continual reinterpretation of norms based 
on the social context. Thus, Habermas acknowledges the 
socio-historical influence on public reason, and underscores 
the communicative and deliberative aspect for arriving at 
norms. Brandom elaborates on the ‘deontic scorekeeping’ 
among rational agents in the social space, which leads to 
the formulation of norms. In his ‘two-ply’ model, Brandom 
understands action as a doxastic commitment to norms, 
where the agent consciously intends to translate the norms 
into action. Hence, action retains its secondary status in 
comparison to deliberation and communication of norms. 
Feminist Critique
In contrast to this understanding of action as being 
caused only through certain cognitive states, feminist and 
Ambedkarite critiques challenge both the secondary status 
of action and the individualistic ontology of self. Feminists 
are primarily wary of the anti-particularistic stance in the 
conception of universal reason and identity, as they argue 
that it is the dominant white heterosexual male identity which 
masquerades as the universal one, while relegating women, 
people of colour and religious/sexual minorities to their 
particularity. In response to the atomistic individualism in 
the dominant models, feminist philosophers like Chodorow, 
Gilligan and Noddings argue for a relational ontology of the 
self, which challenges the distinct separation between self 
and the world (Willet and Anderson 2015/1999).  
At the outset, Noddings charts out the limitations in the 
dominant understanding of ethical action as primarily an 
activity of logos i.e. moral reasoning and establishment of 
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principles at the cost of ignoring eros and care (2013: 1). She 
claims that most of the violence in the world today is done 
in the name of principles, as we keep establishing, contesting 
and subverting those principles regularly. She claims that 
“highly educated people, well trained in the arts and skills 
of reasoning, have performed demonstrably immoral acts” 
(2002: 1) which highlights the fact that reason alone can’t 
be the motivation for moral action. She further states that 
principles are quite limited in being able to respond to the 
“practical domain of moral action,” as most often there are 
many more factors influencing the action of a person located 
in a complex real-life situation. These factors operate both at 
the level of reason as well as affect, and it is in the affective 
aspect of moral action where Noddings places importance 
of care.
Care, for Noddings emerges from an ontological centrality 
of relation between the self and the world, rather than 
beginning from the assumption of a rational autonomous 
self, independent of its context. She clarifies that the nature 
of the relationship in care theory is that of reciprocity, 
different from the contract theories of Plato and Rawls 
(2013: 4). The contract understanding of relation lead to 
a kind of universalizability of action, i.e. a demand to act 
in a way that can become a maxim for others in a similar 
situation, which she ‘emphatically’ rejects. She claims there 
is an impossibility of “similar situation” as every scenario 
and the people involved are coming from different lived 
experiences, and therefore the demand of universalizability 
is unreasonable. She further argues that the moral principle 
approach is “ambiguous and unstable” which erroneously 
portrays a stance of certainty because for every principle 
there are exceptions which are constantly rationalized using 
one argument or other. Moreover, “history suggests that the 
prescriptive use of principles has not been effective” (2002: 1). 
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Instead she argues for an ethics of care which is an extension 
of the natural care we experience in nurturing relationships. 
She explains – 
Why do we recognize an obligation to care? If we were 
Kantians, we would trace our obligation to reason, to 
a commitment that logic won’t allow us to escape. But 
in the ethic of care we accept our obligation because we 
value the relatedness of natural caring. Ethical caring 
is always aimed at establishing, restoring or enhancing 
the kind of relation in which we respond freely because 
we want to do so… It is feeling with and for the other 
that motivates us in natural caring. In ethical caring, 
this feeling is subdued, and so it must be augmented by a 
feeling for our own ethical selves (2002: 14)
The framework for moral education as developed in the 
works of Noddings, bell hooks and Hamington, emphasize 
on four components of modelling, dialogue, practice and 
confirmation. For Noddings, dialogue is at the centre of 
this model where she claims that “the carer must attend to 
or be engrossed in the cared-for, and the cared-for must 
receive the carer’s effort at caring. This reception, too, is a 
form of attention… Dialogue is central to moral education 
because it always implies the question, What are you 
going through?” (2002: 16-17). Thus, both the teacher and 
students take positions of carer and cared-for alternatively, 
and listen to the lived experiences of each other as well 
as of those unrepresented in the classroom through 
autobiographies and films. However, both Noddings 
and bell hooks acknowledge that for such a dialogue and 
listening to happen, we first need a backdrop of trust and 
respect where the participants feel safe to share their 
experiences. In a hostile space, dialogue can easily take up 
the shape of a “war model” where the classroom space is 
used only to debate and win arguments while destroying the 
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fabric of care, essential to nurture relationships in the class 
(Noddings 2002: 17).
Hamington (2012, 2016) elaborates on the practice 
component by exemplifying his classroom experience of 
experimenting with embodied pedagogy. Instead of teaching 
ethics as a set of rules, virtues or “games of normative 
adjudication,” he brought in experiential learning in 
addition to theoretical engagements with feminism and 
phenomenology. This allowed him to contest the dominant 
picture of 
treating ethics as if it were an abstract rubric to be learned 
and simply applied to real-world circumstances... Ethics 
is more than rules, and learning ethics is more than a 
cognitive exercise. Experiential learning is not merely an 
enhancement to pedagogical methods, but it essential 
for a robust understanding of morality. The process of 
learning ethics is comingled with the content of ethics. 
Another implication of this course is that it is difficult 
to divorce ontology from ethics. Learning from one 
self—one’s embodiment, one’s relationality, one’s habits 
of existence—leads to a new perspective on ethical 
behaviour best described as care. (2016: 59, emphasis 
added)
Hamington claims that knowing about ethics is different 
from being ethical, where the emphasis is equally on the 
pedagogical process as the curricular content. As embodied 
pedagogy is directly concerned about the being of the 
student, it necessarily involves the ontological dimension 
of their relational selves. Hamington concludes that an 
embodied performative pedagogy bring ethics, ontology and 
epistemology together and thus challenges the separation 
of the self from body, action and world prevalent in our 
classrooms (ibid.: 62).
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Ambedkarite critique
An ideal society should be mobile, should be full of 
channels for conveying a change taking place in one part 
to other parts. In an ideal society there should be many 
interests consciously communicated and shared. There 
should be varied and free points of contact with other 
modes of association. In other words there should be 
social endosmosis. This is fraternity, which is only another 
name for democracy. Democracy is not merely a form of 
Government. It is primarily a mode of associated living, 
of conjoint communicated experience. It is essentially an 
attitude of respect and reverence towards fellowmen.
- Dr. B. R. Ambedkar in 
‘Annihiliation of Caste’
Ambedkar’s conception of democracy and education was 
centrally influenced by Dewey as he placed high emphasis 
on democratic ideals of Equality, Liberty and Fraternity 
(Mukherjee 2009). Fraternity, in addition to equality, was one 
of the core principles for Ambedkar, for addressing concerns 
of  social transformation and education, which gradually 
took the shape of Maitri in his Buddhist re-interpretation of 
the concept (Kumar 2015: 328). Both Dewey and Ambedkar 
were highly critical of the “dead wood” of the past, which 
could hinder the manifestation of the democratic ideals 
of a sovereign state. Critiquing the dead past of inhuman 
caste practices like untouchability, Ambedkar points out its 
burden on the present and future of India.
Thus, the principles from the past (as enshrined in 
Manusmriti and other Brahminical doctrines) had to be 
discarded, especially those which were inimical to the 
democratic ideals and didn’t promote an “attitude of respect 
and reverence towards fellowmen” (Ambedkar 2014: 57). 
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Hence, Ambedkar’s major contention was regarding the 
problematic ideals that the Indian society was carrying from 
the past and the need to rework them for an egalitarian 
society. However, Ambedkar knew that it was not merely by 
replacing ideals that caste and gender discrimination could 
be addressed. He thought of principles as only the guiding 
light for our actions and not as strict rules to be followed for 
doing the “right” action. Instead, he placed central emphasis 
on the responsibility that we have towards our fellowmen, 
which should inform our actions in the light of democratic 
principles.
Delving deeper into the everyday life of a democratic society, 
Ambedkar problematizes exclusion and isolation of groups 
from each other, as the major hindrance that disrupts the 
harmony among communities. He argues that for us to 
develop a culture of “like-mindedness,” which is essential for 
a democratic society, we need to be in communication with 
each other, as well as participate in each other’s activities 
(ibid.: 248). The problem becomes worse when communities 
are living in geographic proximity but are largely isolated 
from each other, which results in exclusivist conception 
of group identity. Instead it is through social endosmosis 
that can make re-socialization possible, essential for a 
discrimination free society.
Social endosmosis is not just about de-segregation, although 
it is an important component of it. It is more about 
participation in each other’s life activities, which allows for 
shared identities to emerge. Thus, education is not just about 
‘knowing’ the other which can address prejudicial notions 
about them. But it is fundamentally about the actions and 
activities that are shared with the so-called ‘other.’ However, 
for Ambedkar, the biggest roadblock for allowing such an 
endosmosis was untouchability and exclusionary caste 
practices (ibid.: 250). Untouchability was not only extremely 
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dehumanizing for Dalits but also the most anti-social 
practice, hindering any form of dialogue between the upper 
caste and the outcaste communities. Obviously such an anti-
social practice emerges “wherever one group has ‘interest of 
its own’ which shut it out from full interaction with other 
groups, so that its prevailing purpose is protection of what 
it has got. This anti-social spirit, the spirit of protecting its 
own interests as much a marked feature of different castes 
in their isolation from one another as it is of nations in their 
isolation” (ibid.: 52). Thus, Ambedkar hints at the problems 
with the ‘social ego’ of groups which make them exclusive 
and self-serving, and blocks all possibility of dialogue and 
learning from each other.
Ambedkar recognized that such self-serving and anti-social 
group identities, are able to systematically subvert the state 
apparatus for their own benefits. Be it police, judiciary or 
bureaucracy, their complicity with the upper castes always 
end up in promoting further social tyranny on the depressed 
classes. As Dewey remarked, “merely legal guarantees of the 
civil liberties of free belief, free expression, free assembly 
are of little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, 
the give and take of ideas, facts, experience is choked by 
mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and hatred” (quoted 
in Mukherjee 2009: 360). Ambedkar also highlighted the 
difference between political and social democracy, where 
the Constitution could provide only political rights, which 
actually need to bring about social transformation. Thus, it is 
through teaching democracy that we can hope to encourage 
and facilitate endosmosis, which can aid not only in de-
segregation but also mutual respect and participation.
Ambedkar, who turned substantially to Buddhism later 
in his life, understood self as primarily in a relation of 
responsibility with the other. In his germinal work on The 
Buddha and His Dhamma (2013/1957), he was aware of the 
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two extreme conceptions of self, narcissism and nihilism, 
and thus took the mediating position of a selfless self, non-
attached to either extremes and responsible for nurturing 
maitri (fellowship) among groups for a democratic society 
(Kumar 2015, Vajpeyi 2012). Here maitri is conceptualized 
in the Buddhist sense of universal compassion, which is not 
only extended to one’s personal relationships but beyond it 
as well, similar to feminist’s conception of ethical caring. 
Social justice then doesn’t remain only a democratic ideal 
but enters into everyday life as the responsibility towards 
a relationship of maitri with the other. Thus, Ambedkar 
constantly strives to build a ‘working contact’ between the 
democratic values and the social life in India by grounding 
them in a responsible relationality among the social 
groups. 
In this relational ontology of action, Ambedkar argues that 
one must “exceed rules and norms” to be able to respond justly 
to the other (Kumar 2015: 304).  He further emphasises upon 
the primacy of virtuous action by charting out the distinction 
between two classical concepts, that of sila (acting right) and 
pradnya (thinking right). H privileges the former over latter 
although both are necessary but are individually insufficient 
(ibid.: 306). He argues that pradnya purely in itself can be 
dangerous and therefore needs to be grounded in sila, while 
sila is continually informed by pradnya. Thus for Ambedkar, 
maitri, sila and pradnya are equally important in facilitating 
social endosmosis in a divided society on caste and gender 
lines. 
Conclusion
Building on these critiques, one can begin to challenge the 
causal ontological picture of action which presents prejudice 
as the sole cause for discrimination. Instead if we look from 
a feminist and Ambedkarite perspective, discriminatory 
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action emerges from the breakdown of relationship between 
the social self and the world. This breakdown happens 
due to self-serving social egos that makes us perceive 
our relationship with other groups in instrumental terms, 
rather than in terms of care and responsibility. From 
this perspective, discrimination is addressed not only by 
overriding prejudices with egalitarian norms but also by 
addressing one’s own exclusive identity which disrupts the 
relationship with the world. This implies that a complete 
separation of the self, in the utilitarian and normative 
conception, actually leads us towards a kind of isolation 
from other groups that breeds exclusion. Instead of shared 
identity practices that facilitates associated living, the self 
interiorizes its identity based on individualistic desires 
and belief in doctrines.  
In the context of teaching democracy, we need to rethink 
the overemphasis on the knowing of democratic ideals and 
engage with the complexity of being democratic. Following 
care feminists and Ambedkar, it is the triad of caring 
relationships, ethical action and knowledge of democratic 
principles that needs to be worked on together. An unequal 
emphasis on one over the other can skew the educational 
process. By bringing emphasis on the ontological dimensions 
of education, the aim is also to challenge the assumptions 
of theory/practice dichotomy which deviates us from the 
democratic goals of education. This becomes especially 
relevant when we are engaging with discrimination as it 
involves an ontological reworking of the identity which is 
not imagined in exclusion of other groups based on caste, 
gender, race or religion. Practicing maitri forms the central 
pillar of pedagogy from where discriminatory action can 
be dismantled from its habituated embodiment for social 
endosmosis to occur. 
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